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Abstract 
This thesis examines relations between Libya and the United Kingdom after 1969 when 
a new government came to power in Tripoli which seemed to pose a direct threat to a 
number of key British interests. The thesis is grounded on a careful reading of 
secondary literature which has been integrated into newly available official documents 
available in the National Archive. The main claim to originality is in the light these 
documents throw on our understanding of that relationship. 
The thesis uses a case study approach which examines specific themes in UK-Libya 
relations which include arguments over arms sales, the oil economy and the role of oil 
companies, and relations over the Irish question and the problematic Libyan supply of 
weapons and support to the IRA in the 1970s. It inevitably touches on relations between 
both governments and the United States, but that is not a main focus of the study. These 
areas have been chosen for study because they represent the most significant areas of 
bargaining and conflict between Libya and the UK in the time period, according to both 
the secondary literature and press debate at the time and the newly available 
documentation. 
The author has been aware of the limitations of using the National Archives, especially 
where material has newly arrived for view. These include the scope of official 
‘weeding’ before documents are made available to conserve space and to avoid 
repetition, but also to exclude sensitive material relating to intelligence and cognate 
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aspects of relations with other governments. These limitations qualify, but do not 
undermine, the conclusions drawn. 
The main findings  of the research refine our existing understanding of Libya-UK 
relations,  important given that there is only a limited literature on the topic, and that 
no previous published work explores them using the National Archives. The archive 
material helps one to conclude that Straw’s (2010) argument that the basis of UK-Libya 
relations was always ‘strategic interest’ is partly sound but ultimately mistaken. Other 
important factors such as trade also mattered, and energy issues were at the same time 
‘strategic’ and ‘trade-related’ for both sides. At least as important, mutual 
misunderstandings and a certain amount of confusion about the intentions of the other 
party (and what they could find negotiable) also shape the relationship, although 
strategic interest remains an important factor.  
The thesis also reveals for the first time differences in the evaluation of Libyan policy 
and intentions at different levels of the UK government, demonstrating that the 
bureaucratic politics of the British system of foreign policy making shaped some of the 
British responses to Libyan actions. Equally, although the evidence suggests that 
Gaddafi dominated Libyan policy making, it is clear that the elite surrounding him also 
played some part in policy making and in defining responses to British actions and 
announcements. Above all, the thesis demonstrates the complexity of the dynamics of 
UK-Libya relations in the time period studied, and that both sides consistently tended 
to believe that they had more influence over the other than was in fact the case.  
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 Introduction 
British-Libyan relations go back at least to the mid-1940s, when British and French 
forces occupied the Italian colony of Libya during the Second World War until the 
United Nations General Assembly declared Libyan independence in 1951.1 The first 
contact was made with Idris al-Senussi, the head of the Senussi movement. Idris agreed 
to support the United Kingdom and brought the Cyrenaicans to fight alongside the 
Allies against the Axis powers. Idris had seen this as a chance for Libyan independence 
from Italy. 2  From 1943 to 1951, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were under British 
administration, while the French controlled Fezzan. The United States, United Nations 
and United Kingdom played a major role in securing Libyan independence.3 After this, 
Britain remained extensively engaged in its affairs until 1969. The establishment of a 
monarchy in Libya was faced with the weakness and poverty of this new state, as well 
as the growth of revolutionary pan-Arab nationalism during the period of the 1950s 
and 1960s. This brought an external threat to the newborn country. Thus, Libya was 
interested in getting support for its economy and protecting the monarchy from any 
threats.4 At the same time Britain had a great interest in the Mediterranean. Its main 
purpose was to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining a foothold in the region, 
                                                 
1 Gifford, P., Libya: the creation of a client state in: Louis, R., Ends of British Imperialism, I. B. Tauris 
(New York, 2006), pp. 503-527. 
2 Pritchard, E., the Sanusi of Cyrenaica, ACLS history e-book project, (United States, 2001), p. 227. 
3 Gifford, P., Libya: the creation of a client state in: Louis, R., Ends of British Imperialism. 
4 Blackwell, S., “Saving the king: Anglo-American strategy and British counter-subversion operations 
in Libya 1953-1959”, Vol. 39, No. 1, (2003), at: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/105950979-
73126659/content~db=all~content=a714040194, pp. 1-18. 
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especially after the fall of King Farouk of Egypt and the coming to power of the 
revolutionary regime in Egypt in 1952. Therefore, Libya was viewed as an important 
component in Britain’s strategy of maintaining pro-Western regimes in the region.5 For 
all these reasons the interests of the two countries were matched. In 1953 a bilateral 
Libyan and British alliance was signed providing for military bases in exchange for 
financial and military assistance from the United Kingdom.6 Since then, the British 
government had been involved in extensive economic, and strategic projects, as well 
as expanding oil output, especially after the discovery of oil in Libya in the mid-1950s. 
During the 18 years of the monarchy period, Libyan relations with America and the 
West, and particularly Britain, were good. However, the events of the Arab/Israel 
conflict in 1964, when Israeli proposed to divert waters from the River Jordan, and the 
King’s decision not to attend a meeting of Arab States in Cairo and to send the 
unpopular crown prince instead, resulted in demonstrations and violence in Tripoli and 
Benghazi against the monarchy and the foreign bases. These events were disturbed the 
previously good relations between Britain, the US and Libya. The Prime Minster Muhi-
Al-Din Al-Fikini was forced to resign, and the new Prime Minister, Mahmoud Al-
Muntasir, who acted on the Libyan Parliament’s orders, told Britain and the US that 
the government would not renew or extend the base agreement.7 ‘By August 1966 
Britain had evacuated its Libyan bases, although small British garrisons remained at 
several locations in Cyrenaica. Wheelus continued to operate, although withdrawal 
                                                 
5 Pargeter, A., Anglo-Libyan relations and the Suez crisis, Vol. 5, issue 2, The Journal of North African 
Studies, (2000), pp. 41-58. 
6 Ibid 
7 Pargeter, A,. Libya The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi, TJ International Ltd, (Great Britain 2012), pp 45-47 
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discussions were being held with the Americans’.8 In 1969 the monarchy regime was 
overthrown. Young, nationalist revolutionary rulers took power. From then onwards, 
relations between Britain, the US and Libya continued to worsen throughout the 1970s. 
Libyan foreign policy was described as anti-western policy after the 1969 revolution.9  
This study addresses the British-Libyan relationship and the reasons for the strained 
relations between the two countries in the 1970s, which is considered to be the period 
when relations were at their worst. This was because of three main reasons as the 
previous studies indicate. The first major tensions between the two countries were 
related to British oil assets in Libya. A negotiation took place between the new Libyan 
government and the oil companies, including Shell and British Petroleum (BP), to raise 
the Libyan oil price. However, these negotiations broke down, and Libya nationalised 
Shell and BP assets in Libya.10 The second major problem was the Libyan political and 
strategic shift. Libya was less interested in closer links with the West, particularly 
Britain, as a result of an ideological shift and deteriorating relations over specific issues 
that occurred in subsequent years which will be discussed in this thesis. This change 
resulted in Libya developing links with the Soviet Union.11 The third major tension 
                                                 
8 Ibid, pp 45-47 
9 St John, R. B., Qaddafi’s World Design: Libyan Foreign Policy 1969-1987, Saqi books (London , 
1987); Phillips, J. A., Moscow’s thriving Libyan connection, (1984), at: 
http://www.heritage.org/research/MiddleEast/bg362.cfm, pp. 1-12; Yehudit, R., Libya’s conflict with 
Britain: analysis of a diplomatic rupture, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2, (2006), pp. 271-283. 
10 Haight, W. G., Libyan Nationalization of British Petroleum Company Assets, International Lawyer, 
Vol. 6, No. 3, (1972), 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/intlyr6&div=65&i
d=&page=, pp. 541-547; Bamberg, J., British Petroleum and Global Oil 1950-1975, Cambridge 
University Press, (Cambridge , 2002). 
11 Ogunbadejo, O., ‘Gaddafi’s North African design’, International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1, MIT Press 
Journals, (1983), pp. 154-178; Freedman, R. O., Soviet policy toward the Middle East, Proceedings of 
the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 4, Academy of Political Science, (1987), pp. 176-197. 
4 
 
occurred because of Libya’s announcement of its support for the IRA.12 
This comprehensive study is important because very little has been written about 
British-Libyan relations during the 1970s. Through systematic interpretation of 
existing available documents, and by following the chronology of the changes that 
occurred during the 1970s, the study offers a new understanding to British-Libyan 
relations during the period mentioned. Additionally, it offers insight into the factors 
that were behind the worsening of British-Libyan relations in the 1970s, and corrects 
misunderstandings in previous studies about these.13 
The choice of the chapter structure, which is also the choice of the areas for the thesis 
to focus, was derived initially from a sense of the overall topic. This was reviewed 
when most of the secondary reading had been done. It was reviewed again when the 
author’s supervision team changed. It has then been re-assessed as the documentary 
evidence emerged. However the author is confident that the choice of main chapter 
topics has remained the most effective way to discuss the more detailed issues in UK-
Libya relations, identifying the sources of dispute and the problems for negotiation (or 
for negotiation breakdown) effectively. The chapter structure is not determined by the 
                                                 
12 Yehudit, R., Libya’s conflict with Britain: analysis of a diplomatic rupture; Simons, G. and Dalyell, 
T., Libya: The Struggle for Survival,  Macmillan Press Ltd, (London, 1993). 
13 Metz, H C., Libya, Kessinger publishing, (2004); Simons, Geoff and Dalyell, T, Libya: The Struggle 
for Survival; Simons, Geoff, Libya and the West from independence to Lockerbie, B-Line Business 
Centre, (Great Britain , 2003); Cecil, Charles O, the determinants of Libyan foreign policy, Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1, Middle East institute, (1965), pp 20-34; Collins, C, Imperialism and revolution 
in Libya, MERI Reports, No. 27,  Middle East research and information project, (1974), pp 3-22; 
Cooley, J K., the Libyan menace, No. 42, Washington post, Newsweek Interactive (1981), pp 74-93; 
Phillips, James A, Moscow’s thriving Libyan connection; Ronen, Y., Libya’s conflict with Britain 
analysis of a diplomatic rupture, Middle Eastern studies, Vol.42, no. 2, (2006). 
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evidence but by the author. But, even if other possible chapter structures might suggest 
themselves, the author is fully confident that this particular choice is justified by both 
the secondary and primary sources, and by the relative salience of the core issues 
between the two governments in this time period. 
Originality 
There are three main claims to originality. First, the study investigates the causes of 
British-Libyan tensions, which, as demonstrated in this study, did not happen 
immediately after the 1969 coup. They started two years later when Libya nationalised 
BP assets in Libya in December 1971. After that, tension began to rise. Previous studies 
have ignored the two years from September 1969 to December 1971, which formed the 
beginning of, and then the increase in, tension in relations between the two countries. 
The two years are important because they cover the period in which negotiations were 
held to shape new relations between the two countries after the 1969 change of regime. 
This has been clearly and significantly addressed in chapter two. 
The second point of originality of the thesis lies in a re-examination of the three areas 
of tension already mentioned in previous studies; it corrects misunderstandings in that 
body of literature. This is done through chapters three, four and five of the thesis. In 
other words, the current study provides a new way of analysing the three issues, and 
looking at them in terms of their effects. The originality comes from the re-examination 
of these issues in the light of the impact of the failure of negotiations, which has not 
been done before. 
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This study contradicts previous studies on the subject of BP asset nationalisation in 
Libya. It argues that the nationalisation of BP was a direct result of Libya’s 
dissatisfaction with the failure to resolve outstanding issues, and also of Libyan self-
interest. Previous studies indicate that the nationalisation of BP assets was a result of 
Libya’s view of Britain’s handing over of United Arab Emirate (UAE) islands to Iran. 
Thus, this thesis brings a new understanding to this matter, showing the impact of 
outstanding issues on the British-Libyan relationship and correcting the 
misunderstanding in the literature. 
Chapter four also provides a new analysis and understanding of the clamour and 
inconsistency that occurred throughout the 1970s about Libyan-Soviet relations. It also 
explains why Libya turned to the Soviet Union rather than to the West, notably Britain, 
to obtain arms. Three facts have been claimed in chapter four. Firstly, it clearly shows 
that Libya turning to the Soviet Union for arms was not the result of a systematic 
strategy, but a consequence of its failure to obtain arms from the West, and in particular 
Britain, especially after the failure of negotiations over Chieftain Tanks and an air 
defence system. Secondly, it proves that there was magnification of the Libyan-Soviet 
rapprochement in the 1970s by both the Egyptian and the Western media. Unpublished 
primary materials show that up to 1976 the Libyan-Soviet relationship concentrated 
only on the purchase of weapons from the Soviet Union, and there was no major 
political or strategic rapprochement, because of political and ideological differences 
between the two parties. It was also because Gaddafi’s independence from both 
Western and Eastern influences led to a limitation of any Soviet influence over the 
Libyan regime, as mentioned in the British documents. In addition, the documents 
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show that the British government was not greatly concerned that any political 
rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Libya might lead to strategic cooperation 
that would harm Western interests in general and Britain in particular, and that there 
was a magnification by Egypt of the Libyan-Soviet relationship to get as much military 
assistance as it could from America. These findings refute the statement in several 
previous studies that there was a high level of Libyan-Soviet cooperation, which led to 
strained relations between Britain and Libya. Thus, the Libyan-Soviet rapprochement 
in the 1970s was an adjunct factor rather than as the main reason Anglo-Libyan 
tensions. Thirdly, Libya’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union after 1976 was a direct 
result of Gaddafi’s fears about Egypt and the US presence there, and was not mainly 
directed against British or other Western interests in the region. Thus, it is believed that 
this brings further originality to the current study. It is also strongly believed that the 
originality in chapter four centres on an examination of the impact of both the Libyan-
Soviet relationship and Libyan foreign policy on British-Libyan relations, which have 
not been examined in depth before. 
Chapter five explores Libyan support for the IRA in a new way, highlighting the impact 
of outstanding issues on this matter. Despite the limitations of documents available in 
this regard, it is believed that the work done on this chapter addresses a new 
understanding of the British-Libyan dispute over the IRA issue. 
The third and final point about the originality of this thesis is the wide range of 
previously un-consulted documents used which bring new knowledge and 
understanding: the thesis covers the time period for which new British documentation 
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has become available. In addition, these newly available documents suggest the way 
Libyan foreign policy shaped British-Libyan relations (discussed in chapter one).  
Analysis  
British-Libyan relations in the 1970s are divided into two phases: the first phase is 
when both London and Tripoli tried to find a new basis for the relationship between 
the two countries after the collapse of the monarchy; the second phase is a product of 
the failure of the first phase, which escalated the differences and led to an absence of 
full normalisation of relations between the two countries.  
This study focuses around two core areas of analysis. The first area is the nature and 
development of Anglo-Libyan negotiations from 1970 to 1971 to establish the 
foundations of a new British-Libyan relationship after 1 September 1969. The study 
will explore how the relationship was affected by the British review of arms contracts 
signed with the former monarchy. Concurrently, it will consider the growth of tension 
between the two countries over the suspension then cancellation of the British 
contracts. It will also consider why Britain suspended the arms contracts, the Libyans’ 
view of this, and how it affected relations between the two countries as a whole. Finally, 
the analysis will include the failure of the two parties to resolve a dispute over the 
problem of outstanding issues.  
The second part of the analysis will include how the failure of the two countries to 
establish a new framework for their relationship and resolve their outstanding issues 
affected British-Libyan relations in various aspects. It will analyse how the British use 
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of arms contracts with the Libyans failed to secure Britain’s interests in Libya, and how 
this led to Libyan hostility towards British interests and policy in Libya and the region 
as a whole. The analysis will also continue to examine the impact of the outstanding 
negotiations collapse in subsequent years (1972-1979) in the particular fields named 
above.  
Despite Britain’s offer of a package deal (March 1971)  to resolve outstanding issues 
that strongly took into account the securing of its interests in Libya, and prevention of 
penetration of the Soviets in to Libya, the offer was considered too low to satisfy the 
Libyans. The unresolved outstanding issues during 1970 and 1971 led to the first hostile 
Libyan action against British interests in Libya. Shell was nationalised in mid-1970 
and BP in December 1971. The British government responded by suspending all 
negotiations over the outstanding issues and withdrew its package offer. During the 
period from 1972 to late 1974 Libya tried to convince the British to resume negotiations 
to resolve the outstanding issues, but the British refused until a solution was reached 
between Libya and BP.  
In June 1972, Gaddafi declared that he would support the IRA because he considered 
them a national liberation movement. This act came when British-Libyan relations 
were at their worst, and caused serious harm to relations between the two countries. As 
there are no materials, apart from Gaddafi’s speech in June 1972, that proved he was 
supporting the IRA, it is more likely that he did this to put pressure on the British to 
bring them back to the negotiation table to settle the outstanding issues. However, 
Gaddafi did not succeed in this; on the contrary, the British succeeded in turning the 
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tables on him, and used the IRA issue to delay resuming negotiations and settling the 
outstanding questions.  
Concurrently, the failure of Libya to obtain weapons from the West, namely Britain 
and the US, led Libya to turn to the Soviet Union. Throughout the period from 1972 to 
1976, Libyan-Soviet relations were totally established on mutual self-interest. Libya 
wanted arms and the Soviet Union wanted hard currency. Despite ideological affinity 
never playing any role in Libyan-Soviet relations, this began to change after Gaddafi’s 
visit to Moscow in December 1976. The Libyan Congress called for a close and 
strategic cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Libyan shift did not come as a result 
of the Libyan desire to develop a closer link with the Soviet Union; it came as a 
consequence of the Libyan fear of the growing US presence in Egypt, which Gaddafi 
considered a serious threat to him.  
Methodology 
The thesis is a historical study structured in chronological order. The work mainly 
concentrates on archival work, i.e. collecting data from different archives where the 
documentation is kept. Data is only selected from those documents that are original 
and, as far as possible, reliable. An important part of my contribution is to verify or 
dismiss earlier historical accounts by reviewing newly discovered sources that have 
been recently released, comparing primary with existing secondary sources. Thus this 
PhD thesis will be archive-based, relying heavily on the British documents of 
governmental agencies that throw light on policy-making in both countries. 
Understanding will come through the systematic interpretation of existing available 
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documents and by following the chronology of changes that happened throughout the 
1970s. Data collection for this study was centred on the National Archives in Kew, 
which holds governmental and civil service records, and the British Newspaper 
Archive at the British Library in Colindale. Data also includes international newspaper 
comments that are available online.  
Other primary sources such as the records of former Foreign Secretaries (held at the 
Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge) and other published sources (diaries, 
biographies and autobiographies) were checked. However, no data was collected from 
the Churchill Archives Centre, as none was found that related to the thesis topic and 
time period. Company records – for example those of BP – were collected from the 
Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick. Interviews conducted with Libyan 
and British politicians on the BBC News Channel were also checked at the BBC 
National Archives in Reading; but no data was collected from there, as none was found 
that related to my thesis. An academic trip to Libya for one month as part of my data 
collection was made. However, it was not possible to access Libyan government 
documents. Thus, this shortfall was compensated by accessing material more readily 
available in the United Kingdom. In addition, only recently have Libyan archives from 
the period in question become available in Tripoli, although these are poorly organized, 
and it is still not possible to access them, therefore it is not entirely possible to have a 
full picture of the relationship from both sides. This is a limitation of this thesis, but, 
once acknowledged, it does not undermine it.  
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Secondary material, in the form of books and newspaper articles on British-Libyan 
relations throughout the 1970s, has been exploited. These publications have helped to 
evaluate the research, particularly on Libyan policy towards Britain and the British 
attitude towards Libyan hostility at the time. 
Historiography  
The historiography of Anglo-Libyan relations in the 1970s is limited. However quite a 
number of studies have looked into British-Libyan relations during the 1940s, 1950s 
and even 1960s. During the periods of the Second World War and the beginning of the 
Cold War the British government had an increasing interest in North Africa.14 The 
Mediterranean area was economically and politically important to Britain. After the 
opening of the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean became of much greater importance to 
Britain as part of the shortest sea route to India. Therefore, Britain established itself in 
Egypt, Sudan and Aden. However, Britain could not go any further in North Africa, as 
France had established itself in Tunisia and Algeria, and Italy in Libya. This situation 
changed throughout the period of the Second World War and afterwards.15 As one of 
the consequences of the Second World War in North Africa, after the defeat of Italy 
Libya came under British administration until the United Nations General Assembly 
declared Libyan independence in 1951.16 Libya and other nations of North Africa were 
of great strategic importance to Europe, for they offered a potential land route which 
would allow Soviet ground forces to out-flank Western defences in Western Europe in 
                                                 
14  “Blackwell, S., “Saving the King: Anglo-American Strategy and British Counter-Subversion 
Operations in Libya 1953-1959”. 
15 Gordon, E., The Mediterranean Problem, Vol. 28, No. 1, American Geographical Society, (1938), pp. 
83-101. 
16 Collins, C., Imperialism and Revolution in Libya 
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the event of a war, and they offered the possibility of a counter –or a partial counter- 
to the great naval power of NATO forces in the region. Thus, America, Britain and 
France were anxious to have a military presence in Libya, or at least to obtain rights to 
use Libyan airfields. After that, British interest greatly increased in the Mediterranean 
in general and in Libya in particular.17  Libya became more important to Britain, 
especially after the fall of King Farouk of Egypt and the coming to power of the 
revolutionary regime in Egypt in 1952. Libya was viewed as an important component 
in Britain’s strategy of maintaining pro-Western regimes in the Middle East that would 
counter Arab nationalism and provide forces for use against Arab states where 
necessary. In addition, most British troops were redeployed to the Al-Adam base in 
Libya after the evacuation of the British base in Egypt.18 For all these reasons Libya 
became the location of an intense conflict for influence between the Soviet Union, the 
Western powers and President Nasser of Egypt. At the same time, and after its 
independence, the monarchy in Libya faced the growth of revolutionary pan-Arab 
nationalism during the 1950s and 1960s. In addition, Libya was one of the world’s 
poorest countries. It was interested in getting support for its economy and protecting 
the monarchy from any threats. All of these challenges could be attributed to the fact 
that the Libyan regime relied on the protection of America and Britain.19 During the 18 
years of the monarchy the relationship between Britain and Libya was good. However, 
this good relation altered radically after the 1969 Libyan revolution.20 
                                                 
17 Cecil, C. O., the determinants of Libyan foreign policy, Middle East Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1, (1965), 
pp. 20-34. 
18 Pargeter, A., Anglo-Libyan Relations and the Suez Crisis 
19  Blackwell, S., “Saving the King: Anglo-American Strategy and British Counter-Subversion 
Operations in Libya 1953-1959”. 
20 ‘King Idris deposed by military junta in Libya coup’, The Times, 2 September (1969). 
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Little detailed work has been undertaken on the aggravation of relations between Libya 
and Britain and its causes. The primary purpose of this thesis is to redress this omission. 
Previous studies have mainly focused on how Anglo-Libyan relations formed and 
evolved through the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. In addition, the British and American 
roles in the support and creation of the Libyan Kingdom have been the subject of 
study21 and the issue of British and American support in the General Assembly of the 
United Nations for the independence of Libya: ‘The treaty marked the culmination of 
a sustained British effort since 1945 to guarantee its strategic rights in the new 
Kingdom.’22 In addition, other studies have shown that Britain had significant interests 
in Libya in the field of oil exploration, even before independence. Britain began its 
exploration for oil in Libya in the mid-1940s. By the end of the 1940s the British 
military administration in Cyrenaica knew about the discovery that British oil 
companies had made in the western part of Libya. By the late 1950s Libya had become 
a very important oil producer in Africa23 so that by ‘1969 Libya had become the fourth 
petroleum exporter in the world.’24 Libyan oil production was reduced during the 
beginning of the 1970s. So by 1977 Libya became the seventh largest oil producer in 
                                                 
21 Gifford, P., Libya: the creation of a client state in: Louis, R., Ends of British Imperialism; Pelt, A., 
Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization, Carnegie endowment 
for international peace, (United States, 1970); Brett, M., Libyan independence and the United Nation: A 
case of planned decolonization, Journal of African History, Vol. 13, No. 1, Cambridge University Press, 
(1974), pp. 168-170; Louis, W. R., American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British 
Empire, International Affairs, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 3, (1985), pp. 395-
420.; Collins, C., Imperialism and Revolution in Libya. 
22  Blackwell, S., “Saving the King: Anglo-American Strategy and British Counter-Subversion 
Operations in Libya 1953-1959”. 
23 Bamberg, J., British Petroleum and Global Oil 1950-1975, p114  
24 Robert, B., Mehren, V. and Kourides, N., ‘International arbitrations between states and foreign private 
parties: The Libyan nationalization cases’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 75, No. 3, 
(1981), pp. 476-552. 
15 
 
the world.25 ‘Almost all of which was exported declined […], as a result of both the 
OPEC and Libyan policy of cutting production to influence price’.26 This explained the 
decline of Libya from fourth to seventh in the table of international production.  
In addition, the geographical proximity of Libya to Europe gave it great importance in 
world oil markets and also gave Libya advantages over other Middle Eastern oil-
producing nations, making it an attractive oil producer for Europe.27 
In September 1969, a new Libyan government was founded by a group of young 
military officers organised under the leadership of Muammar al-Gaddafi. The new 
government introduced a very different policy, particularly in terms of its relationship 
with the West. A small number of studies have tried to follow the stages and causes of 
change in relations between Libya and Britain in order to explore the complex reasons 
behind this change.28 Libyan foreign policy after the 1969 revolution was seen as 
constituting a radical change of attitude towards Britain. Gaddafi declared that the 
Libyan system would be founded upon socialist principles and he refused any kind of 
Western influence in the region, particularly that of Britain and America.  Gaddafi’s 
Arab and Islamic beliefs also informed his relations with the West.  
                                                 
25 USA International Business Publications, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Int’l 
Business Publications, (United States, 2007), p143 
26 Ibid, P145. 
27 Cecil, Charles O., the determinants of Libyan foreign policy. 
28 Cooley, J K., Libyan sandstor, , Holt, Rinehart and Winston, (New York 1982); Metz, H C., Libya, 
Kessinger Publishing, (US, 2004), Ronen, Y., Gaddafi’s Libya in World politics, Lynne Rienner 
publisher, (United States, 2008); Simons, G and Dalyell, T., Libya: The Struggle for Survival,  
Macmillan Press LTD, (London 1993); Simons, G., Libya and the West from independence to Lockerbie, 
B-Line Business Centre, (Great Britain, 2003); St John, R B., Gaddafi’s world design Libyan foreign 
policy, 1969-1987, Saqi Books, (London, 1987); Wright, J., Libya: a modern history, Croom Helm, Ltd, 
(Kent 1981). 
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The Libyan blend of religion and revolution [...] Islam is at the foundation of Gaddafi’s 
worldview, mixed in with a heady concoction of secular anti-imperialism. This novel ideology 
is based on Gaddafi’s vision of himself and country as an original, new, revolutionary order 
and, according to an official Libyan government publication, as an organic part of the 
movement of the Third World, struggling for emancipation, progress, and freedom form 
imperialist domination.29 
Gaddafi pressured Britain and America to withdraw its troops from Libya 
immediately.30 After the evacuation of British and American bases from Libya, the 
radical change continued in Libyan foreign policy. Gaddafi supported ‘an eclectic mix 
of liberation movements from the African National Congress to the Irish Republican 
Army to Muslim separatist movements in the Philippines’; these acts put him into 
prolonged conflict with international actors, and in particular Britain and the US. 
However, Gaddafi unsuccessfully attempted to differentiate between revolutionary 
violence, which he supported, and terrorism, which he claimed to oppose.31  
Other studies have reported similar trends: the closure of British bases in 1970 followed 
by nationalisation of British interests in Libya, especially the oil companies, caused 
significant damage to the relationship between the two countries. 32  After the 
evacuation of the British base in Libya in 1970, Libya called for the evacuation of all 
NATO bases in the Mediterranean region, especially the British military base in Malta. 
According to the Libyan government, ‘Libya called for conversion of the 
Mediterranean sea into a neutral (sea of peace).’ These actions were considered by 
                                                 
29 Cordes,  B., Gaddafi's Idealist and Revolutionary Philanthropist, (1986) at: 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2005/P7209.pdf 
30 St John, R. B., Qaddafi’s World Design: Libyan Foreign Policy 1969-1987, p.18. 
31 St John, R. B., New era in American-Libyan relations, Vol. IX, No. 3, Middle East Policy Council, 
(2002), pp. 85-93.  
32 St John, R. B., redefining the Libyan revolution: the changing ideology of Muammar al-Qaddafi, 
Vol. 13, The Journal of North African Studies, (2008), pp. 91-106. 
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Britain and America to be a significant threat to their interests.33  The first major 
tensions between the two states over oil exploitation were to grow almost immediately 
after the revolution. Most of the oil sector in Libya was dominated by British oil 
companies. Libya entered into negotiations with all foreign oil companies between 
1970 and 1971. Its revised policy was to nationalise the oil and gain domestic control 
of this vital sector.34 The first move against foreign oil companies in Libya came in 
January 1970, when the new Libyan government claimed that the old price of oil was 
no longer commensurate with the global market for oil and insisted on raising the oil 
price. According to the Libyan government, the posted price of Libyan oil had not 
changed from 1961 until 1970, remaining at $2.23 per barrel. ‘Therefore the companies 
had to grant an immediate price rise of 30 cents a barrel, a further hike of 10 cents over 
a five-year period, and an increase in the tax rate.’35 From this time onwards there was 
conflict between the Libyan government and the foreign oil companies. In March 1971 
an agreement was finally signed in Tripoli between the Libyan government and the 
foreign oil companies. $3.32 was the posted price for a barrel for five years until 1975. 
Tax rates were increased from 50 to 55% and oil prices rose by 90%.36The Tripoli 
Agreement did not last long. Tension rose again between the Libyan government and 
the oil companies over the posted price before the end of 1971. The Libyan government 
declared that the depreciation of the United States dollar in relation to other currencies 
                                                 
33 Metz, H. C., Libya, pp. 230-231. 
 
34 Bamberg, J., British Petroleum and Global Oil 1950-1975, p. 450. 
35 Cooley, J. K., Libyan Sandstorm, pp. 230-231. 
36 Wright, J., Libya: A Modern History, pp. 242-243. 
18 
 
was no longer suited to the oil prices that had been agreed in the Tripoli Agreement.37 
The Libyans insisted on raising the posted price by 80 cents per barrel this time and the 
Libyan government’s share of the additional take was to be another 54 to 63 cents. 
‘This led Lord Strathalmond, the chairman of BP, to say that the Western oil industry 
was becoming a (tax collecting agency) for the producer government.’38 Foreign oil 
companies refused to sign any agreement with Tripoli that would include any rise in 
the posted price.39 By November 1971 the issue of the UAE islands had begun in the 
Arabian Gulf. After Britain had withdrawn its troops Iran took over the islands. On 7 
December 1971 the Libyan government nationalised BP. The Libyans declared this 
action was a response to Britain’s failure to prevent Iran from occupying the Arab 
islands, as a number of previous studies indicated. However, this study does not support 
this argument (see also later discussion here).40 This action drove the situation between 
Britain and Libya from bad to worse. BP was nationalised and replaced by a new 
Libyan company named the Arabian Gulf Petroleum Company.41 
The strained relations between the two countries could also be attributed to political 
and strategic reasons which came from a change in Libyan foreign policy through the 
adoption of certain policies unacceptable to the West, particularly Britain and America, 
such as closer links to the Soviet Union and the increasing role of the Soviet Union in 
                                                 
37 Penrose, E., the development of crisis, Vol. 104, No. 4, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
(1975), pp. 39-57. 
38 Cooley, J. K., Libyan Sandstorm, pp. 68-69. 
39 Bamberg, J., British Petroleum and Global Oil 1950-1975, p. 464. 
40 Cooley, J. K., Libyan Sandstorm, pp. 70-71. 
41 Haight, W. G., Libyan Nationalization of British Petroleum Company Assets, International Lawyer  
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the region through Libya.42 Soviet greed in the region of North Africa clearly emerged 
in the July 1945 Potsdam Conference when the Soviets made an unsuccessful bid for 
trusteeship over the Libyan province of Tripolitania, the former Italian colony. 43 
However, Gaddafi’s interests were matched with Soviet interests in terms of limiting 
Western influence.44 After they were obliged to withdraw personnel from Egypt in 
1972, the Soviet interest in Libya heightened significantly. At the same time, Libya 
was facing difficulties in getting weapons from the West. Thus, the Libyan-Soviet 
rapprochement was a natural result of these circumstances. ‘The Soviet-Libyan 
relationship has been based primarily on mutual self-interest. Libya needed a source of 
arms… For the Soviet Union, Libya was an important source of hard currency.’45 
Based on this, ‘Moscow has fed Libya massive quantities of sophisticated arms, 
military training, technical assistance, and help in repressing its increasingly rebellious 
people. In return, Gaddafi had extended to Moscow access to Libya’s military 
infrastructure, oil for energy-hungry Soviet satellites, hard currency, and a staging base 
for the training of anti-Western terrorists.’46 Since then, Libya has been known to the 
West as a country that works with the Soviet Union against American and British 
interests in the Middle East and Africa. 
Other studies argue that Libyan support of the IRA was one of the main factors in the 
breakdown of British-Libyan relations. In June 1972 Gaddafi declared his support for 
                                                 
42 Ogunbadejo, O., Gaddafi’s North African design; Freedman, R. O., Soviet Policy Toward the Middle 
East; Cooley, J. K., The Libyan Menace; Collins, C., Imperialism and Revolution in Libya. 
43 Phillips, J. A., Moscow’s Thriving Libyan Connection, 1984 
44 St John, R. B., Redefining the Libyan Revolution: the Changing Ideology of Muammar al-Qaddafi. 
45 Metz, H. C., Libya, p. 244. 
46 Phillips, J. A., Moscow’s Thriving Libyan Connection. 
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the IRA, acting as its main financial and military supplier. This was seen from the 
British side as a terrorist action against Britain and drove the relationship to a high level 
of tension. However, this does not explain why Libya supported the IRA.47 A study by 
McKittrick and McVea (2001) also reported Gaddafi’s support to the IRA. This study, 
however, failed to prove this support. The study also showed an obvious limitation of 
information regarding these matters, and attributed that to the lack of MI5  and MI6 
intelligence information. 48  Gaddafi said he was supporting what he called the 
Liberation Movement of the Irish Republican Army against British colonialism. This 
was seen by the British government as interference in its internal affairs and support of 
a terrorist organisation on British territory. Gaddafi later denied giving any financial or 
military support to the IRA and said only moral and political support had been given. 
‘A senior officer in Scotland Yard’s anti-terrorist squad has commented that Libyan 
support for the IRA has been very minor indeed. It can be counted in the thousands of 
pounds, but certainly not in hundreds of thousands and any talk of millions of dollars 
is ludicrous.’49 However, there were many signs that Gaddafi had given financial and 
military training to IRA recruits in Tripoli. A report by The Times showed that the IRA 
had received one million pounds in aid and military training; Libya denied this. ‘Lord 
Balniel, Minister of State, said there were indications the IRA may have received 
military aid and training but the government had no evidence that it was on that scale.’50 
                                                 
47 Ronen, Y., Libya’s conflict with Britain: analysis of a diplomatic rupture; Simons, G. and Dalyell, T., 
Libya: The Struggle for Survival; Loyalists and IRA hold talks in Libya, The Times, 15 November 
(1974). 
48 McKittrick, D and McVea, D., Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland 
Conflict, (England,  2001), p. 198 
49 Simons, G. and Dalyell, T., Libya: The Struggle for Survival, pp. 284-285. 
50 Loyalists and IRA hold talks in Libya, The Times.  
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Looking ahead: the overall thesis narrative 
In each chapter, the thesis explores the details in the documentation before drawing the 
main threads together in the concluding chapter. But although the following chapters 
are dominated by detail, it may also be useful for the reader to have a sense of the 
overarching narrative before it is spelled out, to see the wood from the trees. Therefore, 
looking ahead to the conclusions once the research was completed, and to signal the 
main core narrative which emerges from it, the main themes of the thesis which unify 
it beyond the detail, can be summarised in the following argument. First of all, 
differences of both interests and perceptions emerge in every chapter. Secondly, the 
differences within the UK government, and differences at different levels within it, 
(such as the FCO, Department of Trade and Industry, junior ministers, various foreign 
secretaries, and full cabinet) reflect bureaucratic politics, variations in experience, and 
varied overall perspectives on Libya, as well as divisions aver the best definition of 
interests and the best means to achieve them. Thirdly, there were long running disputes 
between Tripoli and London over both arms sales and arms supplies to Ireland which, 
although they were not only about misperceptions and mismanagement, clearly did on 
the evidence result in part from those factors, as well as from hard interests. 
Furthermore, if there were differences and divisions on the British side, perhaps less 
surprisingly given the large and complex machinery of foreign policy making there, it 
is also evident that there were disagreements and changes of mind within the Libyan 
policy making machinery, notwithstanding the dominant role that President Gaddafi 
occupied. Gaddafi was not consistent in his own views, and did not communicate (or 
did not allow his subordinates to communicate) clearly to the other side what he 
considered core interests and negotiable issues. Thus both sides contributed by their 
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words and actions, and through the structure of policy processes, to the misperceptions 
and mis-readings of the other. More succinctly, Anglo-Libyan relations reflect long 
term conflicts of real interest including those derived from historical experience and 
perceptions, but all the same the dynamics of their relationship cannot be explained 
solely in terms of that legacy or those interests. The role of individuals and bureaucratic 
structures and bureaucratic disagreements on both sides was a significant factor. Both 
sides misunderstood and misread the other quite often, and both sides over-estimated 
their ability to shape the situation or change the thinking of the other.  
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Summary Structure of Thesis 
Chapter one 
This chapter explores the impact of the new Libyan foreign policy from 1969 to 1979 
on British-Libyan relations. To do this, it considers three main areas of interest for both 
countries: the Arab-Israeli conflict; the Mediterranean Basin and Africa; how British-
Libyan political interests no longer matched each other and the consequences for 
British-Libyan relations. 
Chapter two 
This chapter examines the British-Libyan disputes that followed 1969 and their impact 
on British-Libyan relations. These disputes were largely due to outstanding differences 
between the two countries as claimed by Libya after 1969. These outstanding matters 
were based on arms deals that were to be delivered to Libya in December 1969, but 
were suspended after the change of its regime. In addition, there was a financial dispute 
relating to the former government. The Gaddafi regime indicated that the British 
government owed money to the Libyan government for the rent of a British military 
base in Libya for the period from 1965 to 1970. This chapter also examines the attempts 
of the two governments to resolve such disputes and establish a new policy that was 
supposed to replace the previous relations between the British and the monarchy 
regime. The chapter also argues the failure of Britain and Libya to resolve outstanding 
problems. It attempts to trace the stages of the growing tension between the two 
governments: how it started, what the most important points of difference were and 
how relations deteriorated. 
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Chapter Three 
In this chapter the conclusions in chapter two are developed by defining the later impact 
of unresolved outstanding problems in British-Libyan relations, namely in relation to 
the oil fields. The chapter also investigates the Libyan oil policy changes after 1969, 
why these changes occurred and the impact they had on British-Libyan relations. 
Chapter Four 
This chapter examines the Libyan-Soviet relationship and its impact on British-Libyan 
relations during the 1970s. The aim of the chapter is to consider the motives beyond 
the Libyan government’s gravitation towards the Soviet Union, whether it had reached 
the stage of a threat to Western interests, namely British interests in the region, how 
the British government considered the Libyan-Soviet rapprochement in the 1970s and 
whether this put a considerable strain on British-Libyan relations. Moreover, the 
chapter attempts to investigate whether the Libyan turn towards the Soviets was a 
natural choice of the new Libyan leadership or whether certain circumstances 
compelled Libya to adopt this trend.  
Chapter Five 
This chapter investigates the Libyan-IRA relationship and its impact on British-Libyan 
relations (1972-1979). It considers two main issues: the British response to Gaddafi’s 
support for the IRA and Gaddafi’s reasons for supporting the IRA. 
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Chapter Six 
The final chapter provides the general conclusions.  
Table: Primary Records and Archives Consulted in This Thesis  
Summary of Primary Records and Archives Referred to 
Abbreviations, archive and places 
(TNA = The National Archives, Kew, London. Please see also table of abbreviations 
at the start of the thesis) 
  
Cabinet Papers and conclusions. TNA, CAB, for example: CAB 128/26, 
CAB 128/49, CAB 148/110, CAB 
148/116 and CAB 148/122 
Ministry of Defence Archives TNA, DEFE, for example: DEFE 
11/632, DEFE 7/2276, DEFE 24/313 
and DEFE 7/1013 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
Archives, country files. 
TNA, FO, for example: FO 371/119730, 
FO 371/126025, FO 371/131785, FO 
371/138723, FO 371/178880, FO 
371/184228 and FO 371/190493 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
Archives, 
TNA, FCO, for example: FCO 39 /634, 
FCO 39 /635, FCO 39/1067, FCO 
39/1083, FCO 39/1087, FCO 39/1088, 
FCO 39/1111, FCO 39/638, FCO 39-
1067 and FCO 67/432 
Department of Trade and Industry 
records 
TNA, DTI for example 
Prime Minister’s Office: records of 
correspondence, conclusions and 
minutes. 
TNA, PREM, for example: PREM 
13/2758, PREM 15/1066, PREM 
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15/1837, PREM 15/593 and PREM, 
13/3279 
Records of HM Treasury TNA, T, for example: T317/1576 
Records of the Northern Ireland Office TNA, CJ, for example: CJ 4/2395 
British Petroleum company files released 
through the company archive in the 
University of Warwick. 
BPA, for example: Arc Ref 10991 and 
Arc Ref 121728 
There are also a number of archives 
which have been checked for relevant 
material but which either do not have 
usable documents or which are not 
actually open and available for the time 
period this archive covers e.g. Various 
diaries and letters available in Churchill 
College library in Cambridge. 
 
This table shows a sample of the classes of most commonly documents used in this 
thesis. Although FC and FCO contain a very large number of repeated papers, they are 
quite useful papers, supplying very good information, which enables the author to 
successfully fill gaps in the literature. DEFE papers are also very useful, providing the 
thesis with excellent information especially regarding arms deals. CAB and PREM 
files both show limited information regarding Libya and IRA relationship, reflecting 
the limited number of times when Libyan issues were raised at the highest level. But 
in some aspects, such as decisions of particular arms transactions, they provide specific 
data. BPA, Arc Ref is British Petroleum Company archives, which also includes useful 
records of BP and some other oil companies in conflict with Libya during oil price talks 
early in the 1970s and the subsequent nationalisation of BP assets in Libya.  
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The author reviewed a very large number of files from different departments and 
papers, and decided to focus on some files and ignore the others where they just share  
or repeat the same material. Also, some do not include data related to the topic of this 
thesis. These files are as follows: FCO Records of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, FO Records of the Foreign Office, T Records of HM Treasury, BT Records of 
the Board of Trade, CJ Records of the Northern Ireland Office, OD Records of the 
Department of Technical Co-operation, and of successive Overseas Development 
bodies,  Records of BPA,  Arc Ref. 
This chapter has set out the context of the thesis, summarizing its main arguments and 
explaining its structure. It has also offers a brief view of the historical context (very 
brief because rigid space demands preclude a more developed account of the 
background). It summarises the case study methods used and the documentation 
consulted in this historical thesis, and it touches on some of the limitations of these 
sources and how they limit but do not invalidate conclusions that can then be drawn. 
The final conclusions in the last chapter return to and review these arguments and 
sources. 
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Chapter One: 1969: Libyan regime change and its new policy 
orientation 
This chapter explores the political changes that occurred in Libyan foreign policy after 
Gaddafi came to power. It discusses the factors that influenced Gaddafi's foreign 
policy. This is to understand the nature of these trends and how they affected the 
relationship of Libya with Britain. These trends are: Gaddafi being affected by the 
ideologies of Gamal Abdel Nasser; Arab Unity/Arab nationalism; the Arab-Israeli 
conflict; and Gaddafi's ambitions to be a global leader. This chapter will also discuss 
how Gaddafi's foreign policy affected the Libyan relationship with Britain. To this end, 
this chapter is divided into two parts. Firstly, through reviewing the literature briefly, 
it will examine how Gaddafi formed his foreign policy and how it was affected by the 
factors mentioned above. Secondly, it is through unpublished materials, this chapter 
will examine how the behaviour of Gaddafi and his foreign policy affected British-
Libyan relations.  
Libyan foreign policy (influences and trends 1969-1979)  
There is no doubt that Libyan foreign policy after 1969 changed dramatically, 
especially in Libya's relations with the West, Libya's relations with the Arabs and the 
role of Libya in the Arab-Israeli conflict. After 1969, Colonel Gaddafi became the main 
maker of the foreign policy of Libya. Throughout the beginning of the 1970s, the new 
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regime engaged in establishing Libya’s domestic and international politics in line with 
its own ideological perceptions, which emphasized Arab nationalist objectives.51 
Many authors agreed that to understand Libyan foreign policy, it is necessary to 
understand Gaddafi himself, because he was the actual decision-maker in Libyan 
foreign policy.52 It is not just Gaddafi himself; to see the whole picture one must 
highlight the factors that had formed Gaddafi’s personality and then reflect on Libyan 
foreign policy throughout the period of the 1970s. Nasserism, Arab unity/ Arab 
nationalism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, fighting imperialist powers and Gaddafi’s 
ambition to be a world leader all influenced his political character and thus shaped 
foreign policy.53 These trends in Libyan foreign policy have been discussed extensively 
before; however, they must be examined here briefly: firstly to identify the sequence 
of events; secondly to context the debate; and thirdly to find a correlation between 
Gaddafi's orientations and British-Libyan relations. 
The Impact of Nasserism and Palestine issue on Gaddafi’s policy  
Gaddafi had been strongly affected by Gamal Abdel Nasser's political ideology to 
                                                 
51 Niblock, T., the foreign policy of Libya, in:  Hinnebusch, R. and Etheshami, A., the foreign policy of 
Middle East states, p. 222 
52 Blundy, D., and Lycett, A., Gaddafi and the Libyan revolution, weidenfeld and Nicolson, (London 
1987); El-Khawas, M,. Gaddafi: his ideology in theory and practice, Amana books, (1987); Harris, L. 
C,. Libya: Gaddafi’s revolution and modern state, Taylor and Francis Ltd, (London, 1986); Mohamed, 
K., The effect of the leader’s belief system on foreign policy: the case of Libya, PhD thesis, at the Florida 
State University, unpublished thesis, (1988); Parker, R B., North Africa: regional tensions and strategic 
concerns, Praeger, (New York 1984); Sicker, M., The making of a pariah state: the adventurist politics 
of Muammer Gaddafi, Praeger, (New York, 1987); Wright, J., Libya: a modern history.   
53 St. John R B., Redefining the Libyan revolution: the changing ideology of Muammar al-Qaddafi;  
ElWarfally, M G., Imagery and Ideology in U.S. Policy Toward Libya 1969-1982; Yehudit, R., Qaddafi's 
Libya in World Politics; Simons, G and Dalyell, T., Libya: The Struggle for Survival; Simons, G., Libya 
and the West from independence to Lockerbie; St John, R B., Qaddafi’s world design: Libyan foreign 
policy 1969-1987; Vandewalle, D., A history of modern Libya; Wright, J., Libya: a modern history. 
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achieve Arab unity and liberate Palestine. These significantly affected his political 
views and shaped Libyan foreign policy during the 1970s. Gaddafi saw himself as the 
rightful heir to Nasser's ideas, the secretary of Arab nationalism, and that he must 
accomplish what Abdel Nasser started to achieve for Arab unity. Gaddafi went far 
beyond Nasser. 'Qaddafi's vision extends beyond Libya's borders. Believing he is a 
revolutionary world leader, he compared himself to historical figures from the Guevara 
to Garibaldi'.54 The Egyptian envoy to Gaddafi, Mohammed Heikal, during the first 
months of the revolution, said 'Libya would be at Nasser’s disposal for the battle' 
against Israel. 55 Mr. Tripp, the British Ambassador in Tripoli at the time, said, 'On the 
foreign and inter-Arab aspects, Gaddafi covered too much ground in his global review, 
he was clearly imitating Nasser’s style of covering the world scene, without having 
Nasser’s competence and experience. The attention of his audience often flagged. He 
did not say much that was new.56 
Gaddafi was also affected by the Arab-Israeli conflict, saying that since he was a child, 
he had identified with the Palestinian issue, when he was listening to news broadcasts 
by the Voice of Cairo. Since that time he became obsessed with the plight of the 
Palestinians and the extent of the injustice they incurred. Gaddafi said that the 
international community did not do anything to help the Palestinians, and that the issue 
of refugees in the camps under the conditions of misery and suffering left them without 
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a solution. Therefore, he became convinced that Palestine must be liberated and 
refugees return to their homes.57 Thus, when Gaddafi came to power, he publicly 
declared his support to the Palestinian groups. Gaddafi saw Palestine as the usurpation 
of Arab land which was an integral part of the Arab nation which can never be truly 
free until Palestine is completely liberated.58 Gaddafi had never denied his funding and 
arming of Palestinian groups, providing them with training camps in Libya. Gaddafi 
saw these activities 'as part of his pan-Arab mission to oppose any settlement with 
Israel, and indeed its very presence'.59  
Throughout the 1970s Gaddafi strongly believed in Arab unity. He did not come out 
with anything new, only repeating what he had heard from Nasser. Since the ideas of 
Gaddafi and his attempts to promote Arab unity have been discussed extensively by 
many researchers, it will be sufficient to list below the most important points. The 
reason for this is to show and understand how the ideas of Gaddafi influenced Libya's 
later foreign policy, and how his political behaviour impacted on Libya's relationship 
with the world, particularly with Britain.  
• Gaddafi shared with Abdul Nasser the belief in the need to achieve Arab unity. 
Gaddafi believed that Arab unity must exist between the Arab countries, not only 
because of geography, but as an expression of shared beliefs. 
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• Gaddafi saw that the Arab nation shared a common cultural history and destiny, 
and they must unite as equals to any other race on Earth.   
• Gaddafi related the weakness and backwardness of the Arabs to their 
disintegration into tribal states and regions; a process encouraged by the colonial 
powers to help them dominate the Arab world. 
• Gaddafi strongly believed that the Arabs must unite into a single Arab state if 
they were to regain their former glory and reach their full potential.  
• The Palestinian issue is closely connected to this emphasis on Arab unity. 
Gaddafi argued that the victory of Israel over the Arabs was simply the latest 
consequence of Arab divisions; thus the Arabs must unite to regain Palestine.60 
Gaddafi from the outset, declared his hostility to Israel. Due to the possession of Libya's 
ability to provide aid and particularly economic aid, Gaddafi started to fight against the 
Israeli presence on the African continent, through the provision of economic aid to 
some African countries, to reduce the Israeli presence, as well as non-recognition of 
these countries to Israel. 'Indeed, Libyan aid was quite successful in dislodging Israeli 
influence in several African countries'. For example, when in December 1972 Gaddafi 
established diplomatic relations with Chad, one of his conditions was that Chad's 
diplomatic relations with Israel be severed immediately in return for Libyan aid. 
'Consequently, Chad cut all links with Israel and expelled all its military advisors'.  
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Chaim Herzog, Israeli former President, claimed that 'Gaddafi pressured Zaire's 
President Mobutu Sese Seko to stop cooperating with Israel, threatening to assassinate 
him'. Gaddafi continued his activities in convincing other African states to sever 
diplomatic relations with Israel. 'He was overjoyed after the Yom Kippur War, when 
most African countries decided to' do so.61 Gaddafi's opinion was that Israel was the 
main threat to the integrity of Islam and the Arab world. Thus for him, the primary way 
to achieve Arab unity was the liberation of Palestine. 
Gaddafi's ambitions, ideology and practices  
Gaddafi was born in a Bedouin family, in the town of Sirte. “The Bedouin ways of his 
parents and the importance of the tribe in his culture have been built up in his memory 
and self-edited over the years to establish his personal narrative, the personal story he 
carries in his head”. Gaddafi was enrolled in a preparatory school in Sirte, and later he 
moved to Sabha, which lies in the southern region of Fezzan, to continue his primary 
education. “He came into contact with Egyptian teachers and under the influence of 
Nasser’s ‘Voice of the Arab’ on the radio”.62 During his Study in Sabha and later, in 
his secondary school in Misurata, Gaddafi was affected by the Suez crisis in 1956, the 
1967 war and Nasser's style of leadership. Later Nasser's leadership reflected in the 
planning of the Libyan revolution of 1969 when Gaddafi and his colleagues set up an 
organisation similar to the one established by Nasser's revolution in Egypt; namely, the 
Revolution Command Council (RCC). In this respect, Qaddafi and his colleagues 
declared themselves as followers of Nasser, devoted to his goals of Arab unity, anti-
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imperialism and Arab socialism.63 All these matters later reflected in Gaddafi’s foreign 
policy as it will be discussed in this chapter. 
Gaddafi's ambition was another important factor driving his foreign policy. Since his 
early days, Gaddafi declared that Arab nationalism and Arab unity were the most 
important priorities, not only for the ideological framework espoused by the regime, 
but also for its claim to legitimacy.64  Perhaps Gaddafi believed that his legitimacy 
derived from the adoption of the principle of Arab unity, and therefore a legitimate 
revolution, gave him the right to be the Arab leader who should lead the struggle against 
imperialism and the liberation of Palestine. By supporting the most radical Palestinian 
organisations against Israel, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – 
General Command (PFLP-GC), founded in 1968 by Ahmed Jibril, Gaddafi played a 
leading role in the conflict, aiming to lead the conflict against Israel.65 Gaddafi had 
seen in these activities a kind of strike at imperialism, using such activities to increase 
his popularity as an anti-imperialist, enhancing his domestic and international 
reputation.66 However, these acts actually significantly damaged Libyan aspirations to 
regional and international leadership. Thus, he tried several times to differentiate 
between revolutionary violence, which he supported, and terrorism, which he 
opposed.67 But he did not succeed in doing so. The Libyan monarchy's participation in 
the surrounding Arab world was limited, whereas its cooperation with Western allies 
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was evident. Gaddafi began his tenure in office by moving Libya out of the Western 
orbit and into a closer association with other Arab powers.68 To do this, he demanded 
a quick evacuation of British and American bases from Libya. In addition, he engaged 
in union discussions with Egypt, Syria, Sudan, and Tunisia. In December 1977, 
Gaddafi called a meeting in Tripoli opposing any plan of signing a peace agreement 
with Israel. The meeting was joined by Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, Algeria and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).69 Gaddafi’s aim was to isolate Egypt, leading 
the Arab boycott. 
Gaddafi's engagement in supporting what he viewed as revolutionary movements in 
many parts of the world was one way to advance his grandiose ambitions to be a major 
player on the world stage. His anti-communist beliefs did not stop him dealing with the 
Soviet Union. 'However, government leaders of Arab countries and of many other 
countries of the world came to regard Gaddafi as bizarre, untrustworthy, and sometimes 
dangerous'.70 Gaddafi obtained large quantities of arms from the USSR. He aimed to 
make Libya the main supplier of weapons to Arab countries if a war broke out between 
the Arabs and Israel. This would enhance his voice in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 
addition, Gaddafi had ambitions through these large quantities of weapons to be the 
biggest funder to Palestinian groups in their operations against Israel. This, of course, 
would give him a direct impact on these groups, and so on the conflict. Such an aim 
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was achieved with some extremist Palestinian groups. 
This approach to foreign policy making led to Libya being internationally outcast by 
the West, in particular the US, but also by surrounding Arab countries. Its perceived 
unreasonable and unacceptable foreign policies created a clear reluctance in the West 
in general, and the US and UK in particular, to deal with Libya. This created a 
confrontation with the Western powers who were trying to protect their interests in the 
region, as well as to protect those regimes loyal to the West.  
From the viewpoint of Western powers, Gaddafi’s regime was seen as a threat to 
Western interests and stability in the Middle East and Africa. This had led to measures 
of restriction and retaliation towards Libya. Gaddafi had seen the presence of Western 
powers in the Arab region as a protection of their interests at the expense of damaging 
the interests of Arab states. Thus, Libya put itself as the target of more Western 
governmental hostility than any other Arab country. 71  Gaddafi made the political 
positions of Libya based on the positions of other countries on the Palestinian cause, 
as he claims.72 The activities which Gaddafi was engaged in between 1973-1977, and 
subsequently in the Arab region and elsewhere in the world, involved some 
organisations regarded as being involved in international terrorism. As a result Libya 
was regarded as a major player in the disruptive role within the region and to Western 
interests.73  These activities will be pointed out below. 
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In the region, it seems clear that the hostile policy which was pursued by Libya was 
directly against those pro-Western countries in the region, deemed by Libya as standing 
against Libyan policy, or betraying traditional Arab objectives on the Palestine issue, 
as Gaddafi viewed them. The best example that can be highlighted here, is the 
escalation of hostilities against Egypt after the Egyptian-Israeli agreement in 1974 and 
the increase of hostility between Libya and Egypt during the late 1970s. This will be 
widely discussed in chapter 4.   
In March 1970, in a speech in Al-Bayda city, Gaddafi strongly attacked the imperialist 
powers, and accused them of acting against the interests of small states such as Libya. 
In addition he announced his hostility to Israel, his support for the Palestinian struggle 
against Israeli occupation, and demanded the Arab countries to open their territories to 
be a base for Palestinian movements to attack Israel, and give full support to these 
movements. The most important points contained in this speech are as follows:74  
• Imperialism is bound to conspire with local reaction and world Zionism to 
impede our march[...]Imperialism is aware of the serious threat the Libyan revolution 
poses to imperialist interests[....]It will know the gravity of this decision and that the 
battle is bound to take place. Therefore, imperialism will either have to surrender as it 
did in the battle over the bases or use the oil weapon against the freedom of the Libyan 
people. 
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• The 1st September revolution cannot in any circumstances deviate from the 
path of Arabism and Islam. The revolution cannot in any circumstances deviate from 
actual participation in the battle of Arab destiny. We are massing the resources and 
capabilities to arm not only Libya, but all the Arabs. 
• We always strongly declare that in any circumstances shall we deviate from the 
path of Arab unity[...]without hesitation we shall bear all our responsibilities and 
commitments for the sake of achieving unity. 
• The Palestine question does not concern Palestine or the Palestinians alone [...] 
the Arab nation is mobilising all its resources for the great confrontation for the sake 
of Palestine. I challenge any Palestinian to be more enthusiastic, more loyal, or more 
nostalgic than I for the sake of Palestine. I challenge any Palestinian to have stronger 
feelings than I in this respect. 
• I am aware that Palestine action was (and still is) facing a serious problem. The 
problem is that it does not stand on solid ground. A number of Arab countries reject 
Palestine action. Palestine action is seeking secure launching points and rear bases. We 
denounce the attempts to deny these. Arab territory must be open to Fia’iyin (freedom 
fighters) and Arab territory as a whole should be a launching point for Palestine. 
What was Gaddafi saying in his public speeches, especially in the early days of his 
coming to power? At the time when Britain was assessing the directions of its policy 
with him, was not encouraging that it would be any common interests between the two 
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countries in the field of international politics. This led to the cancellation of exports of 
tanks to Libya in 1970, because of its anti-Israel policy. For more details see chapter 3. 
All the factors mentioned above, formed the political behaviour of Gaddafi throughout 
the 1970s. These actions and others have made the Western world and the United 
States, consider the new regime in Libya with suspicion, and later classified Libya as 
a state sponsor of terrorism. 
A letter from the State Department to Senator Jacob Javits shows that Libya had 'at 
least since 1972, actively assisted a number of terrorist groups and individuals, 
including the Palestinian ‘rejectionist’ factions. The Libyan support of the Palestinian 
rejectionists ran counter to the Carter Administration’s willingness to move ahead with 
the peace process [...] culminating in the 1978 Camp David Accords. Accordingly [...] 
to Libyan efforts to derail the peace process'.75 Gaddafi became increasingly opposed 
to specifically Western influence in his terms. The Western capitals declared their 
concern over Gaddafi's alleged subversive activities in countries thought to be friendly 
to Western interests in Africa and the Arab world.76 For the removal of these regimes, 
Gaddafi supported opposition groups in Tunisia and Morocco. Tunisia is a case in 
point. As a result of his failure to persuade Arab leaders to his project of Arab unity, 
Gaddafi turned to supporting opposition groups in these countries to change those 
leaders who were opposed to him. In his view, they stood in the way of Arab unity. 
After his dispute with President Habib Bourguiba to form a union, Gaddafi tried to 
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bring down Bourguiba's regime.77 He trained and armed some Tunisians and sent them 
to Gafsa in Southern Tunisia to start an armed rebellion. However, Gaddafi failed to 
overthrow Bourguiba and the relations between Tunisia and Libya were damaged.78 
Extensive support was given to the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(General Command) and the Abu Nidal group.79Gaddafi's support for Palestinian 
organisations translated into action. It included financial support for their operations 
and military training of Palestinian fighters. In September 1972, Libya was accused of 
the financial support for the attack on the Israeli athletes in Munich. $5 million was 
given to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to expand his operation against Israel. In 
October 1973, the Arab National Youth Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine 
(ANYOLP) was supported by Libya to hijack a Lufthansa plane. The Bonn government 
was forced to release the three Munich commandos jailed in West Germany in order to 
free the plane. Later after the three men were released, they headed to Libya.80  Some 
reports claimed that the total amount of Libya's contribution to terrorism varied from 
$40 to $250 million a year. Israeli intelligence claimed that the amount was $1 billion. 
Another Israeli intelligence report said that in October 1978, 'Libya promised to 
provide the PLO with $39.3 million a year and also offered support to Ahmed Jibril's 
organisation, although Gaddafi delivered only a small part of the amount promised'.81 
                                                 
77 El-Khawas, M A., Gaddafi his ideology in theory and practice, Amana Books, Brattleboro, (Michigan 
1986) 
78 Ibid 
79 Niblack, T.,  the foreign policy of Libya, in:  Hinnebusch, R. and Etheshami, A., the foreign policy of 
Middle East states, pp. 224,225 
80 El-Khawas, M A., Gaddafi his ideology in theory and practice 
81 Jacob A., Pragmatism and Rhetoric in Libya's Policy toward Israel 
41 
 
A third Israeli intelligence report claimed that up to 1986, over 7,000 terrorists were 
being trained by foreign experts across Libya. An American report shows that 'Gaddafi 
maintained 34 bases used by terrorists. He paid Abu Nidal, the head of the PFLP-GC, 
between $5 million and $6 million for massacres carried out in Rome and Vienna, and 
an additional annual fee of $5 million to his group'.82However, no documents were 
found to prove or deny these figures. At the same time a couple of secondary sources 
show that Gaddafi offered training and funding for many terrorist groups, including the 
IRA.83  
In fact, political activity and the financial and economic support, which was run by 
Gaddafi, had concerned the United States and the West. Therefore, it was considered 
as a hit to the American and Western interests in the Arab region and Africa. Much of 
Gaddafi's support has been a sideshow to his main area of interest: Africa and the Arab 
world. In Africa most of his activities were to reduce the influence of Israel on the 
continent.  
In a 1971 statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Libyan activities 
abroad were described as follows: 'Libya has increasingly interested itself in sub-
Saharan Africa through expressions in the past of support for Moslem populations in 
other states in opposition to what it regards as Israeli influence detrimental to the Arab 
cause in Africa'.84 Gaddafi used the Libyan oil money to give financial and other 
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support to many organisations he regarded as revolutionary or waging national 
liberation struggles. This was considered by the American administration as engaging 
in terrorist violence. In the mid-1970s tension between Libya and Egypt increased, and 
the United States’ support to Egypt increased in its efforts to support the peace process 
between Egypt and Israel.85Libya was against the peace process with Israel. By 1976, 
the American administration of President Gerald Ford was publicly suggesting that 
Libya was supporting international terrorism. In 1977, the United States supported 
Egypt in the skirmishes that took place on the Libyan-Egyptian border. In the same 
year, the Carter administration said that there was strong evidence of the involvement 
of Libya in an attempt to assassinate Herman Frederick Eilts the American Ambassador 
in Egypt (1974-79). Gaddafi denied this. The United States blocked the sale of transport 
planes to Libya, accusing it of terrorism.86 
The major and complicated issue in this was how each party considered these acts. 
While these acts were considered by Gaddafi as support for liberation movements, 
either with regard to its support for Palestinian groups, it was seen that it was a duty 
for him toward the Palestinians and the Palestinian cause. However, the West, 
particularly Britain and the United States categorised it as support for terrorism, and a 
hostile action against them in the Arab region and the world as a whole. The radical 
foreign policy that was set up by Gaddafi, had led Libya to confrontation with the West 
which reached its intensity in 1986 when the United States attacked Libya militarily.  
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 All the factors discussed above are well-known in secondary sources as the factors 
guided Libya's general foreign policy during the 1970s and 1980s. However, no studies 
were founded to examine the effect and impact of these factors and other reasons 
mentioned in this thesis (outstanding issues, Libyan attitude toward Israel) on the 
British-Libyan relations in particular. Thus, the discussion below will shed light on 
these issues by using unpublished materials. This aims at exploring the impact of all 
these issues on the British-Libyan relations as a whole, and how the British government 
considered this. Gaddafi's beliefs had put him in a conflict and confrontation with the 
strategic and political interests of Britain in the Mediterranean region, Africa and the 
Middle East. He was young, no experience and no one guided him, America, Britain, 
or even the Soviet Union failed to do so. Thus, Gaddafi failed to be pragmatic and make 
a balance between his principles in theory and practice.  
Britain's view of Libyan foreign policy in theory and practice 1969-
1979 
In an unpublished and quite a long document, containing 20 pages, Mr Anthony 
Williams, the British Ambassador to Libya (1977–1980) addressed how the British 
government considered Libya's foreign policy during the period of the 1970s. This 
document was sent to David Owen, the British Foreign Secretary from 1977 to 1979, 
and also Leader of the Council for Social Democracy Party (SDP) (1983 to 1987) after 
breaking away from the Labour Party. The other unpublished British document which 
will be addressed below shows that there was an agreement in the British government 
about what this document included over Libyan foreign policy. In addition, these 
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British documents are in an agreement with the previous studies that concluded that 
Libyan foreign policy in the 1970s was driven by Nasserism, Arab Nationalism, the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and Gaddafi's ambitions. Indeed what is new to add here is: how 
the British government viewed Libyan foreign policy in the 1970s, how the British 
government dealt with Libyan foreign policy, and what tools they used to do this.  
In this regard, the British government had seen Gaddafi's thinking in the 1970s being 
highly derivative from his primary source on nearly everything: on Gamal Abdel 
Nasser's Philosophy of the Revolution. In his theory of Jamahiriya, Gaddafi goes far 
beyond Nasser's Arab Socialist Union.87 Mr Williams described Libya's foreign policy 
in the 1970s by saying that: 'Libyan foreign policy in the wider context is essentially 
theoretical rather than pragmatic; an expression of the dogmas of the "great teacher and 
leader'.88 He went on to say that: 
in foreign affairs, Gaddafi is still thinking in terms of Nasser's three circles the Arab, the 
African and the Islamic. Like Nasser, Gaddafi sees the Arab circle as a single entity, a single 
region with the same factors and forces, foremost among them imperialism, united against 
them[…]within the Arab circle there is a role wandering aimlessly in search of a hero.89 
This British view of Libyan foreign policy had not changed throughout the 1970s, but 
on the contrary, the British policy to deal with Libya in that period was built on this 
basis. Another unpublished British document report in the early 1980s shows that the 
British still had the same view of Libyan foreign policy. The document reported that: 
Following Nasser's death in 1970 Gaddafi sought to adopt his mantle as an African 
revolutionary. His policies and philosophy owe a good deal to Nasser, although his concept 
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of the Jamahiriya goes far beyond Nasser's Arab Socialist Union and many of his economic 
ideas would probably have been regarded by Nasser as bizarre.90 
After Nasser's death, it seemed to Gaddafi that it was possible to replace him, lead the 
Arab world and play an international role, especially in Africa. This was discussed 
above through Gaddafi's ambitions. The British report extensively mentioned this 
addressing that: 
A main reason why Gaddafi is even more inclined than Nasser was to seek a star role in each 
of these three circles is, of course, that, while Nasser's Egypt was poor and getting poorer, 
Gaddafi's Libya has since his revolution, got steadily richer. The advantages of being rich if 
one is tempted to an activist, meddling foreign policy are obvious.91 
In 1973, Gaddafi elaborated his own ideas and principles in his third international 
theory that he considered as an alternative to both capitalism and communism, which 
he refused in both theory and practice. Gaddafi's third international theory included his 
beliefs 'in Islamic solidarity and other inter-related goals: the unity of Libya, the unity 
of the Arab world, and the unity of the non-aligned states, particularly those in 
Africa[...]in part, this belief  motivated Gaddafi's interventionist policies in sub-
Saharan Africa'.92 Other beliefs of Gaddafi were put in his theory such as 'commitment 
to eliminate all forms of imperialist and colonialist influence has been a mainspring of 
his African policy. There were, however, more basic factors of real politics including 
destroying Israel's African links which also governed Gaddafi's relationship with Black 
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African states, particularly Chad and Uganda in both of which Libya became militarily 
embroiled'.93 
All of these and perhaps other considerations formed Gaddafi's policy in the 1970s.94 
In addition, it cannot be ignored that the tension occurred between the two countries 
during the 1970s over the arms contracts and Libyan attitude towards Israel, had 
strongly directed Gaddafi's policy with Britain.95  
The British never accepted the Libyan foreign policy in the 1970s or viewed it as 
reasonable. Mr Williams discussed how the British government should deal with Libya, 
he said that:  
Libya is an unreliable friend, but also not as formidable an enemy as might be imagined; not, 
for instance, in the Soviet pocket. Our best course is, wherever possible, to keep out of the 
way and leave her to defeat herself, maintaining sensible commercial and bilateral relation at 
the working level.96 
Williams also wrote: 
Libya under Gaddafi will never be predictable let alone reliable. Libya is a menace as much 
to the Soviet Union as to the West. There is little chance of influencing Libya to fully sensible 
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policies. We should try keep out of Libya's way while trying to build up useful commercial 
bilateral relations through officials and technicians whose feet sometimes touch the ground.97   
What can be added here is that this is the policy that drew Britain's relationship with 
Libya throughout the 1970s. In 1975 Wilson’s government followed a policy to meet 
the Libyan desire for talks in order to settle their outstanding claims and normalise 
relations, providing that such settlement should not bring any obligation to Libya. This 
was to benefit from the improvement in trade relations without putting forward a clear 
framework for a settlement.98 By the end of the 1970s Britain was still following the 
same policy. 
 Mr Tomkys, the former Head of the Near East and North Africa Department said that: 
'I agree that Libyan foreign policy is irrational and directed by an essentially irrational 
leader it is explicable in Libyan terms'.99 Mr Tomkys went on to say that: 
I agree with Mr Williams that we should take a pragmatic view. We cannot change Gaddafi 
[…] we cannot hope to reform the Libyan regime. But our interest in doing business with it 
is substantial […] closer association with Libya might not make the Libyans amenable but it 
could mitigate to some extent the damage they seek to do to British interests.100  
Another British report said that: 'In balancing Gaddafi's foreign policy objectives 
against his poor success rate. I do not think his recommendations (Mr Williams, the 
British Ambassador) for HMG's policy cut across the tactics we envisage employing 
e.g. on the arms package or claims'.101  
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There are two conclusions that can be drawn here: first that there was a consensus 
within the British government that it could not cope with the Gaddafi regime in light 
of Libyan foreign policy which was considered anti-British, and therefore it had to be 
kept to the least amount of diplomatic relations with the Libyan government, at the 
same time maintaining the commercial interests of the British in Libya. Secondly, that 
the British government was seeking to save its commercial interests with Libya, but 
not to get too close to the Libyan government, in other words not to have normalised 
relations with Gaddafi's regime. The purpose of this was to save the British export 
market which was over £200 million by the end of 1978 with invisible earnings of some 
£50 million and some 4,000 British citizens working in Libya. There was also a British 
hope to increase British profit in the degree of more improvement in British-Libyan 
relations especially in terms of settling the outstanding issues.102    
The British-Libyan dispute over the Arab-Israeli conflict 
The conflict in both countries’ interests mainly occurred during the period of the 1970s 
over three specific issue areas: the Arab-Israel conflict, the Mediterranean and Africa. 
Mr. Quesne said that 'I have never believed that we (the British government) should 
ever be able to establish a stable and permanent modus vivendi with a regime run by 
as unstable a character as Gaddafi'.103 According to the British government, the most 
important goals of British foreign policy in the Middle East were to maintain the 
balance of military forces in the region, and work for an effective arms limitation 
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agreement covering all the main suppliers, at the same time to continue its arms trade 
with the countries of the region, but without prejudicing the balance of power. Another 
important objective of the British government was to resolve this conflict by peaceful 
means. It was not difficult for the British to achieve the first goal particularly with 
Libya, until the regime was changed in Tripoli in September 1969. The FCO said that, 
until there is a limitation to weapon-exporting to the Middle East 'we should continue 
to supply arms to the Middle East; not to do so would damage our commercial and 
political interests.104 Britain has a vital interest in keeping the flow of oil from the Gulf 
open. It also has a broader commercial relationship with the Middle East. In particular, 
the region has been an important customer for British arms exports, which have 
constituted a significant element of the British economy'.105  
It cannot be denied that the position of the Libyan government after 1969 towards the 
Arab-Israeli conflict was the most important point which worried the British 
government. The position of Libya has shaped Britain's policy towards Libya in this 
regard, particularly in the British policy of exporting arms to Libya. The Secretary of 
State said that: 
We [the British government] must also do what we can to see the new Libyan government, 
whose thinking is still largely in the formative stage....pursue moderate policies in the 
international affairs, and in particular favour a peaceful rather than a violent settlement of the 
Arab/Israel dispute.106 
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A large number of British documents show how the new Libyan foreign policy after 
September 1969, had affected British policy with Libya, especially in the light of 
Libyan policy towards the Arab/Israeli conflict. Emmanuel Shinwell, Labour MP for 
Easington (and Labour’s leading Zionist), argued that:  
Even if it is a traditional custom not to furnish information about the provision of arms to 
other countries, how does the Secretary of State justify the action vis-a-vis Libya in providing 
that country with Chieftain tanks in spite of the declaration of war against Israel and refusing 
to implement the Government undertaking to provide Chieftain tanks to Israel?.107  
The British government expressed its concern about the position of Libya over the 
Arab-Israeli conflict since the early days of the regime changed in Libya in 1969. This 
made the position of Libya from the conflict in the Middle East, one of the main points 
that concerned the British government and led the British to evaluate its relationship 
with Libya, after the year 1969. The Secretary of State wrote that 'the new government 
must be expected to follow a more active policy of opposition to Israel than their 
predecessors. They have said they will'.108  
As the political change occurred in Libya, the Libyan foreign policy over the Arab-
Israeli conflict became the central issue of the British government’s policy towards the 
Middle East, namely its military commercial dealings with the Middle East 
country. 109 The British government took a decision that dealing with the new 
government in Libya would be based on its attitudes towards all the international issues 
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of common interest, namely the position of Libya towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. For 
this purpose, the British government linked its cooperation particularly in the field of 
military cooperation and arms to the position of Libya from the conflict in the Middle 
East.110 Thus the British government entered into debates to explore the position of 
Libya with regards to the conflict in the Middle East. Later the outcome of these debates 
formed the British position and relationship with the Gaddafi government in 
subsequent years.111 Mr. Maitland, the British Ambassador, said:  
They (RCC) regarded the existence of Israel as an affront to Arab dignity; influenced over the 
years by 'The Voice of the Arabs', they were inclined to hold the West responsible for Arab 
misfortunes; they wanted to build up their armed forces and would judge our intentions by 
our willingness to help in this process.112  
The British government explored Libyan foreign policies towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict through its Ambassador in Tripoli. Maitland wrote: 'My first task was to report 
to London my assessment of the nature, durability and likely policies of the new regime 
and the implications of these for British interests'.113 In a conversation between Mr. 
Maitland and the Libyan Foreign Minister Mr. Buaisir, said regarding British and 
Libyan attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict that 'The gap between us was too wide 
to make political quote cooperation unquote possible'.114  
Thus, it can be drawn here that the disagreement between Britain and Libya on the 
issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict was one of the main points of contention  in the 
                                                 
110 TNA, CAB 148-91,  meeting minutes, 4 November 1969. 
111 Ibid 
112 Jones, S., British policy in the Middle East, 1966-1974, with special reference 
to Israel, 
113Ibid 
114 TNA, FCO 39-634, Anglo-Libyan relations, letter from Maitland to FCO, 5 January 1970 
52 
 
relationship between the two countries, as it was shown clearly that Libya was keeping 
its relations with Britain in the light of Britain's position of supplying arms to Libya, 
which is mainly based on Britain's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole, and 
in particular Libya's position on this conflict after September 1969. 
The position of Libya on the conflict in the Middle East was very important to the 
British government. The FCO stated that 'We [the British government] shall, remain 
closely interested [...] and the Libyan attitude towards the Arab/Israel conflict.115  
Indeed, the position of Libya on the Arab-Israeli conflict, which became more clearly 
hostile to Israel day after day, and to any kind of normalisation with Israel, especially 
in the subsequent years following 1969, obviously shaped Britain's policy in dealing 
with the regime in Tripoli, especially in the field of arms sales. 
At the Rabat summit meeting and during the Tripartite Summit meeting in Tripoli in 
1970, Libya confirmed that it supported the Del confrontation with Israel and provided 
the necessary support in this regard.116After this meeting, the British government 
through its Ambassador in Libya, handed over three points to the Libyan government 
which Britain saw as the base of its policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, and asked 
Libya to respond to them. The British government confirmed that these points 
represented a common interest in the Palestine question and in particular hoped that the 
Libyan side would agree to them. These points are as follows:117   
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• It was in the interest of both Britain and Libya that there should be a just and 
lasting settlement of the question as proposed in the Security Council Resolution of 
November 1967. 
• It was in the interest of both Britain and Libya that such a just and lasting 
settlement should be achieved by peaceful means. 
• The continuance of the present instability and hostilities were not in the interest 
of Britain or Libya. 
Major Jallud responded to the British points as follows:118  
• That Libya would welcome peace. But a distinction must be drawn between 
peace and surrender. A true and just peace settlement must not be capable of many 
different interpretations. 
• Libya agreed that a peaceful solution would be the best. This had been clear 
since the Arab territory was occupied in 1967. 
• That Libya of the revolution had decided that everything must be linked to 
Palestine. Israeli withdrawal, which must be unconditional, must be tied to the question 
of Palestine, not to the 1967 aggression. 
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The British government considered the Security Council Resolution of November 1967 
to be the main base for the Arab-Israeli peace process. Whereas, RCC insisted that 
Israeli withdrawal must be unconditional and did not see the Security Council 
Resolution of November 1967 as a base for the Arab-Israeli settlement. In November 
Mr. Maitland sent his report about the Libyan view about the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.119Discussions that took place between the two parties, explored the attitude of 
the new rulers in Libya towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, with particular reference to 
future cooperation in the military field. In addition, it examined the future outlook in 
Libya and the international relations of the RCC. Maitland's report about his dialogues 
with the Libyans contained very important outcomes. They are as follows:120  
Paragraph 1 (F) - Libyan troops sent to Egypt are there for training purposes only, and 
will not (not) go to the front. 
(G)- Military equipment supplied by Britain any other country will be for the sole use 
of the Libyan armed forces. 
(H)- Such equipment would be used only for Libya’s defence. 
Paragraph 4- The remarks quoted in paragraph 1 (F), (G), and (H) above cannot be 
regarded as a complete guarantee that Libyan Chieftains would never appear on the 
Arab/Israel front. 
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Paragraph 4- (C) contribution to the build up of Arab strength. The RCC believes that 
steady mobilisation of the Arab’s potential is necessary if Israel is to be persuaded to 
deal justly with the Arabs of Palestine. They consider it their duty to play their part.  
 The consequences of the British Libyan dialogues over the possibility of finding a 
common formula, are that it can be agreed by both sides on the Arab-Israeli conflict 
that it did not deliver good results. Libyan trends in this regard were not apparently 
acceptable to the British government, and were considered fanatical attitudes. The 
Secretary of State said 'Major Jallud[...]holds extreme views and like other members 
of the Libyan regime rejects resolution 242 and the Rogers initiative'.121  
The goals of the Libyan government to show its full support to the countries of the 
confrontation with Israel, were not only driven by a sense of national duty. By adopting 
this attitude, Libya would first make its foreign voice in this matter heard in the Arab 
system and elsewhere. A second emotional unity could provide the RCC with an 
effective control over sectors of the army. Thirdly, their secondary aim may be to 
provide an issue with which all Libyans can identify themselves.122   
The position of Libya on the Arab-Israeli conflict was known as radical. Thus, the 
foreign policies of the new rulers in Libya were considered by the British government 
as incompatible with British policies and interests in the Middle East. This led to 
inconsistencies in the foreign policies of both countries towards the Arab-Israeli 
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conflict. Perhaps the most important evidence of this was the fear of the British 
government of the new regime in Libya to obtain the kind of sophisticated weapons 
that may disturb the balance of power in the region, and would lead to a dangerous 
arms race which may have taken the region to war. Therefore, Britain suspended all 
arms deals that had already been signed with the regime of King Idris, which was 
supposed to be received by the new regime in Tripoli. This will be discussed in detail 
in chapter 2.  
Gaddafi publically and repeatedly announced that it was his honour to be a party in any 
war against Israel and that all Libyan military supplies are for the liberation of 
Palestine.123 Gaddafi said that 'We must support the Palestinian revolution, but this 
would not be enough because the enemy is not threatening only the Palestinians; it 
threatens the very existence of the Arab.'124  Although in his negotiations with the 
British Ambassador in 1970, Major Jallud gave an assurance that the weapons that may 
be imported by Libya from Britain would not be used against Israel and would not be 
given to Egypt in any possible war with Israel. However, the British government did 
not trust any guarantees provided by the Libyan government.125  
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British-Libyan conflict of interests over the Mediterranean 
In 1972 Gaddafi called for the evacuation in the Mediterranean of any military 
presence, and in particular had invited the closure of the British military base in Malta. 
Britain considered this to be a hostile act against its strategic interests in the 
Mediterranean.126 At that time and for Britain and NATO, Malta was a strategic link to 
the empire east of Suez and one of the main Western naval forces in the Mediterranean. 
Malta was in need of improving its economic situation, and for that had looked to 
Britain and NATO to help her, but nothing was done to improve the Maltese economy. 
Mr. Dom Mintoff who was the Maltese Prime Minister threatened to end the British 
presence in Malta unless more money was paid for the rent of the British base. He went 
on to say that 'foreign armed forces would be brought to Malta without specifying their 
nationality[...]Mintoff had announced that 15 January 1972 would be the final deadline 
for the withdrawal of British troops, and Britain had said it had no intention of meeting 
it'.127 
Mintoff visited Libya, met with Gaddafi and discussed the British base issue and the 
Libyan support to the Maltese. After Mintoff's visit to Libya, Gaddafi announced that 
'we [the Libyans] support the Maltese government's drive to keep out of foreign 
alliances, Eastern or Western. We have, therefore, started a new chapter of cooperation 
with Malta and will extend aid to her'.128  Gaddafi took this opportunity and offered 
economic assistance to Malta if the British base was evacuated. For this purpose 
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Mintoff made several trips to Libya for talks with Gaddafi. Both sides agreed to receive 
Libya Maltese workers and in return provided technical training for Libya.129'During 
which time it is believed Libya passed emergency credits of a rumoured £5 million to 
the cash-starved Maltese government’.130  
Britain began to evacuate British service families from the island, at the same time, a 
group of 44 Libyans and Egyptians arrived on Malta, to help the Maltese operate the 
control tower of the Royal Air Force base, which also served as Malta’s only civilian 
airport. 
The United States mediated to solve this issue and after intensive consultation with 
NATO allies, a British-Maltese agreement was signed as a seven-year defence 
agreement. 'Britain and NATO agreed to pay Malta $36.4 million in annual rent, with 
the United States paying $9.5 million of this. Another $23 million in bilateral aid came 
from NATO countries'.131 At the Summit of the Non-Aligned Countries in Algeria in 
1973, Gaddafi called again to evacuate the Mediterranean region of military bases and 
fleets, and in particular Gaddafi attacked the military presence of NATO in the 
Mediterranean Sea.132 In addition, and during Jallud's visit to Moscow, it was agreed 
that the Soviet Union strongly supported the request of Libya to evacuate the 
Mediterranean region of military bases and any foreign military presence. The Soviet 
Union and Libya said that 'the presence of military bases in the area constitutes a 
permanent threat to the peace and security of Mediterranean states and hinders their 
                                                 
129 Metz, Libya, p. 231 
130 Malta finds the development market coy, The Times, Jan 03, (1972) 
131 Lewis, J W., The strategic balance in the Mediterranean 
132 Metz, Libya, p. 231 
59 
 
development and progress'.133 This share in common interest between Libya and the 
Soviet Union must have been perceived to be against US and Western interests, 
especially the British interest, in the Mediterranean basin.  
Gaddafi did not stop making trouble for the British government, as it was the case in 
the problem of the British military base in Malta. In the view point of Mr. Tripp, 
Gaddafi was making difficulties for the British government because of his financial 
claims. However, he said that it seems that even if the financial claims were settled in 
full, Gaddafi would pursue his ideological beliefs. He was inflexible in his policies, 
imposed his views, and did not listen to his officials and ministers.134Tripp went on to 
say that 'While Gaddafi remains in charge there is unlikely to be any moderation of 
Libyan policies'.135  
In spite of all this, there was great suspicion of Colonel Gaddafi's apparent keen interest 
in the island and his willingness and generosity, while the Maltese had not much to 
offer Libya. In this context, why did Gaddafi take this line to support the Maltese 
against the British? The Times argued Gaddafi's reason to support the Maltese and 
addressed two main purposes as follows: 
First the Libyans might find the excellent harbour and dockyard facilities in Malta of value 
for their own oil industry. Secondly, the Libyans are especially anxious to see the 
Mediterranean completely defused in military terms. In other worlds they might be prepared 
to dig into their coffers for the simple purpose of providing for Malta's immediate needs and 
eliminate not merely Britain but more especially the Soviet Union from using the base 
facilities and in turn influencing the island.136  
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However, there was another important reason missed, and that was the deterioration in 
British-Libyan relations over several issues, such as the outstanding issues, 
nationalisation of BP and the British refusal to resume negotiations to settle the 
outstanding matters. All of these issues occurred at the same time and must have had 
an impact on British-Libyan relations, and helped to encourage some of Libya's hostile 
actions against British interest in Malta and elsewhere. The British document, shows 
that Libyan hostilities against British interests were part of the impact of British-Libyan 
disputes during the early 1970s.137 
The question that should be raised here: would Gaddafi oppose British interests in the 
region, if there was no disagreement between him and Britain on outstanding issues, 
and if Britain agreed to supply him the Chieftains? Indeed, no single document has 
answered this question or even secondary sources as there is no study that has looked 
at this matter. However, many primary key texts correlate Gaddafi hostility towards 
British interest with the conflict over the outstanding issues. This will be highlighted 
in the following chapters. 
British-Libyan conflict of interests in Africa 
Africa was not an exception to the support of Gaddafi to the rights of people to self-
determination and support for liberation movements, as he claimed. As was the case 
with the Palestinian movements, Gaddafi supplied financial and political support, 
                                                 
137 For details see:  TNA, FCO 87-785, relations with Libya; TNA, FCO 39-1083, letter from the 
Secretary of State to Rt Hon Duncan Sandys MP House of Commons, 1972; TNA, FCO 39/1111, 
Libya/BP: Anglo/Libyan relations. 
61 
 
military training and arms to African liberation movements. Much of the support that 
was provided by Gaddafi had been a sideshow to his main area of interest: Africa and 
the Arab world. His support was largely directed to limit the influence of Israel in the 
African continent. However, the principles which were advocated by Gaddafi in 
support of liberation movements and the fight against imperialism, led Gaddafi to clash 
with the interests of Britain in Africa, specifically in the case of Southern Rhodesia 
(now Zimbabwe). 
Gaddafi was against British policy in Rhodesia; for this reason, he had provided support 
to armed movements against the UDI regime in Salisbury, which was tacitly backed by 
Britain.  The new rulers in Libya condemned this tacit acceptance of the regime of 
Southern Rhodesia, saying that the Smith regime was only a white minority power, and 
not black African majority rule.138 In 1972 war broke out between the Rhodesian 
government and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe 
African People's Union (ZAPU).  Gaddafi sided with ZANU and ZAPU against Smith's 
regime. After the war ended in 1979 and the Lancaster House Agreement was signed, 
Gaddafi continued to support the ZAPU. Later, after Robert Mugabe was elected Prime 
Minister, Gaddafi sought to strengthen and expand political ties between the two 
countries and supplied material assistance to Rhodesia, which later became 
Zimbabwe.139  
Gaddafi engaged with many other African movements, although he denied giving 
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facilities to training and sending support to many of these groups, as he did with 
Rhodesia and South Africa. Gaddafi was involved in providing material and financial 
assistance to Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verdo (PAIGC) in 
Guinea-Bissau, the Frente de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) in Angola. Gaddafi’s 
activites included support extended to Mozambique for its struggle against Portuguese 
colonialism. Namibia and Libya had engaged extensively in supporting Idi Amin’s 
regime in Uganda; his support to Uganda had included sending Libyan troops and 
supplies. Gaddafi’s anti-colonial beliefs led him to clash with France as well; he 
attacked the French-speaking nations, and accused France of considering them as still 
her colonies. Gaddafi threatened to reconsider all the Libyan aid to these African 
countries that followed France’s policy in his view. He had also threatened to withdraw 
all the Libyan diplomatic representation to Paris if France continued to exercise 
leadership over the Francophone African states. Libya had intervened in Chad (a 
former French colony); Gaddafi had supported Goukouni Oueddei against Hissein 
Habre who was supported by France. By the late 1970s, Libyan troops were sent to 
Chad to help Oueddei. Libyan forces were kept there until the late 1980s.140  
In general, the Libyan policies were not balanced and supportive for stability in Africa. 
Support by Libya to the fronts, opposition and rebel movements in Africa were based 
most often on the volatility of Gaddafi’s policies. For instance, until 1974 Libyan arms 
and financial assistance had flowed to the Eritrean liberation front (ELF). Later in 1974 
the Libyan policy towards Ethiopia changed when a Libyan delegation visited Addis 
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Ababa in September 1974. Gaddafi's regime supported the Ethiopian Provisional 
Military Administrative Council (PMAC). However, the Libyans became disillusioned 
with their wrong decision supporting PMAC against ELF, following the renewed 
warfare and killings of Muslims in Eritrea early in 1975.141  
The British were not at all satisfied with the Libyan policies and activities on the 
continent. In addition they often considered this as a threat to the British economic and 
strategic interests in Africa. Near East and North Africa Department (NENAD) papers 
show clearly the British concern over the Libyan activities in Africa. A C D S Macrae, 
West African department said that: 
These Libyan activities are harmful to our interests because their result is to create instability 
in the region. The group of countries actively concerned at present (eg Chad, Niger, Tunisia) 
are not individually so important to us: but they add up to a market and a political bloc which 
is by no means negligible. Moreover, Gaddafi's meddling also extends to countries where we 
have considerable stakes (eg Nigeria, Ghana, Sudan and Egypt).142    
From the above discussion, it is clear that, no political common interests were shared 
between the two countries. On the contrary, all the Libyan foreign policy conflicted 
with political and strategic British interests in the Middle East (Arab-Israeli conflict), 
the Mediterranean (Malta) and Africa. In other words, both countries were opposed 
each other.
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Conclusion 
Gaddafi's foreign policy in particular towards Britain can be considered as one of the 
main reasons that had kept relations between the two countries at a very low level. The 
British government viewed the foreign policy of Gaddafi as opposed to British 
international interests. Gaddafi's foreign policy was opposite to British international 
interests, thus, Libya was described by the British as so unpredictable, unacceptable 
and untrustworthy.143 It is also sometimes seen in Gaddafi himself, as he was not 
mentally stable. Gaddafi was well known to be mentally unbalanced, as perceived by 
the British government. There were 'precedents for mental derangement in national 
leaders. President Sukarno’s mental balance was thought to have been disturbed by his 
kidney complaint during the Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia'.144 
 London failed to steer the RCC over its intentions towards the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and make the regime pro-Western. In early 1970 Gaddafi declared ‘that his greatest 
ambition was to see a free, sovereign and independent Palestine' and ‘to prepare the 
Arab world for the annihilation of Israel’.145 Over time it became clear that the RCC 
did not subscribe to maintaining a shared strategic position with Britain, because of its 
Pan Arab, anti–Western political orientation, and proclamations of support for the 
Palestinian cause, as well as the contradiction of interests in the Mediterranean and 
Africa. The two countries became politically opposed. 
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The British-Libyan dialogue took place in early 1970 regarding Libya’s attitude 
towards Israel led to the cancellation of the Chieftains contract, as the British did not 
trust the Libyans over this matter. The Libyans considered this as a support to Israel 
against Libya. No common interests were made in this regard, and it became clear that 
the two countries had different positions from the Arab-Israeli conflict.  No doubt all 
this had a major impact on the relations between Libya and the UK. The collapse of 
negotiations over the arms contracts led to a more hard-line position in Libyan policy. 
Gaddafi nationalised British oil interests in Libya.  
All these events mentioned here occurred in the same period when both countries were 
evaluating their relations after 1969, which made a lot of overlap and lack of 
understanding, and led both countries to take a hostile attitude towards each other. The 
British-Libyan negotiation over the arms contract in the next chapter will show how 
much the Libyan foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict affected the British-
Libyan relations, particularly in the field of arms trade. The inflexibility of Gaddafi in 
the problem of outstanding issues and the nationalisation of the oil companies, 
describes the extent of the change that has occurred in Libyan politics as well as the 
transition from a pro-Western state to a state hostile to Western interests, namely the 
British. All these issues will be discussed in depth in the subsequent chapters.   
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Chapter Two: Evaluation of British-Libyan relations after 1969 and 
the outstanding issues 
This chapter considers the British response to the regime change in 1969, and the 
debates which took place between the Libyan and British governments concerning the 
new relations of the two countries after 1969. The aim is to highlight the difficulties 
which the two governments faced in the process of developing a new basis for Libyan-
British relations, and to the subsequent changes to Libyan foreign policy thereafter. It 
also examines the problems which emerged between the two sides and the development 
of British-Libyan relations after 1969. 
Britain evaluates its relations with Libya after 1969 
After 1 September 1969 the British government made a decision to re-evaluate its 
relations with Libya, particularly in the field of arms contracts as it attached a great 
importance to the British policy towards the situation in the Middle East because of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and Britain's position in this conflict as well as Britain’s interests 
in the region and in Libya in particular.146  Britain also agreed on 13 December 1969, 
to withdraw its remaining troops from Libya by the end of March 1970. Additionally, 
the two governments were agreed to terminate the 1953 Treaty and later to discuss the 
new framework of the new British-Libyan relations.147 There still, however, remained 
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a number of what later became outstanding questions, which needed to be solved, if 
relations were to develop after the evacuation of the British base in Libya.  
On 4 September 1969, the Labour government decided that the arms deliveries to Libya 
should be further considered.148 The key issue of the British arms contracts was the 
Chieftains contract. The consideration of these contracts was based on different views. 
The FCO supported the delivery of tanks to Libya after considering all the benefits and 
disadvantages that may result from such supplying suspension.  The British Secretary 
of State said, one of the key problems was that the supply of the tanks had already 
attracted negative parliamentary attention, particularly in the context that the weapons 
might be used against Israel. This was unlikely to be a problem in the short-term, 
however, because it would take 5 years before the Libyans were capable of using the 
Chieftains effectively. In addition the Chieftains require extensive support facilities 
which did not exist in any Arab country and could only be supplied by the British.149 
The British Secretary of State had also indicated that withholding or cancelling the 
Chieftains contract would strongly affect the British economic and strategic interests 
in Libya. Britain had engaged in large arms contracts sales with the former Libyan 
regime, therefore, any British action to withhold or cancel the Chieftains contract 
would cause a serious loss of business to the British Air Defence Industry and the 
civilian field. The British exports to Libya were amounting in total to between £150 
and £200 million. Thus, cancelling or postponing the delivery of Chieftains would put 
British trade with Libya at risk, worsen Anglo-Libyan relations and would doubtlessly 
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effect British oil interests. 150  In addition, it was feared, the cancellation of the 
Chieftains contract would make Libya turn to the Soviet Union to supply it with arms 
which in turn would replace Western arms sales in Libya. This would further lead to 
increased Soviet penetration and influence in the southern flank of NATO and would 
seriously harm the political and Strategic interests of Western Europe. 151  Libyan 
requests for arms from the Soviet Union would lead to a serious loss of business to the 
British defence industry. Because of these reasons Michael Stewart recommended that 
all existing arms contracts with Libya should go forward as planned.152 
A number of Ministers said that the question of supplying Chieftains to Libya could 
not be separated from the Arab-Israeli conflict and Britain's relationship with both 
parties to the conflict. They insisted that accepting to supply Libya with Chieftains 
should be balanced by a decision to supply them to Israel too. However, the Ministers 
indicated that the two cases were not parallel. The British government had a firm 
contract with the Libyans for which the British government had received £10 million, 
whereas there was no contract with Israeli. Thus, ‘It would be impossible to persuade 
the Libyans that the cancellation of their contract was a justifiable consequence of a 
decision not to enter into a commitment with Israel’. 153  Stewart indicated that 
supplying Chieftains to Israel would considerably affect British interests in the Arab 
countries. The situation became even more difficult following representations from 
many Arab countries who spoke about the question of supplying Chieftains to Israel.154 
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The British government had more interests in Arab countries than in Israel as the 
Britain commercial transactions in Arab countries were many times greater than in 
Israel. As a result of this, the British government did not want to be in conflict with the 
Arab governments as they could harm the British economy through their holding of 
Sterling and through their interference with flow of oil. It could also pose a serious risk 
to the lives and properties of British people in the Arab region.155   
On 16 October 1969, the British government argued that refusal to supply Chieftain Tanks to 
Libya would undoubtedly put British interests in Libya at risk, and would cause 
unemployment in the industries concerned and cancellation charges. It would also put at risk 
the over-flying right and military training facilities which they enjoyed in Libya.156   
Stewart stated that ‘military balance between Israel and the Arabs show that Israel was 
not in danger of defeat and that on present evidence we could expect Israel to win a 
war in the next 5 years’.157 In this same report, Stewart emphasised that ‘Israel must be 
enabled to survive [….]’158My sympathies were with Israel’ and in general policy we 
should ‘allow Israel to buy in Britain such arms ....to defend herself’.159 
The MOD also agreed that Israel was the superior military force in the Middle East. It 
warned, too that arms sales to Israel would put British commercial relations with the 
Arabs in jeopardy. In addition to that, sales of the Chieftains to Israel would bring the 
important British training facilities in Libya to an end.160 Cabinet Secretary, Burke 
Trend (1963-1973) agreed with the view of the FCO and MOD insisting on obtaining 
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the maximum extent possible of weapons sales to Libya. He went on to recommend 
that 'we (the British) should extract the maximum of advantage from the concessions 
in terms of a guarantee of the continuation of training facilities, over flying rights, other 
defence contracts'161 
 However, the British government's decision whether to supply Chieftains to Libya or 
not would depend on the position of the Libyan government concerning the arms 
contract as a whole. Harold Wilson said if the Libyans  
Adopted an unreasonable attitude in this matter, we should be better placed to indicate that 
we could no longer fulfil the order for Chieftains tanks. If they tried to cancel some of their 
other orders but to hold us to the Chieftains contract, it would be impossible for us to accept 
an arrangement of this kind if we were at the same time refusing to supply Israel with tanks.162  
Wilson was against supplying the Chieftains to Libya and denying them to Israel. The 
British Prime Minister argued that at the present time the British government knew 
very little about the attitude and intentions of the new regime in Libya; therefore, the 
first British objective must be to explore the attitudes of the new regime towards the 
international issues and British interests in Libya and then to determine the British 
position accordingly. ‘Subject to this, in our initial approach to the Libyans, we should 
neither commit ourselves specifically to the supply of Chieftains nor rule it out’.163     
Cabinet Ministers Richard Crossman and Barbara Castle mentioned some possible 
reasons behind Wilson’s attitude. Castle said: most of us at DOPC were ‘appalled to 
learn that the Foreign Office and the MOD are preparing to supply Chieftains to Libya’. 
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Wilson was the only one who ‘made it clear that he was in favour’ of supplying the 
Chieftains to Israel. Castle considered Wilson’s attitude an electoral liability as it 
seemed to discriminate in favour of Israel.164 Crossman stated that: Wilson wanted to 
supply the Chieftains to Israel whereas Stewart supported supplying them to Libya, 
which was supported by the MOD also. He added that Wilson was a strong supporter 
of Israel. Wilson was concerned about the election in 1970, so he was unwilling to 
antagonise the Jewish vote.165 
On 4 November 1969, the British government decided not to dispatch the consignment 
of the six Chieftains due to be delivered in December 1969 to Libya, until it discovered 
the attitude and intentions of the new regime in international policy.166  The DOPC 
agreed that Britain’s commercial position was likely to be threatened by an action from 
Arab nations, if the Chieftains were sold to Israel. It was agreed that any decision on 
supplying tanks to Libya needed a final assessment of the risks to British interests if 
the Libyan contract was cancelled and so a decision on supply was postponed.167 
Indeed, this decision was also taken for immediate several reasons. Following the 
Libyan request to evacuate British troops, it was made clear also that the chance of 
retaining the training facilities would not be possible now. The British had attached 
great importance to that provision. There was also a demonstration in Tripoli against 
the existence of British troops in Libya which caused damage to the British embassy. 
There was a feeling that the new regime might be reluctant to restrain itself, but rather 
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be tempted to exploit such street violence. It was also felt that the decision of the British 
government not to supply Chieftain Tanks to Israel at this stage should be balanced 
with not to supplying them to Libya.168  
The Chieftains was affected by all these reasons. Moreover, the British decision was 
based more than anything else on the aim of preserving British interests, first with the 
Arab world, and secondly, to maintaining its good relations with Israel. At the same 
time, the British government was also keen to maintain its interests in Libya, as much 
as they could, until the British government could explore the future of British-Libyan 
cooperation, especially in the procurement of weapons. It seems that the British 
government had made a balance between their interests in Libya and the reaction of the 
Libyan government on British-Libyan cooperation in the future, and this balance had 
to be reached. From what has been mentioned, it is clear that it was difficult for Britain 
to find a compromise to ensure that the British interests in Libya and British relations 
with Israel and the other Arab countries would not be negatively affected. Undoubtedly, 
the British decision would be at the expense of one side or the other. As a consequence, 
such a decision would affect the interests of Britain with one of these parties.  
Events in Libya in the early 1970s did not encourage the British to deliver the 
Chieftains. Gaddafi’s statements regarding the war on Israel were unhelpful: namely 
that 'Libya’s armed forces would have the great honour to take part in, with men and 
arms, in the battle of liberation of the Arab soil', to liberate Arab land, worried British 
government.169 
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In March 1970, the British government indefinitely suspended the supply of Chieftain 
Tanks to Libya, citing the political situation in the Middle East and arguing that their 
supply would upset the Arab-Israeli power balance.170  The British expected in these 
circumstances that the Libyans were likely to react adversely to a refusal to supply 
Chieftains, which would undoubtedly affect the British interests in Libya, particularly 
the remaining arms contract. To mollify this, it was thought therefore, that some offer 
of different tank types should be made to the Libyans.171  The British government thus 
made a new offer to the Libyans to supply 35 Centurions during the coming financial 
years and 38 during the following years. Sixteen more Centurions could be added later 
if required. In principle the British government had also agreed to supply the Libyans 
with the new Vickers tank when it became available for delivery in about two years’ 
time.172    
The British then decided to enter into negotiations with the Libyans in order to discover 
Libya’s position concerning some international issues, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict 
in general and Libya’s attitude towards British interests in Libya, especially in the light 
of Britain's refusal to supply tanks to Libya. Based on the position of the Libyans, the 
British government would determine the future of their relationship with the new 
regime in Libya. 
 
 
                                                 
170 TNA, CAB 148/110, supply of arms to Libya, meeting minutes, 25 March 1970 
171 TNA, CAB 148/91, supply of arms to Libya, meeting minutes,  25 March 1970 
172Ibid  
74 
 
Libyan claims against the British government 
After the evacuation of the British troops from Libya the two governments agreed to 
establish a new base for a new era of relations. At this stage the two parties had different 
agendas. Some sticking points between the two governments arose in light of new 
circumstances. Both governments agreed that it was necessary to find a solution to 
them before entering into discussions concerning the structure and the quality of new 
relations. On the Libyan side the new government requested re-evaluation of some of 
the arms contracts that had been signed with the former Libyan regime: the Chieftain 
tank contract signed on 21 April 1969, and the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) 
contract signed on 28 April 1968. The absence of £16.25 million of payment for renting 
of the military base from 1965 to 1970 related to the 1953 treaty financial agreement 
was also contentious.173   
There were also some British claims against the Libyan government which occurred 
after 1969. All of them were centred on the nationalisation of British interests. Only 
one claim was governmental; the rest were directed by either private companies or 
individuals. These included a claim by Shell, for compensation of the nationalisation 
of their marketing organisation in 1970 and of their production assets in 1973. This was 
later to be settled, by the Libyan government on 12 June 1974; the compensation value 
was about £5 million. Compensation for the nationalisation of Barclays Bank in 1970 
was valued at about £7 million. Governmental claims totalled about £1 million and 
were mostly owed to the Ministry of Defence; the largest of which was for the Libyan 
share of the cost of the British Naval Mission (£580,000). 
                                                 
173 TNA, FCO 39 /634, Mr. Maitland to FCO 
75 
 
British arms contracts with the monarchy 1968-69 
In order to secure the growing British interests in Libya, and also to strengthen the 
monarchy to be able to survive after the 1967 war, the Libyan Minister of Defence, 
Sayid Hamid Al-Abaidi, visited London between 26 February and 8 March 1968 to 
discuss arming the Libyan forces.174 On 25 March 1968 the MOD visited Libya. Later 
both sides agreed to comprehensive arms contracts.175 
Chieftain Tanks 
British-Libyan committee aiming to study the needs of the Libyan army was 
established under the Chairmanship of Lieutenant-General Sir John Mogg. The 
committee’s report, ‘recommended that the Libyan army should be re-organised and 
re-equipped with the latest British army equipment, including Chieftain Tanks’. 
Consequently, the British government gave approval in principle to the supply of 
Chieftains to Libya in May 1968. The Libyan government subsequently made a request 
to purchase 188 of these tanks, which were 78 more than the number recommended in 
the Mogg report. The supply of this higher number was approved by British 
government.176   
On 30 October 1968, the British government agreed to provide the necessary 
equipment for the Libyan army. According to the Chieftains contract the delivery of 
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the first 6 thanks was due in Libya in December 1969, with 40 in the second half of 
1970, and four or five a month thereafter until the end of the delivery in 
1973. 177 However, the delivery of the Chieftains was suspended by the British 
government after the Libyan coup in September 1969. The Libyan government had so 
far paid £9.75 million under the equipment contract. This included purchases for some 
other military equipment, such as Abbott self-propelled guns, armoured cars and other 
minor weapons, spares, ammunition and equipment for the Libyan army.178 
An air defence system 
On 28 April 1968, an equipment contract to buy the radar integrated system was signed 
between the Libyan government and the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC). The deal 
included ‘5 Thunderbird batteries (90 Missiles), 5 Rapier batteries (2340 Missiles), 5 
tactical control groups, an air defence operations centre, mobile radar reporting posts 
and supporting communications’. The contract was evaluated On 2 February 1969 a 
further contract was added for BAC to provide ‘support services for the equipment 
delivered, including initial system maintenance and the training of the Libyan 
personnel who would eventually man the system’. The possibility of including aircraft 
in such a scheme was considered at that stage, but rejected later because of the ‘fear of 
treading on the toes of the Americans who traditionally supplied and trained the Libyan 
air force’.179 The support contract valued at £20.4 million. Under the terms of the two 
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contracts, the Libyan government had already paid £35.5 million to BAC deliveries of 
the first surface-to-air missiles due to take place in early 1971,180 worth in total £511 
million.181   
The Libyan financial claim 
Under the terms of the 1953 Anglo-Libyan Treaty, the British government had agreed 
to provide an annual subsidy to Libyan government, which was to be reviewed at the 
end of each year. In return, Libya was to provide an army and air force base in Eastern 
Libya.182  One million pounds was to be paid annually by the British government to the 
Libyan government from 1953 to 1958. This money was to be used for the development 
of Libya. Also, an additional £3.75 million annually from 1959 to 1963 was offered by 
way of financial assistance towards the Libyan budget.183  ‘Before the end of each 
succeeding period of five years during the currency of the agreement, the United 
Kingdom would, taking into account the needs of Libya in consultation with the 
government of Libya, undertake to give such suitable financial assistance annually 
during the following period of five years as may be agreed between the two 
governments’.184  
In 1958 both parties agreed that the total of the annual payment previously would be 
reduced from £3.75 million to £3.25 million for the period of 5 years from 1 April 1958 
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to 31 March 1963. In the latter year, further discussions were agreed on a 10 year 
review of the Anglo-Libyan treaty of 1953 and its connected military and financial 
agreement should be continued until 1965, but that in the meantime Britain would 
continue to give financial assistance to Libya for the two financial years from 1 April 
1963 to 31 March 1965 at the rate of £3.25 million per annum.185  
In January and February 1965 further discussions continued between King Idris and 
Sir R Sarell, the British Ambassador in Libya. The British government claimed that 
both sides agreed that in the light of the significant improvement in the economy of 
Libya and the consequent improvement in the Libyan financial position as a result of 
Libya’s oil revenues there was no need for financial aid from Britain for the next 5 
years. This was agreed (informally and orally) between King Idris and the British 
Ambassador.186  Thus, no British payment was given to the Libyan government during 
the period from 1965 to 1970. 
British-Libyan negotiations on resolving the outstanding issues  
On 21 January 1970, the British and Libyan governments entered negotiations which 
in particular focused on the development of a framework of the relationship between 
the two countries. The negotiations also aimed to solve the issues related to contracts 
of arms. The negotiations initially started in January 1970 and continued through 1971 
until the British government suspended them in December of that year, following the 
Libyan decision to nationalise the assets of British Petroleum Company (BP). The 
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British primary objectives at this time were: ‘to explore the possibilities for Anglo-
Libyan co-operation in the future; to explore the attitude of the revolutionary command 
council (RCC) to the Arab-Israel conflict, with particular reference to the role they 
envisaged for the armed forces; to assess the prospects for British interests in Libya’.187  
Meanwhile the Libyan aim was to find out the reason for the British government not 
supplying the  shipment of 6 Chieftain tanks that were due to be delivered to Libya in 
December 1969, and whether Britain would deliver them or not. 
The question that might be raised here is how the British government would explore 
the future of British-Libyan co-operation. 
To do so the British side began its negotiations with the Libyans by emphasising the 
fate of the two British military missions which remained in Libya after the withdrawal 
of British forces from Libya, and after the termination of the 1953 treaty. Meanwhile, 
the British government was not opposed to keeping the two missions in Libya on the 
condition that there must be a formal agreement on the status of these missions and 
necessary privileges for them.188 However, the British government made it clear to the 
Libyans that any agreement most includes the future of the British naval and military 
missions in Libya.189  
One conclusion that can be drawn from the above mentioned negotiations is that the 
British government was not just concerned about the legal status of the two missions, 
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but also about the future of military cooperation. This could lead us to assume that, the 
acceptance of the Libyan government to allow the British missions to remain in Libya 
meant that there would be future cooperation and new military equipment requirement. 
However, the leave of the missions would affect the whole military cooperation 
between the two countries. Conditionally, the British missions and the whole military 
cooperation between the two countries were depending on the volume of arms that 
Britain would agree to supply to Libya, in particular the Chieftains. 
Mr Maitland argued that: 
To assess how British interests in Libya will be affected if we decide not to supply Chieftains 
[...] in this event any British relationship with the Libyan army would come to an end, and 
our promising relationship with the Libyan Navy would be up as serious risk. The military 
mission would go. It is unlikely that the Libyans would take any further equipment under the 
army and public security force contracts [...] the effects of a negative decision on Chieftains 
would by no means be confined to the defence field.190  
On November 1970 Jalloud indicated that the Libyan decision on the British mission’s 
future in Libya especially for the military mission depended on two main points, the 
outcome of the negotiations and on the volume of arms deals that was agreed.191  
Therefore, whether or not the missions were allowed to remain in Libya would 
determine the future of British relations with Libya, especially in the field of military 
cooperation. In order to settle the future status of the missions, the Libyans conditioned 
a prior agreement on the problems of BAC, the broader financial agreements and the 
Chieftains. The Libyans expressed that ‘The future status of the missions would depend 
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on the volume and importance of the military cooperation between the two 
countries’.192 
No agreement was reached on the matter of the military and naval missions, until 25 
January 1972 when the two governments agreed to terminate the 1953 treaty and the 
missions had been withdrawn.193 The agreement also included that any Libyan military 
requirements for arms and training in both Libya and the UK will need a new agreement 
between the two parties.194    
British-Libyan negotiation over the financial problem 
The RCC believed that the British government owed Libya £3.25 million per year from 
1965 to 1970 for the facilities enjoyed by the British forces. These payments were 
stopped by the British government on the pretext that Libya had become rich from 
oil.195 In this issue there was a completely different point of view from the two parties. 
Another factor which had affected the agreement between the two governments over 
the financial matter was the absence of any formal agreement between the British 
government and the previous regime, showing that there was an agreement to stop 
paying the subsidy. In addition there was no objection from the government of King 
Idris about the discontinuation of payment or claim for renewal of the subsidy in the 
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period from 1965 to 1970, although the RCC did not recognise this.196   
On the one hand, the Libyan government believed that the subsidy payment referred to 
Article 3 of the 1953 treaty (military agreement) which indicates that ‘In return for 
facilities provided by His Majesty the King of Libya for the British armed forces in 
Libya on conditions to be agreed upon, Her Britannic Majesty will provide financial 
assistance to His Majesty the King of Libya, on terms to be agreed upon as 
aforesaid’.197 
On the other hand, the British government denied the Libyan view and insisted that the 
subsidy payment referred to Article 2 of the 1953 Treaty (financial agreement) which 
shows that:  
In order to carry out the purpose of this Agreement the United Kingdom Government [...] will 
give financial assistance annually to the Government of Libya for the duration of the 
Agreement. For the five financial years from the 1st of April, 1953 to the 31st of March, 1958, 
£1,000,000[...]will be paid annually[...]to other development organisations set up thereafter 
and £2,750,000 will be paid as financial assistance[...]Before the end of each succeeding 
period of five years[...]the United Kingdom Government will, taking into account the needs 
of Libya in consultation with the Government of Libya, undertake to give such suitable 
financial assistance annually during the following period of five years as may be agreed 
between the two Governments.198 
The Libyan review was based on that fact that the subsidy was connected with the 
facilities. Therefore, as long as the British remained in Libya, the subsidy should be 
continued. In addition, they believed that as the subsidy payment was linked to the 
review of each 5 years of the treaty, and that no formal review had taken place in 1965. 
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Thus they did not accept the oral agreement between King Idris and the British 
Ambassador.199 The British were not convinced by the Libyan view.  
The two governments referred their dispute to a different article of the treaty, and they 
stuck to their respective views. It was quite likely that if the two countries were more 
flexible in the other two issues (BAC and Chieftains contracts), this issue would be 
resolved, as the amount of the money was not huge. 
The British government had emphasised that:   
The treaty did not make it a condition that there was a connection between the continued 
presence of British troops and a fixed sum of money. The treaty did not stipulate that if the 
two sides agreed that the amount should be nil British troops should leave Libya.200  
Furthermore, in 1963 there was an agreement to continue the payment of the subsidy 
until 1965. In 1965 there was another agreement between the two governments that in 
light of the improvement of the Libyan financial position after the discovery of oil, 
there was no need for financial aid from Britain to the Libyan government. Thus, the 
British government did not fulfill any financial obligation towards the Libyan 
government. However the 1965 agreement was not formally written. It was only an 
oral agreement between King Idris and the British Ambassador.201   
Negotiations on the financial issue failed to be resolved. The Libyans demanded proof 
that a formal agreement existed between the British government and the previous 
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Libyan regime for Britain to stop paying annual aid, while the British similarly 
demanded written evidence of earlier Libyan objections to the British not paying the 
annual subsidy after 1965.  Neither side could offer such proof. 
British-Libyan negotiations to the resolve arms contracts disputes  
1- Chieftain Tanks contract 
According to Mr Maitland who was the British Ambassador in Tripoli and the head of 
the British negotiators team, one of the key problems regarding British Chieftain sales 
to the Middle East was the British insistence on maintaining balance, which meant that 
sales to Libya would equally open the door for sales to Israel. In turn this became a 
very sensitive issue after several Arab countries objected strongly to the supply of 
Chieftains to Israel. The Chieftains issue had no doubt attached the public opinion in 
both Britain and Arab would.202 The British government’s decision for suspending the 
supply of Chieftains was related to several reasons as the British ambassador pointed 
out throughout the negotiations with the Libyans. Firstly, as already noted, the British 
arms supply policy was based on the principle not to upset the peace settlement between 
the Arabs and Israel and not to impair the balance of power between the two parties. 
Thus, supplying Libya with this kind of tank would undoubtedly affect Israeli-British 
relations, and harm the balance of power in the region.203 There were doubts too in 
British minds as to the use to which these tanks would be put.   
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Maitland, for example, referred to Colonel Gaddafi’s public rhetoric in which he said: ‘the 
Libyan armed forces would have the honour of serving with men and weapons in the battle 
for the liberation of Arab land’. The French press had already reported the arrival of two 
battalions of United Arab Republic UAR troops to Libya. Similarly, the Egyptian press 
noted that Libya had offered to send troops to the Egyptian-Israeli frontline. In Cairo it was 
also agreed that in the future the defence policies of Libya, Sudan and the UAR would be 
co-ordinated. Maitland added that in the light of these events the British government had 
taken a decision to withhold the delivery of Chieftains until receiving clarification from the 
Libyan government about the future use of these tanks.204 The British Ambassador further 
pointed out that the British government had yet to decide whether to supply the Chieftain to 
Libya or not, and its decision would depend on the Libyan attitude towards the Arab-Israeli 
tensions. The British government asked, therefore a series of questions.205 These questions 
were; ‘First would any Libyan forces serve outside Libya? Secondly, would any equipment 
sold by Britain to Libya be used by such forces outside Libya? Thirdly, would any British 
equipment supplied to Libya be transferred to non-Libyan forces?’.206  Rightly or wrongly, 
the Libyan government refused to offer such assurances. The Libyans clarified their attitude 
by saying that Libya and Britain have had common interests since World War II; therefore, 
Libya did not expect to be treated like Israel, and ‘it was clear to the Libyan side that her 
contract was tied to political attitudes’. The Libyan government was disappointed with such 
a request indicating that the story in Le Figaro (the French press) was not true and there 
were no Egyptian troops in Libya.207 The Libyan government considered Britain had taken 
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a pro-Israeli stance. Jallud said that ‘A refusal to supply Libya with Chieftains would be 
tantamount to indirect support of Israel’. 208 
Major Jallud later clarified his position, stating that Libyan troops had been sent to 
Egypt but for training purposes only, from which they would shortly return. He also 
insisted that, the arms to be supplied would be used by the Libyan armed forces for 
Libya’s defence only and would not be transferred elsewhere. However, he warned that 
the refusal to supply Chieftains to Libya would be considered by the Libyan 
government as indirect support to Israel against the Arabs. In addition Jallud wondered 
why these questions which were now being raised by the British government had not 
appeared when the contract was signed with the former regime.209   
Maitland responded by arguing that when the original Anglo-Libyan contract was 
signed in April 1969, there were discussions about political questions and cooperation 
in various fields. At that time the British government knew well the positions of the 
former Libyan regime. The cooperation between it and the British government had 
existed for many years, and it knew that the Chieftains would be used by the Libyan 
army only, for Libyan defence alone and would not be used against Israel in any Arab-
Israeli confrontation.210 Moreover, after the Libyan revolution both parties agreed to 
terminate the 1953 treaty. This Treaty had been the basis of all British-Libyan relations 
in the field of armaments, military training, the provision of military equipment and 
weapons to the Libyan army. It spelt out that Britain was obliged to supply weapons to 
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the Libyans, and it was under these terms that Britain had signed the April 1969 
contract with the former regime to supply the 188 Chieftains.211  Maitland also pointed 
out that: 
There was therefore a direct connection between the contract and the treaty which both sides 
had agreed to end. This connection was the legal basis for the contract. The treaty defined the 
nature of the political relationship between Britain and Libya. The former political 
relationship did not conform to the present circumstances.212  
Thus, the British government had the right to review the framework in which there 
would be co-operation in the defence field in the future.  
In the new circumstances the information which was available at the time of the former 
regime was lacking.213  Meanwhile, the British government had fears about their use in 
any possible future wars against Israel, either directly or by being passed over to Egypt 
in particular.214   
It is a fact that the Israeli and British governments expressed concern over the UAR‘s 
increasing influence in Libya after the revolution. Moreover, Israel became deeply 
concerned about the sale of Chieftain Tanks to Libya even before the revolution. 
Remez, Israel’s Ambassador in the UK had earlier noted that “If the King died and 
there was a coup, they could be transported elsewhere overnight”.215  
Yogal Allon, the deputy Prime Minister of Israel, indicated his government's concern 
about the growth of the UAR's influence over Libya, describing Libya as “The UAR‘s 
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backyard”. There were now two battalions of UAR troops in Libya, and according to 
Israeli information, there would shortly be a third. Libya’s wealth and sparse 
population was a great attraction for the UAR.216  
However, on 17 June 1970 the British government appeared to reconsider partially its 
decision, offering the supply of Centurions and Vickers tanks instead of the 
Chieftain.217  Furthermore, the British government was to supply the other items in the 
original contract and to discuss any new Libyan requests for military equipment which 
were not included in the Chieftains contract.218  
This attempted compromise did not impress Libyan negotiators. Major Jallud’s 
response was that ‘Since the 1 September Libya’s policy had been clear. She would co-
operate with everyone for the benefit of Libya. Relations would not be built by linking 
one event to another or one promise to another but on a basis of mutual trust’.219   In 
the viewpoint of the Libyan government, the justifications put forward by Britain were 
rejected. It continued to argue that the situation in the Middle-East did not prevent 
Britain from implementing the original contract.  
However, the offer of Centurions and Vickers was accepted in principle. 220 
Furthermore, the Libyan government considered the contracts as a whole and wanted 
to buy other military equipment. This would depend on reaching a satisfactory solution 
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on the subject of the air defence Scheme, as well as a promise from the British 
government to supply the Chieftains at a later stage if the political situation improved. 
Then the Libyans would be able to buy new military equipments under a new 
contract.221 One month later, the Libyan government rejected the offer of Centurions, 
and demanded the return of its £9 million deposit, together with compound interest and 
damage.222 At the same time, the Libyan government began to receive the T54/55 
Soviet Tanks, which were considered by the British as a reason behind the Libyan 
rejection of the British alternative offer. It was also considered as a threat to the British 
interests in Libya.223  In view of these facts, it is quite likely that though the Libyans 
continued negotiations on the subject of the Chieftain tanks, they were despaired of not 
receiving the Chieftains. Therefore, they turned to the Soviet tanks. Another conclusion 
that can be drown here is that, by turning to the Soviets for tanks, Libya might have 
thought, this would make the British government have second thought about its 
decision over the Chieftains in particular, and the whole issue of arms contracts in the 
future. 
Whatever the British justifications for not supplying Chieftains were, the Libyan party 
did not accept them. In the viewpoint of the Libyan government, the British decision 
not to provide Chieftains was a bad sign on the British-Libyan relations, and did not 
serve the common interests of both countries in the future.224  Negotiations over the 
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Chieftains contract dispute did not lead to  the required progress needed for solving the 
Chieftains disagreement and rebuilding good relations between the two countries. 
2- The Air Defence Scheme 
The discussions on the problem of a radar system were conducted at the same time as 
discussions were taking place over the problem of the Chieftains, and the problem of 
£16.25 million worth of unpaid rent for the facilities enjoyed by the British forces for 
the period from 1965 to 1970. The RCC considered the air defence system void, 
because it was unsuitable for Libya.  
Major Jallud said that: 
The British government is completely responsible for the air defence scheme which was 
concluded by the previous regime, since she offered us consultants, advice on the question, 
and, as even the British press at that time revealed, it was imposed and was not an ordinary 
contract. The future relations between our two countries depend on it: it is the door and the 
window for economic, technical, scientific and trade relations and on it depends whether this 
door will be open or shut.225  
The British government, and in particular the Ministry of Technology, the Ministry of 
Defence and the British Ambassador in Libya played a major role in the early 
negotiations between the Libyan government and BAC, presenting proposals which 
had been worked out in consultation with BAC. However, when war broke out in June 
1967, the King of Libya and his government realised the vulnerability of the defensive 
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and offensive capabilities of the Libyan air force. This then led to the BAC proposal to 
be accepted by the Libyans.226   
On 4 December 1967, the Secretary of State for Defence wrote to Bakhush, the Libyan 
Prime Minister, advocating the purchase of the new Air Defence Scheme. On 27 March 
1967 the Secretary of State wrote a further letter to Bakhush to reassure the Libyans 
that the scheme had the support of the British Ministry of Defence.227   This was 
considered later by the Libyan government to constitute the active involvement of the 
British government in the contract.  
The talks over the support contract also faced great difficulties at the Libyan military 
institution as a whole, and put the scheme at risk even before 1969. There were many 
objections to the proposal within Libya. Some said there were no threats against Libya 
from its neighbours. Others, such as Gaddafi himself and his colleagues were 
unconvinced that Libya needed such sophisticated equipment.  With regards to the cost 
of the equipment contract, there were rumours that the negotiators were involved in 
corruption.  Moreover, there were Libyan suspicions that the "management fee (profit, 
salaries and administration of the 750-odd British personnel who worked in Libya) led 
to prolonged wrangles over individual items in the contract."228  After signing the 
contract, some flaws emerged, including the fact that the scheme was far too big for 
Libyan needs and abilities in the future. In December 1968 a new Libyan government 
was formed, and Wanis Al-Gaddafi replaced Bakhush as Prime Minister. After he 
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became Prime Minister, Wanis withheld the £10 million instalment due under the 
equipment contract. However, the instalment was paid later, and the support contract 
was signed.229  
The new Libyan rulers claimed that the contract had been rejected during the time of 
the Hussein Maziq and Abdul Qadir al-Badri government because the radar system was 
not appropriate for Libya. After the proposal had been refused, the British Ambassador 
interfered and persuaded the King of the feasibility of the project. For all these reasons 
the Libyan government considered the contract illegal, and believed that the people 
who worked on it shared in the corruption. As well as this, they also thought that it 
contained many legal and financial errors.230  Consequently the Libyan government 
insisted that the British government was a part of the problem, because they had 
participated in previous discussions between the British aircraft corporation and the 
Libyan government, and had a significant role in persuading the Libyans to accept the 
project. Therefore, the Libyan government asked the British government to enter into 
government to government negotiations to find a solution to this matter.  
After 1969 the new rulers had suspended the payment of an instalment of £7 million 
due under the equipment contract on 15 December and considered the contract of the 
Air Defence System void. On 24 December BAC terminated the contract as a result of 
non-payment of the second instalment.231  
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The RCC regarded that if no solution was reached, then the corporation should give the 
Libyan government its money back. If they did find a solution, however, then there 
could be a fresh beginning to relations between the governments.232  
In the light of these events the Libyan government considered that all the cooperation 
in the military, economic and political fields would depend on the settlement of these 
issues. Otherwise, future cooperation would be difficult. The main problem here is that 
the Libyan contract, which was signed with BAC, was a contract with a company which 
was completely independent and free from government control. Thus, the British 
government attitude was negative. 
The British said that the government was aware of the discussions that took place 
between the Libyan government and BAC, but due to the fact that the British 
government was not involved in the contract, it had no direct responsibility in the 
matter. "If the British government intervened over this contract, the company could 
have grounds for legal action against the British government in the courts". However, 
the British government offered its good faith by offering to mediate between the two 
parties.233 As a first step, it asked the Libyans to look at the contract again and decide 
what items it still wanted and which they had no further interest in. The Libyans 
accepted the British offer. However, they insisted that the British government must be 
involved in any agreement or new contract with BAC. According to Kekhiya, who was 
the Under Secretary, Minister of Unity and Foreign Affairs and a member of the Libyan 
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negotiation team, the Libyan government was ready to take some of the materials 
manufactured by the company and might buy other things. Libya promised to set up a 
sub-committee to examine the status of all the military equipment contracts.234  On 
March 1971 the Libyan government announced that they would take the air defence 
system. However, they asked the British government to prepare a revised scheme, 
making as much use as possible of the equipment produced under the BAC contract. 
The Libyans wanted to go towards the installation of this system under a new contract 
negotiated directly with HMG.235  
A Libyan committee visited London later to reconsider the disposal of the equipment 
so far produced by BAC under the terminated contract. The Libyan government had 
also agreed to take delivery of the 114 Vigilants covered by another one of their 
terminated contracts. BAC agreed to receive a representative of the Libyan Ministry of 
Defence in the UK. In addition BAC agreed to treat the Vigilants contracts separately 
from the contentious air defence scheme.236   
The Libyans had declared that they wanted to make further arms purchases from Britain, but 
they had paid £32 million towards the cost of the air defence scheme and they wanted to 
recover their money[...]They preferred to proceed with the contract. They did not insist on 
recovering the £32 million in cash, but were ready to accept material in lieu, some of which 
would have already been manufactured by BAC under the air defence scheme contract.237  
The negotiations were later to centre on how the Libyan government would define 
which items they wanted from the previous contract, how BAC would value these, and 
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on the legal details of the contract. However, the sticking point continued to be the 
Libyan insistence that the British government be party to the agreement.238   
Libya insisted that the British government ‘had played a major role in the conclusion 
of the contract. It was therefore fair, just and logical that they should be equally 
involved in reaching a solution for the present difficulties’. The British government 
refused to do so.239  
From mid June to early November 1970, no direct negotiations between the two parties 
took place. This was due to the change of the British Ambassador in Tripoli, who was 
the head of the British delegation at the negotiations, and the decision not to send 
another Ambassador until the beginning of 1971. The other reason was that the Libyans 
insisted that the new head of the British delegation should be of equal rank to the head 
of the Libyan delegation, and should be authorised to take decisions, especially 
important ones. 
However, the two governments later agreed to restart negotiations in London, and 
Major Jallud arrived in Britain. The negotiations, however, made no progress as both 
parties stuck to their original positions. It became clear to both governments that the 
issues of the Air defence Scheme and the Chieftain Tanks were the key issues of their 
dispute. In November 1970 the Libyan government pointed out that British interests in 
Libya would be at risk unless a satisfactory solution was reached on the outstanding 
issues. In his words Jallud said that:  
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These outstanding problems had to be resolved before forward movement could be resumed 
Anglo-Libyan relations. Until they were resolved British companies would not be permitted 
to benefit from the Libyan government's spending on development.240  
From the end of 1970 to the beginning of 1971 the British-Libyan negotiations went 
round in circles. On the one hand the British government needed to make its own 
decision regarding the future of British-Libyan  cooperation in the field of arms 
purchases, and whether Libya would require more contracts for the purchase of 
weapons or not. On the other hand the Libyans insisted that before entering into a 
discussion on the future of British-Libyan cooperation a solution must be found to the 
outstanding issues between the two parties, and the solution alone would determine the 
kind of cooperation which would exist in the future.241 In March 1971 the Libyan 
government was instructed to withhold purchases from Britain, which amounted to 
some £81 million at the time, until the British government met the claims arising from 
the Libyan government from its contract with BAC. 242  The British government 
regarded the Libyan measure as a serious threat to British interests in Libya. 
From what has been discussed, it appears that it became clear to the British government 
that no new military equipment orders would be made by the Libyans before their 
claims were met. The British Ambassador in Tripoli said that the British government 
should move quickly in order to save British interests in Libya. He suggested a package 
offer:  
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which would comprise of an agreement on the termination of the BAC contract, the army 
equipment contract and the Anglo-Libyan treaty of friendship of 1953 and its associated 
agreement, and a British offer to provide a simpler air defence system and to credit towards 
any military equipment the £9.5 million paid by the Libyans as a deposit for Chieftains.243  
The Ambassador added that a settlement might be reached at a considerably lower cost 
to the British government. The net cost to the British of such a package might be in the 
region of £10-12 million.244 
British offer to settle the outstanding issues 
Throughout the duration of the talks between the two parties, the British government 
did not accept any of the Libyan claims, and insisted that they did not fall under any 
legal or financial obligation to the Libyan government. However, in March 1971 the 
British government said that because they shared the Libyan government's aspiration 
to ensure the establishment of new relationships, they proposed a package offer to settle 
the outstanding matters between the two governments.245 
However, the British package was also prompted by two other important factors. The 
first was the arrival of a shipment of the T54/55 Soviet tanks to Libya, which might be 
considered as the beginning stages of future Libyan-Soviet cooperation, particularly in 
the military field. It could also be seen, as the founding of Soviet penetration in Libya. 
This would no doubt make a serious threat to the strategic interests of the Western 
countries and Britain in the region. The other factor was the Libyan decision to 
withhold purchases from Britain, and to not allow British companies to benefit from 
participating in the development plans drawn up by the Libyan government, which 
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Libya estimated at about £81 million. The policy of the British government in the 
negotiations with the Libyans was based on prolonging the negotiations as much as 
possible in order to reach an agreement with the Libyans at the lowest costs, and to 
ensure British interests in Libya. 
Thus, on 17 March 1971, the FCO recommended making an offer package to the 
Libyans. Alec Douglas-Home believed that the offer package was worth paying by way 
of insurance to the British interests in Libya and the returns in terms of sales, military 
and civil, which could be very large indeed. Douglas-Home warned that, any 
cancellation of this offer would increase the possibility of the Libyans looking to the 
Soviet Union for their military equipment, which would undoubtedly be regarded as 
hurtful discrimination against British firms.246   
In March 1971 the Conservative government offered the Libyan government a package 
consisting of an £8 million radar network in lieu of the previous BAC contract, an ex-
gratia payment of £3 million to settle the financial agreement, and the return of the £9 
million Chieftain deposit. The offer was conditional on no money being paid to the 
Libyan government until further military equipment orders had been received by the 
British government to a minimum value of £40-50 million.  
The Libyan government's response to the British offer was not wholly negative. They 
rejected the offer of £3 million because it was very low.247 On the Chieftain tanks they 
accepted repayment of the deposit, which they then used to buy other British military 
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equipment,248 and the matter of the Chieftain tank was dropped from the outstanding 
issues. On the BAC dispute, the Libyans initially appeared to accept the offer in 
principle. However, they asked the British government to make some amendments to 
it.249 The Libyans request included some new equipment, such as anti-aircraft guns and 
ground-to-air missiles, which were not included in the old contract. 250  In their 
memorandum on 5 July 1971 the FCO and MOD stated that in principle there would 
be no security objections to supply most of these items and in terms of commercial 
value the Libyan equipment was very attractive. Yet, there were problems with the 
supply of certain items of air defence.251 ‘The major air threat during the next decade’, 
it was thought, ‘-is expected to be at low altitude. Rapier will occupy a crucial position 
in our low level defence especially on the central front in Europe. Exposure of it to 
Russian intelligence, which is considered inevitable if it is in Libyan hands, would 
minimise that defence.’252 However, at the same time there was a risk that the Libyans 
would turn to the Soviet Union to get what they wanted. The British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence have indicated that,  
If we (the British government) cannot help them (the Libyans) to get one (Air Defence 
System)[...]they may turn to the Russian and there would be a risk that they then fall under 
Soviet influence. If this were to happen there could be an increase in the threat to NATO and 
the weakening of Western influence in Malta.253  
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The Libyan proposal was under the consideration of the British until the nationalisation 
of BP and the British package offer was withdrawn.     
In July 1971, the British government increased the £3 million financial agreement offer, 
to £6 million in cash, which made the total British package offer £14million. This was 
also refused by the Libyan side, because it was still not satisfactory.254 In December 
1971 the British government again increased the package offer made to the Libyans, 
increasing the radar element from £8 million to £19 million, making the total value of 
the package offer £25 million. Despite learning of this intention, the Libyan 
government nationalised the British Petroleum Company. In these circumstances the 
British government suspended the consultations regarding an increase in the package 
offer, withdrew the previous offer, and told the Libyans that they would not enter into 
any further negotiations until a satisfactory solution could be reached with BP.255 
British-Libyan re-negotiations over outstanding issues from 1974 to 
1979 
The outstanding problems between the British and Libyan governments changed 
slightly after 1974. Despite the Chieftain contract being resolved with the acceptance 
of the repayment of the £9 million deposit, the relationship deteriorated following the 
nationalisation of BP, and the declaration by Gaddafi of support for the IRA in June 
1972. In 1973 Libya also banned certain British consumer goods, which affected about 
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12% of British exports to Libya. This came as an apparent response from the Libyan 
government to Britain's decision to ban arms exports to Libya.256  
The Libyans, tried many times to persuade Britain to resume negotiations to resolve 
the outstanding issues between the countries, and to not link the British-Libyan dispute 
over BP with the other issues. This received little response from the British, who said 
that there should be a tangible progress on the BP front before the negotiations could 
be restarted to discuss substantive Anglo-Libyan problems.257 
The Libyans then attempted to restart negotiations through an Egyptian mediator. Mr 
Marawan, who was the adviser of the former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. He in 
turn tried to persuade the British to resume discussions, arguing that it would be better 
not to link the settlement between Libya and BP with re-started negotiations, because 
these latter discussions could take a long time to reach a settlement which would be 
satisfactory to both parties. In addition, if the British government put BP up front, this 
would block everything. The British government said that it would be very difficult to 
leave BP to one side. Therefore to resume discussions with Libya it would need good 
progress towards a satisfactory settlement.258 
 In early 1973, Libya embarked on a large internal development programme. In order 
to obtain the technology needed for the programme, the Libyans sought to improve 
relations with both Eastern and Western Europe. In this context, they expressed a strong 
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desire to improve their relationship with Britain, and in particular with a view, as the 
Libyans themselves called it, “to turning over a new page”. At that time the relations 
remained bad and it was difficult to renegotiate. In November 1974, the situation 
changed when, a settlement was reached between the Libyans and BP. In view of the 
Libyans the main obstacle to the resumption of talks had been removed.259 Thus, the 
British should resume negotiations; however, this was not the British view.  
The Libyans also said that they regretted the fact that certain difficulties still existed 
between Britain and Libya, such as outstanding issues between the two countries over 
the Air Defence Scheme and the lease of British military facilities in Libya. However, 
it was time to resolve them after the settlement had been reached between Libya and 
BP.260 The question needed to be asked here is, how keen Britain would remain to 
resolve the outstanding issues, in the light of all disputes occurred since December 
1971? 
Whilst accepting this offer Britain was not keen to return to negotiations for several 
reasons. Mr N C R Williams of the Near East and North Africa department argued that: 
We (the British government) took the view that while our relations remained so bad it was 
difficult to contemplate making the payment to Libya without which there could not be a full 
settlement, but that we should do what we could to avoid a complete breach.261  
Williams added that:  
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We (the British) need not be greatly concerned over our oil import from Libya, which is small, 
or over a threat to withdraw Libya’s small residual holdings of sterling, or even over a breach 
of relations. A denial of overflying right would, however, be inconvenient.262  
Britain also emphasised that since 1971 there had been a complete change in the global 
economic situation. Britain’s financial position was now much worse than in 1971 and 
Libya had a favourable balance. In these circumstances it was inconceivable that the 
British government would make any payment, either in cash or in credits, to the Libyan 
government.263 
However, the most important reason for not taking the negotiations seriously seemed 
to be the British Libyan dispute over Libyan’s support to the IRA. The British 
government took the view that while Gaddafi was still giving support to the IRA and 
considering it as a freedom movement, any negotiations would lead to settle the Libyan 
claims and making a payment to them would be unacceptable to the public and would 
cause a heavy debate in parliament.264 Thus, the British government decided to accept 
the Libyan proposal to negotiate without the intention of settling the claims by spinning 
out talks about Anglo-Libyan relations in general for as long as possible.265  
At this stage there were two different points of view. On the one hand, the Libyan side 
believed that when the negotiations stopped there was a British offer of £25 million to 
settle the Libyan claims. On the other hand, the British denied this and said there was 
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only one offer of £14 million, already refused by the Libyans, which had anyway been 
withdrawn by the British government after the nationalisation of BP. The British made 
it clear that it ‘should not, for the time being, consider whether any new offer should 
be made to the Libyans, but seek to maintain the dialogue with them through our 
embassy in Tripoli.’266 
With regards to the British denial of any offer of £25 million having been made by the 
British government, the Libyan government insisted that there was an offer of £25 to 
£30 million which had been considered by the British government in the context of the 
previous 1971 negotiations. Thus, the British government should now get back to the 
1971 offer, and take it as a basis for a future settlement of the financial claims between 
the two governments.267 At the time the British government rejected the Libyan request 
and indicated that there had been no offer whatsoever put to the Libyan government 
after the 1971 offer had been withdrawn.268 It seemed that a misunderstanding occurred 
between the two parties. The British claimed that in November 1971, the Egyptian 
mediator, learned that the Libyans might be ready to settle their claims for about £30 
million. Thus, the British government was about to consider increasing the offer 
package to £25 million. However, when Libya expropriated BP on 7 December 1971 
all the negotiations between Libya and Britain were stopped. Therefore, no formal offer 
of £25 million was made to the Libyan government.269  
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Conclusion  
Throughout the period of the negotiation of the outstanding issues there was no change 
in the position of either party, and therefore no solution was reached with regards to 
the dispute between Libya and Britain. 
The Labour government hoped to secure British interests in Libya (trade, training rights 
and a limited military presence). To achieve this, the British government first 
considered how to determine the attitude of the RCC over the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
which would allow the British to gauge the implications for British priorities in the 
wider region and then formulate their position accordingly. The British government 
believed the key to creating a relationship with the Gaddafi regime was to 
understanding its mentality, gauging the implications for wider British concerns which 
in turn would enable them to determine their own position. In addition, securing 
Britain's strategic aims that Libya should not fall under Soviet or other hostile influence 
and that Britain should economically continue to benefit  from trade with Libya, namely 
in oil and arms trade. Thus, economic, strategic and political factors were gathered to 
influence the British decision towards the Gaddafi regime, but it seems that the most 
important of these factors was the Libyan foreign policy towards Israel. Thus, the arms 
contract particularly, the Chieftains, was the key issue in British-Libyan relations 
during the early 1970s. In other words the creation of good relations failed because the 
Labour government would not supply the Chieftain tanks. 
A British review of the existing relationship and creation of a productive new one 
proved to have failed. This was due to the stand-off between the two governments over 
the major element of the arms contracts, namely the Chieftain tank and linking the 
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supply of the Chieftain to Libya's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Finally, the 
deadlocked negotiations led to a failure to secure British interests in Libya, and keeping 
Libya a pro-Western state, and resulted in a deterioration in relations worse through 
the 1970s. British claims that they would keep talking were much more a stalling tactic 
than a genuine commitment to negotiate, and it appears that the British officials 
involved underestimated the commitment of Tripoli to secure a real solution and 
underestimated the possible costs if the negotiations broke down. 
To sum up, disputes centred upon some arms deals and some financial problems dating 
back to the period before 1969. The fact that the two governments could not resolve 
these matters affected the relations between Libya and Britain as a whole in subsequent 
years. The lack of success on both sides in resolving their outstanding problems was 
the main reason that led to the worsening in British-Libyan relations. This had reflected 
badly on the relations between the two countries in various fields, and drove each party 
to take a negative attitude towards the other. Libya later adopted a hostile policy against 
British interests in Libya and in the region, such as Libyan nationalisation of BP.270 
Libya's relationship with the Soviet Union was considered as a service to the interests 
of the Soviets and a hostile act against the interests of the West in general and the 
interests of Britain and America in particular. This was the direct result of the failure 
of obtaining arms from the West, the US and particularly Britain.271
                                                 
270 TNA, FCO 67/436, Planning paper on British interests in Libya, from P G P D Fullerton to Mr. Hope-
Jones, 10 December 1970; TNA, FCO39/1083, letter from Mr. M R Melhuish to A J M Craig Esq, 11 
January 1972 
271 TNA, CAB 148/122, Cabinet, defence and oversea policy committee, Chieftains for Libya, 
memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 10 March 1972; TNA, 
FCO 39-1067, Major Jallud’s visit to Moscow, letter from Tripp to FCO, 22 February 1972. 
107 
 
Chapter Three: Libyan oil policy after 1969 
This chapter examines British-Libyan relations in the early years of the 1970s focusing 
on the nationalisation of oil assets after the 1969 revolution. It aims to determine the 
impact of new policies on British oil interests in Libya and on their relationship, and to 
establish how and why this was one of the main causes of tension between the two 
countries. The chapter also discusses the impact of their failure to resolve outstanding 
issues, which were explored in the previous chapter and how these influenced the 
decision to nationalise the assets of British Petroleum in Libya. Moreover, the chapter 
considers the debate over the value of the British losses caused by the nationalisation 
and how this also affected Libyan-British relations. 
Nationalisation of British oil interests in Libya 
The disagreement that occurred after 1969 in the field of oil had a great influence on 
relations between the two countries. This originated with the conflict between the 
Libyan government, the oil companies and the countries those companies came from. 
The first major tensions between the two states over oil exploitation grew almost 
immediately after the revolution. Most of the oil sector in Libya was dominated by 
British companies. Libya entered into negotiations with all foreign oil companies 
between 1970 and 1971,272 which led to nationalization of British oil interests. The 
Libyan government’s insistence on controlling its oil sector was intended to reduce the 
power of foreign interests.  
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After independence, the Idris regime proceeded to open the country to foreign oil 
capital. In 1955 the first Libyan Petroleum law was passed.273 Both sides later benefited 
from this law: 14 different companies or consortia gained 47 concessions. Large 
quantities of oil had been discovered by Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon). Export 
production began at 20,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 1961 and started to increase rapidly. 
By 1966 production had reached 1.5 million b/d. This rose to 2.6 million b/d by 1968 
and 3.6 million b/d by 1970. These production rates nearly equalled those of the long-
established producers Iran and Saudi Arabia (2.8 million b/d each in 1968, and 3.7 
million b/d in 1970). 274  In the late 1950s, Libya had become a significant oil 
producer; 275  by 1968-69, Libya was supplying a quarter of Western Europe’s oil 
requirements.276 
The Libyan monarchy’s policy after independence was based on the protection of both 
the United States and the United Kingdom for two main reasons.  Firstly, it was 
intended to repel any internal or external threats. Secondly, it established the 
foundations of the oil industry and stimulated the development of the national 
economy. 277  Thus, the government relied on technical support from America and 
Britain for economic growth through the development of its oil sector. At the same 
time, the discovery of oil in Libya significantly increased its importance to both the US 
and Britain.  
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However, instead of this discovery liberating Libya from dependency on the West, it 
seems that it made the country only more dependent on technical support, to the benefit 
of the oil companies. Libyan oil was almost exclusively exported to European markets. 
Libya's oil is of high quality and the country's proximity to Europe offered the 
possibility of reducing Western dependency on the politically and strategically 
vulnerable Gulf. 278  In order to protect its interests, Britain extensively supplied 
financial and military aid. Additionally, it exported technology for Libya’s oil industry. 
Libya's relationship with the foreign oil companies remained close as a result. That 
situation altered radically after the 1969 Libyan revolution, and relations between 
Britain, America and Libya changed from bad to worse throughout the 1970s as a 
result. The revised policy of Libya to nationalise oil exploration, production, and 
processing and to gain domestic control of this vital sector hit British firms most 
seriously. 279  However, the Libyan government was not initially in a position to 
nationalise the whole oil sector. Its new policy was delivered in several stages, the first 
of which was a demand to raise the price of its oil and nationalise some of the oil 
companies, before full nationalisation could be achieved. 
In early 1970, the new rulers in Libya increased demands against the oil companies. 
Oil constituted more than 80% of national income, the most important sector of the 
Libyan economy. The government held that the price of Libyan oil had been artificially 
frozen for years despite the technical, financial and political changes in both Libya and 
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the wider world.280 The RCC viewed its behaviour toward the international companies 
as ‘a first step in the direction of realising the state's objective of restricting the control 
exercised by foreign firms over an important aspect of the Libyan economy’.281 In 
1970, oil production in Libya reached a record of almost three million barrels per day, 
providing Libya with 98.7 per cent of its revenues. After this, the new government 
started to alter the pricing mechanism, increasing the oil price. In less than five years 
the combination of these fortuitous circumstances and the brinkmanship of the new 
regime allowed it to dramatically increase prices for Libyan oil.282 Libya’s call for 
higher oil prices was supported by many OPEC members, especially the Mediterranean 
members.283 Algeria and Libya met with Iraq and Saudi Arabia in Tripoli in March 
1970 and agreed to the oil price demanded by the Libyan government. They warned 
that they would shut down oil production if the demands were not met.284 
Jallud writes that:  
The posted price of choice Libyan crude [...] had not changed from 1961 until 1970, and 
remained at $2.23 per barrel. Therefore the companies had to grant an immediate price rise of 
30 cents a barrel, a further hike of 10 cents over a five year period, and an increase in the tax 
rate (the government’s chief source of revenue) from 50 to 58 percent.285 
The October 1973 war then later played a major role in pushing up oil prices. The war 
brought changes in the levels of various prices of oil and the relationship of the 
petroleum exporting countries with oil-producing companies. The Arab oil-producing 
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countries imposed oil restrictions. They also abandoned all pretence of negotiations 
over prices and began to impose new price levels by unilateral decree through OPEC. 
On 18 October 1973, Saudi Arabia initiated an application of a restrictive measure, 
which included both general production cutbacks and an export embargo to specified 
countries, including the United States, based on OPEC’s decision taken in Kuwait on 
16 October. ‘On 20 October it announced the price of oil would be immediately 
increased from $4.60 to $8.90 per barrel’.286 ’The price increase justified the action on 
the basis of inflation, increased demand for oil and fluctuation in currency exchange 
rates and freight charges [...] the October 1973 war solidified the basic changes in the 
oil industry initiated by Libya in 1970. Throughout the Middle East, the old system of 
oil concessions had been replaced by host government participation. The oil companies 
no longer owned, or could act as if they owned, the producing properties in the future, 
production levels, and to a lesser extent price levels, would be set by the host 
governments’.287 
The question that might be raised here is whether there was always an intention to 
nationalise the companies; some of the signals Libya put out gave an impression that 
there was no intention to do this, while others suggested the opposite. According to a 
number of researchers who have investigated this issue, it seems that the new Libyan 
government did not actually intend to nationalise this vital sector of their economy.288 
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There are a number of relevant factors which point to such a conclusion. 
Libya did not have the means, expertise, or technological sophistication to operate 
upstream production without assistance from foreign oil companies. Any major 
differences with these companies could lead to disruption of production which would 
not serve the interests of either party. Therefore, 100% nationalisation, or outright 
expropriation, would do nothing but erode the credibility of this aspiring new 
government". In addition, some of the oil companies, such as Shell and BP, thought 
that Libya dared not nationalise, as it lacked the labour and experience to run the 
production and marketing of oil.289 Although the Libyan government had announced 
that its economy was in constant growth, this claim did not seem particularly credible. 
Also, the government needed foreign investment to complete its economic plans. Thus, 
the Libyan government did not want to create an escalation of bad feeling with the oil 
companies, and certainly did not want the oil companies to leave the country. Equally, 
the companies themselves did not want to leave the country. 290  However, what 
happened was different to this. The British Ambassador in Libya emphasised that the 
RCC in Libya was facing many internal difficulties, which were threatening the 
authority of the Council and internal stability, and that this made it difficult for the 
Council to continue to pressure oil companies. It does not seem that the Libyan 
government was really able to push the situation between them and the oil companies 
to the limit. What the Libyan government wanted to do was to gain as much leverage 
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as possible from the oil companies, and to increase its own internal popular support.291 
Also, Libya did not have enough resources to forego oil revenues because the non-oil 
economy was so under-developed. In these circumstances Libya was aware of the 
problems of total nationalisation of the oil industry, but selective nationalisation was a 
likely alternative.292 
From examining the statements of some Libyan officials, it can again be concluded that 
nationalisation was not Libya’s initial intention. However, what happened contradicted 
this. As Major Jallud stated ‘The RCC’s goal was to correct posted prices through 
peaceful negotiations. The Libyan government had no intention of nationalising the oil 
industry but thought that the current terms and conditions under which the oil 
companies were operating were altogether too much in the oil companies’ favour’.293 
Maghrebi also made a similar statement reported in the FCO documents: ‘The Libyan 
government only wanted the posted price to be corrected, and had no thought of 
expropriating or nationalising any of the oil companies’.294 
At the same time, other evidence indicates that government’s policy was from the 
outset concerned with extending its control over the oil sector so as to bring it under its 
effective control. 
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According to the Libyan petroleum minister at that time, the Libyan government saw 
that lack of control of foreign oil companies comprised a kind of economic colonialism: 
while oil production and marketing were still under the control of foreign companies, 
this would prevent the Libyan government’s key development projects. The Oil 
Minister has also added that:  
The transfer of the ownership of these companies was a great stride in the country’s march 
towards the objective of liberating the national economy from all foreign influence and 
subservience. The state had laid its hands, in the interests of the people, on an important aspect 
of economic activity which had been exploited in their own interests. This made it necessary 
for the state to intervene in order to curb their dominance over this sphere of public interest.295 
Another statement by the Libyan oil minister showed similar thinking. ‘The takeover 
of local marketing operation was expected to provide the state with a sizeable income 
which would help it implement its development plans[...]the marketing companies in 
Libya are realizing an annual profit of about £6 million which would now revert to the 
state’.296  Thus, the process of nationalisation was not due to the ongoing dispute 
between the government and these companies over the subject of rising oil prices so 
much as to the perceived national interest of the country.297 
At the same time that the Libyans began negotiations with oil companies, they started 
to negotiate with the USSR in order to lay the foundations of cooperation. The Libyan 
government was taking into account that, in its negotiations with the oil companies for 
an increase in posted prices, the oil companies could create serious difficulties which 
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could not be resisted for long. The Libyan government’s purpose was to secure Soviet 
help in anticipation that steps might be taken by oil companies to stop oil production if 
the Libyan government did not reach a solution satisfactory to the oil companies about 
oil prices.298 On 6 March 1970, the Libyan Minister of Oil, Izzedin A-Mabruk, visited 
Moscow and discussed with the Soviets the possibility of cooperation between Libya 
and the Soviet Union in maintaining and exploiting the Libyan oil fields.299 
The visit of Mabruk to Moscow was followed by another discussion between the Soviet 
Ambassador in Tripoli and Mr. Mabruk on 21 March. Both parties discussed the 
assistance that the Soviets could provide.300According to Mr. Abdelhay Ben-Omran, 
Director of the Technical Department in the Libyan Ministry of Petroleum, ‘Libya’s 
desire for cooperation with the Soviet Union over oil matters has been evidenced by 
the recent visit to Moscow of the Libyan oil minister. He said that there was a great 
scope for such cooperation in a variety of fields, namely joint ventures between the 
USSR and the Libyan national oil company for oil exploration and development in 
Libya’.301 Then in May, Mr. Mikhail Tarasov, the deputy head of the Middle East 
department of the Soviet State Committee for Economic Relations with Foreign 
Countries, arrived in Libya to discuss oil matters.302  
On 24 March, the Beirut newspaper Al-Sayyad stated that the Soviet-Libyan 
rapprochement ‘represents the trump card which Libya’s new leaders plan to play at 
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the appropriate time. In the opinion of observers, the appropriate time would be when 
the current talks with the operating companies on the question of raising the posted 
prices of Libyan crude oil fail to achieve the desired results’.303  
Two conclusions can be drawn from this: firstly, the Libyans wanted to raise the price 
of oil, but, as they knew very well, that could lead to steps being taken that could harm 
their interests with the oil companies, so they had begun to consolidate their 
relationship with the Soviet Union. Secondly, it had been noticed that from the 
beginning, the Libyan government had targeted some but not all of the oil companies. 
In addition, there is no doubt that there were differences between Libya and Britain 
regarding arms contracts and financial disputes. Failure to reach a solution satisfactory 
to both parties in these disputes made it very difficult to create fruitful cooperation, and 
could possibly lead to Libya adopting a rigid policy toward the British oil interests in 
Libya. 
The FCO warned of this issue and accordingly the British Secretary of State said: 
If the outstanding inter-governmental problems cannot be resolved the Libyans may 
expropriate BP and Shell’s assets, which have a book value of 34 million. Additionally at risk 
is the 10-15 million per annum that the Libyan operations of these two oil companies 
contribute to the UK balance of payment.304 
In early 1970, Libya, Algeria and Iraq agreed to coordinate oil policies.305 According 
to the British government, it was clear that the Libyans had been receiving a great deal 
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of advice from the Algerians. This strengthened the position of the Libyan government 
as a result of the mutual coordination between Libya and Algeria over their oil fields.306  
In a statement to the Algerian News Agency (APS), Izzad-Din Mabruk, the Libyan 
Minister of Oil and Minerals ‘stressed the need for extensive cooperation between 
Algeria and Libya in the oil industry and for coordination of the joint exploitation of 
our (Algerian and Libyan) natural resources’.307 
At this time, when the Libyans were negotiating with the oil companies, Algeria was 
engaged in similar negotiations to raise the posted prices of the French companies 
operating there. Algeria sent an oil delegation, led by a senior government technical 
adviser on oil production to Libya and Iraq. By January 1970 this had resulted in a joint 
declaration communiqué calling for close cooperation.308 This increased pressure on 
the oil companies operating in these countries. Bamberg adds that ‘the three radical oil-
exporting states, Algeria, Libya and Iraq, got together to form a common front against 
the oil companies. The pressure continued to rise. In June the Libyans ordered more 
production be cut from Occidental and this time also Amoseas; Algeria nationalised 
the assets of Shell, Phillips and other smaller companies which refused to accept higher 
posted prices; and early in July Libya nationalised the local marketing companies of 
Shell and Standard Oil (NJ)’.309 If we look at the process of nationalisation of oil 
companies operating in the region, we can note that Iraq preceded others in its 
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nationalisations, followed by Algeria, and that Libya came afterwards, benefiting from 
the experience of the two other countries. Even so, the Tripoli government was fully 
aware that it would not be immediately capable of full nationalisation of the oil sector, 
nationalising only some of the oil marketing companies. 
Libyan conflict with foreign oil companies over posted prices 
The dispute between the Libyan government and the oil companies over raising the 
price of Libyan oil had a significant impact on the relationship between the Libyan 
government and these companies, as well as on Libyan relations with both the British 
and American governments, as most of these companies were American or British. The 
Libyan demands to increase oil prices and the tough negotiations that followed, which 
took more than a year, opened the door to the other oil exporting countries to follow 
similar policies. This established a new type of relationship between the oil producing 
countries and the oil companies. This was clearly shown by the two agreements signed 
in Tehran and Tripoli, which outlined a new framework for the relationship between 
the oil producing countries and the oil companies and marked the biggest increase in 
oil prices in that period of the last century. 
At the beginning of 1969, the production of oil in Libya was dominated by the large oil 
companies or groups: Esso, Oasis, Marathon, Continental, The Amerada and Shell 
companies, Occidental (U.S); Amoseas (U.S); BP-Bunker Hunt; and Mobil-
Gelsenberg (U.S./West Germany’. The largest single British interest was that of Shell... 
on the Oasis production, this was nearly 40 million tons. Shell also concluded a joint 
venture agreement with Lipetco. BP’s joint operation with Bunker Hunt produced a 
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total of 16 million tons in 1969. The main markets for the Libyan oil were in Western 
Europe. West Germany was the largest customer (35.6 million tons in 1968), followed 
by Italy, the UK and France (25, 23.5, and 10.3 million tons respectively).310 
On 8 April 1970, Colonel Gaddafi said: 
We (the Libyans) are now fighting the battle of political liberation. Soon [...] Libya will 
become politically free of all restrictions or controls. We (the Libyans) entered the stage of 
political freedom from foreign imperialism and bases[....]After political freedom comes the 
phase of industrial and economic freedom[....]After the withdrawal of American troops from 
the country (Libya)[....] the battle will be with the oil companies[....]We (the Libyans) must 
fight the foreign oil companies.311 
Gaddafi himself made the demands of the Libyan government quite explicit ‘The price 
of Libyan crude is too low. The Libyan worker is not getting his fair share of the profits. 
Too few Libyans are being employed. Too few Libyans are being technically 
trained’.312 
The Libyan government demanded that the foreign companies operating in Libya agree 
to raise the price of Libyan oil from $2.23 to $2.53, saying they would negotiate with 
the companies individually. 313  The Libyan government justified its position by 
declaring that ‘the government was not seeking an increase, but a correction reportedly 
of around 44 cents/barrel in the posted price, based on alleged under posting since 1961, 
the freight and sulphur advantages of Libyan crude, and the comparable posting of 
$2.65 in neighbouring Algeria’.314 In addition, the low price of Libyan oil of $2.14 was 
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lower than the Gulf oil pricing of $2.37.315 In February 1970 the Libyan government 
representatives led by Major Jallud begun negotiations over oil posted prices with the 
two American companies Standard and Occidental, the two largest oil producers in 
Libya. Both rejected the Libyan price demands. Later in April, the Libyan government 
focused its pressure on Occidental, which was in a weaker position than Standard, as 
Occidental was wholly dependent on Libyan oil to supply its customers.316 In May, as 
a result of its rejection of the increased oil price, Occidental was ordered by the Libyan 
government to reduce its output by 40%, from 800,000 barrels a day to around 
425,000.317 This pressure continued. In June, more production cuts were ordered from 
Occidental. At the same time, Algeria nationalised the assets of Shell, Phillips and other 
smaller companies which refused to accept higher posted prices. 318  The Libyan 
government had also received support from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) by ‘demanding a 55 percent tax base instead of the oil fifty-fifty 
arrangements [...] and a 30 percent increase in posted price’.319 It became clear that 
Occidental could not stand this kind of pressure. ‘As intended, such cuts were crippling 
to a company with no other source of crude oil outside the United States[…]Occidental 
was, in the meantime, under acute pressure. Profits had fallen from $47.9 million in the 
second quarter of 1969 to $43.8 million in the same quarter of 1970’.320 Thus, in 
September Occidental agreed to raise the posted price of Libyan oil from $2.23 to $2.53 
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a barrel and to an annual increase of 2 cents a barrel for a five year period starting from 
1971. The Libyan tax rate was also raised from 50% to 58%.321 After succeeding in 
imposing its new posted price on the oil companies after breaking Occidental’s 
resistance, Libya was accused of opening the door to other countries to make more 
demands to increase oil prices. Cooley (1982) points out that the increase in the Libyan 
oil price had an immediate effect abroad. Just before the end of 1970, the Shah of Iran 
began pressuring the Western consortium working in Iran to pay more. 322  The 
agreement between the oil companies and the Libyan government to increase the oil 
price had ‘marked the first big advance in crude oil postings in over 13 years of 
depressed prices and the largest ever recorded’. The Libyan settlement had an 
immediate impact on other oil producing states. OPEC met on 12 December 1970 in 
Caracas and called for an increases in posted prices and stated that the acceptance rate 
of increase should be not less than 55%. After this, the demands for rises in posted 
prices did not stop until the Tehran agreement. Following the meeting in Caracas, 
OPEC held another meeting in Tehran on 3 February. The discussions continued until 
an agreement about the Gulf oil posted price was signed on 14 February 1971 between 
the oil companies and the Gulf members of OPEC. The agreement was to be valid for 
5 years from June 1971 and gave the oil producers a posted price increase of 35 cents 
a barrel, along with annual increases of 5 cents a barrel.323 The Mediterranean oil 
producers did not agree to the Tehran agreement. On 24 February the negotiations 
started, with Libya was negotiating on behalf of the other OPEC countries in the 
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Mediterranean.324 On 20 March the Tripoli agreement was reached between the Libyan 
government and the oil companies. The agreement raised the posted price of OPEC 
members of the Mediterranean for 40-degree, Libyan crude was to increase by 90 cents 
a barrel, from $2.55 to $3.32 plus 12.7 cents accelerated escalation. The agreement was 
for five years, from March 1971 to 1975.325 The Tehran and Tripoli agreements of early 
1971 marked a watershed in the history of the international oil industry, transferring 
control over prices to the producer governments and ending the dominance of oil 
companies.326 One of the main impacts of the change in posted prices was that under 
the ‘five-year agreements, the revenues of oil-exporting states would rise from $7 
billion in 1970 to $18.5 in 1975; Europe’s bill for oil imports would rise by $5.5 billion 
in the same period’.327 
The Tehran and Tripoli agreements marked a significant positive outcome for the 
OPEC countries in general and the Libyan government in particular, since Libya was 
one of the first countries that demanded a price increase. These agreements transformed 
relations between oil companies and oil producing countries. The two agreements 
succeeded in reducing the control of oil companies over the manufacturing and 
marketing of oil, and increased oil revenues for these countries, strengthening their 
control over their economies. The oil companies and oil-importing countries had to pay 
more to import oil, and the hegemony of the oil importing countries over the oil 
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industry and its marketing was broken. The Teheran-Tripoli agreements led to the 
subsequent embargo and the participation crises of 1973-74.328 
In 1971 the US dollar started to depreciate faster in relation to other currencies. This 
caused trouble, as the posted price of oil was stated in dollars and the Teheran 
agreement had not provided for a fall in its value. In August 1971, OPEC warned that 
the 'Teheran and Tripoli price agreements did not deal with the question of the parity 
of money, and, therefore, should the United States dollar be devalued, the gains 
achieved by the Teheran, Tripoli and related agreements would be substantially 
eroded." On 18 December 1971, an agreement was reached by the ten major industrial 
countries in Washington. The agreement ‘provided for a formal devaluation of the 
dollar against gold and for a revaluation of leading currencies against the dollar’. In 
January 1972, an agreement was signed in Geneva between OPEC countries and oil 
companies for an increase in posted prices of 8.59%. Posted prices were then to change 
quarterly in accordance with an agreed formula for an index of exchange rate 
movements. The price of Arabian light rose from $2.285 to $2.479 a barrel’.329 In 1973, 
the further devaluation of the United States dollar once more caused trouble, for the 
posted price of oil with a rising demand in the United States for imported oil continued 
to push up market prices. In September 1973, all the OPEC countries demanded a 
revision of the price agreements as they could no longer accept the steady decline in 
their share of the profits from oil. On October 6, war broke out which imposed more 
increases to the posted price of oil.330 
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The decline of the oil price during the 1950s and early 1960s had aided industrial 
growth in the US and Western Europe. However, the events that began in late 1969 
‘culminated in the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 and 1974’ and led later to the 
complete nationalisation of the oil industry in certain countries331 The demands for 
increasing oil prices and subsequent events ‘made the international monetary system 
more unstable [...] excess reserves held by oil exporting states in the form of short-term 
funds[....]These developments also helped plunge the industrial West into its most 
severe economic crisis since World War II: in 1975 unemployment in developed 
market economies was at a 40-year high’. This did not mean the downfall of the West; 
but the demands for higher prices and the nationalisations brought a serious crisis to 
the Western economies.332 
British oil companies’ response to the increase in the posted price 
Having broken Occidental’s resistance, the Libyan government quickly turned the 
screws on the other oil companies. Continental, Marathon, Amerada-Hess and Shell 
were told that they were also expected to accept a retroactive price rise. On the 21 
September, two of the Oasis independents agreed to the Libyan posted price but Shell 
refused.333 Shell is an Anglo-Dutch oil company, 60% is owned in Holland and 40% 
owned in the UK. It is a member of the Oasis group, which was responsible for 31% 
of total Libyan oil output.334 Shell was very concerned about the new price of oil being 
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demanded by the Libyan government. According to David Barran, then chairman of 
Shell transport and trading, ‘(members of Shell company were) particularly concerned 
about the knock-on effects of accepting the principle of retroactivity, which might 
undermine the whole nexus of relationship between producing governments, oil 
companies and consumers’.335 Thus, Shell rejected the new Libyan posted price. As a 
result, Shell was ordered to abide by a 12% cut in their oil production in Libya, effective 
from 30 July 1970. Before that date was reached, however, Libya nationalised all the 
company’s Libyan marketing operations.336 British Petroleum’s response was similar 
to Shell. ‘BP, like Shell, realized that if Libya got its way, other oil-producing countries 
would quickly make similar demands’.337  It also reported similar trends ‘for the majors 
in Libya[…]and BP such terms, both as regards the price hike and the increase in tax 
rates, posed a cruel dilemma. If they accepted, the percolation effect on their interests 
elsewhere could be very significant indeed.338 Sir Eric Drake, BP’s chairman and chief 
executive, favoured strong resistance. He said that the companies should reject the 
Libyan government’s unilateral demands, despite the threat to stop supplies. However, 
Drake said that he accepted that ‘the companies might have to increase the posted prices 
of Libyan and other short-haul crudes to reflect their freight advantages, but they should 
not, he thought, go further than that by granting Libya’s demands of retroactivity and 
an increase in the tax rate’.339 
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Libyan action against foreign oil companies and the nationalisation 
of Shell and BP assets 
The question that might be raised here is:  What were the reasons behind the strong 
Libyan position and the weakness of the oil companies which ultimately led Libya to 
succeed in most of its demands, especially for raising the price of oil, and which 
eventually led to the nationalisation of Libya's oil sector?  
The strength of the Libyan government's position in negotiations with oil companies in 
the early seventies was due to several factors, which have been noted by many 
researchers. They will be very briefly drawn together here:340 
• Libya was supported by two major oil exporters, Algeria and Iraq, and both 
countries were engaged in outright confrontation with their concessionaire companies. 
Libya maintained extremely close contact with the Algerian government and had also 
received advice from Algeria during negotiations with the oil companies. 
• Libya had also benefited from the pressure brought by the Algerian government 
on the oil companies operating in their country. In June, 1970, Algeria nationalised 
Shell and Phillips. These actions by the Algerian government weakened the position of 
oil companies operating in Libya, and allowed the Libyan government to put greater 
pressure on oil companies to accept its demands. 
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• Libyan oil is high quality, low in resultant pollution and corrosive sulphur, and 
cheap to transport to nearby markets in Europe. These transport cost advantages over 
Arab Gulf crude were increased by the closure of the Suez Canal, which had been out 
of operation since the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War in 1967. 
• The Idris regime had deliberately encouraged competition in the Libyan oil 
industry by granting concessions to many companies, including independents as well 
as majors.  
Gaddafi did not, therefore, have to deal with a dominant single concession holder like 
the IPC in Iraq, the KOC in Kuwait, the Consortium in Iran, or Aramco in Saudi Arabia. 
The Libyan government was dealing with competing firms, which did not necessarily 
share the same interests. 
In addition to a number of other factors such as decreasing production that greatly 
influenced the scarcity of oil in 1970, there was an unexpected world shortage of oil 
and particularly of low-sulphur refined fuel in the winter of 1969-70. Libya’s oil 
income had risen to levels which exceeded the short-term development needs of the 
desert state, with its small population. Indeed, by 1970 Libya’s per capita income was 
twice as high as Saudi Arabia’s and nearly four times as high as Iran’s. Thus, Libya 
could live with reduced oil exports more easily than Western Europe could live with 
reduced imports.341 
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From the discussion above, two other major factors can be added. First, when the 
Libyans came into oil production, the oil companies drove a hard bargain on price with 
the Libyan Government. This made Libyan oil very attractive in price terms to 
companies and the world market compared with Middle East oil, especially given its 
low sulphur content. The price advantage of Libyan oil became even more marked 
when the Suez Canal was closed after 1967. Middle East oil for European markets had 
to be carried around Africa. The price advantage and the shortage of tanker capacity as 
a result of the increased journey around Africa led the oil companies to become 
dependent on Libyan oil: ‘at one time Europe was dependent upon Libya for some 
33.33 per cent of its oil supplies’.342 
Before Gaddafi came to power, King Idris had entered into negotiation about an 
increase of 10 cents in the price of Libyan oil. However, the negotiations were not 
completed until Idris was overthrown. If the 10 cents agreement had been reached, it 
would have reduced the later pressure on the companies. The claim of 10 cents was 
then seen as entirely justifiable, but agreement failed. In 1970, Gaddafi demanded an 
increase from 10 cents to 40 cents a barrel. It was obvious that he would not settle for 
what King Idris had demanded or less. Specifically, Esso offered an increase of only 7 
cents.343 This offer was strongly rejected by the Libyan Government, arguing that 
Libyan oil was the cheapest and needed to be increased. 
The other factor which made the Libyan Government’s position strong was the lack of 
British government support to the oil companies. The British oil companies and the 
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British government were sure that, if Libya nationalised any British oil companies 
operating in Libya, the Libyan government would not agree to go into arbitration in 
any dispute between them and these companies. Thus, the BP representative suggested 
that the British government ought to keep the 1953 treaty alive in case Britain needed 
it – in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under Article 7 - to refer to in a dispute 
over nationalisation. Article 7 of the Anglo-Libyan treaty of 1953 can be interpreted as 
providing grounds for the British government to refer any dispute with the Libyan 
government to the ICJ.344 ‘The oil company representatives put down a marker that 
they hoped the treaty would not be brought to an end while the threat of nationalisation 
continued, and asked that the FCO should consider the advantages of keeping it 
valid’.345 On the Libyan side, the Libyan government considered the treaty a dead letter 
and were anxious to terminate it as soon as possible. On the British side, it was 
recognised that the treaty was no longer appropriate and the Libyan government was 
informed that Britain was prepared to proceed its termination. The British government 
was willing to generate some goodwill on the Libyan side in the hope of extracting 
some benefits in subsequent negotiations, and recognized that a refusal to end the treaty 
would forfeit Libyan goodwill.346 In the light of this, the British government informed 
the oil companies that, ‘For purely political reasons, it is wholly undesirable to delay 
the formal termination in order to keep article 7 alive’.347 The British government was 
already engaged in complex negotiations with the Libyan government on outstanding 
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issues. The British government wanted to avoid any negative effects that negotiations 
between the Libyan Government and the oil companies could create which might affect 
the negotiations of these outstanding issues. 
The British government's position on the conflict between Libya and 
the oil companies 
The British companies now turned to the British government to try to secure diplomatic 
support to protect British oil interests in Libya,348 principally those of BP and Shell. 
The new steps that the Libyan government took seemed to the UK to be very 
nationalistic. The British government outlined its view of the relationship between 
British oil companies and the Libyan government as follows: ‘Since the Libyan 
revolution of September, 1969, relations have deteriorated sharply between the 
government and the companies, to a point where oil production itself has been affected 
[…] the RCC and its advisers have set themselves to pursue radical and nationalistic 
policies against the oil companies.349 
British oil interests in Libya had grown over twenty years up to 1969, and by the late 
1960s were importing large quantities of oil. By 1969 about 150 million tons of 
Europe’s supplies came from Libyan sources (out of total consumption of 510 million 
tons), of which 21 million came to the UK (out of a total consumption of 90 million 
tons). From the view point of the FCO oil department, the potential threat to the oil 
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companies’ production in Libya by reducing its production significantly threatened the 
security of British and European oil supplies. Reducing or cutting off Occidental’s oil 
supplies, estimated at 40 million tons in 1969, would not have a decisive effect on the 
situation. However, any further cut off of oil production from other Libyan oil sources 
would have a more serious effect on British and European oil supplies.350 But there 
seemed to be little the British government could do to support Shell and BP, as a result 
of a lack of any agreement with Libya over the outstanding issues.  
The British Ambassador in Tripoli Mr Tripp argued that British-Libyan relations were 
worse since the RCC took power, because of the outstanding issues, and the future of 
any joint cooperation between Libya and Britain appeared to be dependent upon the 
progress that would be achieved on both sides to resolve the outstanding problems. The 
Ambassador also said that the British government has always been aware that failure 
to reach an agreement satisfactory to both parties was a threat to British interests in 
Libya, especially oil interests. He added that Libyan dissatisfaction with the British 
government's response to their claims had them to adopt a more hostile attitude to 
Britain and more hostility could be expected over other British interests in the Middle 
East and Mediterranean.351  
In 1970, the Wilson government made it clear to the oil companies that their political 
relationship with the new Libyan government had many problems, and that there were 
many outstanding issues which would be hard to solve. These included the agreement 
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the Libyans had made to purchase British Chieftain tanks and air defence hardware. If 
this were to come under threat, the Libyans could potentially lose their £32m deposit, 
which might then lead to an aggressive Libyan response.352 It is clear that such factors 
adversely affected attempts at diplomatic intervention for British oil companies 
operating in Libya. However, it must be stated that outstanding issues between the 
British and Libyan governments would have an effect on the negotiations between the 
Libyans and the oil companies negotiations over the posted price, and British fears that 
this might lead to the loss of British oil interests in Libya. 
Mr. Ellingworth, of FCO and Mr. A. Ibbott, also from FCO, stated that: 
H M government would not seek to influence the companies’ decision on the reaction to an 
imposed posted prices settlement on political grounds. H M government is concerned that an 
oil industry decision would prejudice other British interests: rather the reverse, that strained 
Anglo-Libyan relations might make the oil companies’ position even more difficult. We were, 
however, concerned about the supply and consumer price implications.353 
The British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home agreed that every effort should 
be made to stand firm in support of the principle that posted prices and tax rates could 
be amended only by mutual agreement, not by unilateral fiat. He recognised the need 
to strengthen the resolve of European governments to face up to the possibility of a fuel 
shortage and undertook to speak to them. Later, however, he reported back that other 
governments had no enthusiasm for action which would result in a reduction in 
Europe’s oil supplies. The British companies in Libya were told to be guided by their 
commercial judgment.354  
                                                 
352 TNA, FCO 67-432, Libyan oil: the British stake 
353 TNA, FCO 67-432, Record of meeting held at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
354 Bamberg, J., British Petroleum, p. 454 
133 
 
It can be seen that, the British government's position was not strong enough with regard 
to providing any support for Shell and BP. The British government stated that this 
would be limited only to diplomatic support when required (e.g. over the expulsion of 
staff). Thus, Shell and BP should take their own appropriate decisions for the protection 
of their interests particularly with regard to the posted price issue.355 
The impact of the outstanding issues over the Libyan policy toward 
the British oil companies 
In the same period that the Libyan government entered into negotiations with oil 
companies, there were other negotiations taking place between the British government 
and the Libyan government to resolve the outstanding issues between the two sides. 
The negotiations between the Libyan government and oil companies have, from the 
start, been significantly affected by the outcome of negotiations between the British 
government and the Libyan government on outstanding issues.  
At the beginning of 1970, Major Jallud warned the British government that, if there 
was a failure to reach a solution satisfactory to both parties with respect to the 
outstanding issues, British interests in Libya would be in danger and that the Libyan 
Government would take a tough roadblock against these interests. Jallud went on to 
say ‘Unless the British government gave the Libyan Government satisfaction over the 
major issues outstanding between the two governments, the Libyan government would 
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take action against British interests in Libya’.356 
The relationship between Britain and Libya is thus very complicated. Libya linked its 
cooperation with Britain in every field, especially in the oil business, to reach a solution 
to outstanding issues. In the light of this, there were two trends for the British–Libyan 
cooperation, particularly in the oil field. The first was to settle the outstanding issues 
and this would lead to comprehensive cooperation in all fields and save the British oil 
interests in Libya. The second trend was the opposite of this and, especially, there was 
no guarantee that, if the British government settled its dispute with the Libyan 
government, this would save the British interests in Libya. Also there was no guarantee 
that Gaddafi would take no action against the British.357 In a letter from the North 
African Department (NAD) to the FCO, in the early 1970, Hope-Jones warned 
Ellingworth of FCO saying that:     
It has become increasingly clear in recent weeks that HMG will have to pay a high price in 
order to attain their various policy objectives in UK/Libyan relations. The price will probably 
be higher than they are prepared to pay, and we therefore need to assess just how important 
these various objectives are. One of our principle objectives is of course that the export of 
Libyan oil to Britain and Western Europe by British companies, among others, should proceed 
without hindrance.358 
Differences between the two governments, especially regarding the settlement of 
outstanding issues of arms deals between the two sides, affected the ongoing 
negotiations between the Libyan government and the oil companies. They made the 
position of the Libyan government with regard to these companies inflexible and 
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rigid.359 The Libyans’ differentiation between BP and other companies can be seen in 
the light of the fact that the British government's shareholding in BP made the Libyans 
view BP as a way of influencing the British Government in regard to the defence 
agreement.360 Thus, the British oil interests were not outside the bargains that were 
used by the Libyan government in order to force the British government to settle the 
outstanding issues of arms, but it does not appear that the Libyan policy succeeded. 
The Libyans told the British Government several times that, if they got a satisfactory 
settlement on the issue of outstanding arms contracts between the two sides as well as 
on outstanding financial issues with respect to renting the British base that existed in 
eastern Libya before 1970, and on the Libyan cooperation with Britain in the various 
disciplines, there would be no limit to the cooperation between the two countries in the 
future. However, failure in this would lead to counter-productive results.361  R. C. 
Hope-Jones again stated ‘If we (the British Government) fail to give the Libyans 
satisfaction over current problems, there will be various courses of action open to them. 
They might for instance nationalise part or all of the production interests of BP and 
Shell’.362 
After March 1971, and the Libyan rejection to the offer package of £14 million the 
British concerning increased, in light of the lack of progress in finding a solution to the 
problem of the outstanding issues between the British and Libyan governments, it was 
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quite likely that the Libyan government would take some harsh measures against the 
British oil companies operating in Libya. 363  Hope-Jones explained that ‘We (the 
British) cannot exclude the possibility that if the outstanding problems cannot be 
resolved, the Libyans may take discriminatory action against British oil interests. This 
might well take the form of nationalisation or expropriation’.364 
The FCO also expressed concerns that the Libyan move would be in the form of harsh 
procedures against oil companies. However, presenting an appropriate and acceptable 
offer to the Libyans would probably make the Libyan government more flexible in its 
negotiations with oil companies. The British ambassador in Tripoli indicated that Libya 
was already engaged in simultaneous negotiations with two parties: the oil companies 
and the British government on the outstanding issues. The Libyan government 
desperately needed to get positive and satisfactory results with one of the negotiating 
parties; otherwise, any reaction would be counterproductive and violent but the 
progress of negotiations between the two countries, with respect to the outstanding 
issues, would allow for positive results in favour of the oil companies. 365  The 
Ambassador added that ‘It is not impossible that a reasonable attitude on our part in the 
present context could contribute to an oil settlement rather to our disadvantage’.366 
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Nationalisation of the British-Dutch oil company assets in Libya 
(Shell) 
As it mentioned above, Shell was nationalised on July 1970. Just before the 
nationalisation, Libya refused the oil companies’ offer. Maghrebi, explained that the 
offer made by the oil companies was totally rejected, and that  
Our aim (Libyan aims) is to realise the people’s interests, (Libyan people) which according 
to studies will not be achieved by a 10 cent increase[...]it would be better for companies who 
aim at such a figure to notify us (Libyan government and oil companies) early so we  (Libyan 
government and oil companies) could save effort and time.367 
On 21 September, the three Oasis independents agreed to the Libyan demands, while 
Shell refused.368 In October, the dispute between Shell and the Libyan government was 
resolved after Shell agreed to the same terms already accepted by the other 
companies.369 The company agreed to a rise in the posted price of Libyan crude by 30 
cents from $2.23 per barrel to $2.53 plus another 2 cents a barrel annually until 1975. 
The agreement also raised the tax rate from 50 to 58 per cent.370 
The British government’s reaction to the Libyan nationalisation of Shell oil marketing 
needs to be seen in the light of British-Libyan relations as a whole. The British 
government stated that, before making representations of any kind to the Libyan 
government, it would wait and see the result of discussions between Shell and Libya 
for compensation, as nationalisation should involve the provision of satisfactory 
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compensation. A committee would be set up in three months to evaluate the assets of 
the Shell Marketing Company. A. J. Miller of Shell’s Middle East coordinator’s staff 
had requested help from the British government, reminding the Libyan government of 
its obligations under international law to provide prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation for the Shell assets. The British government’s influence on the Libyan 
government was limited to providing assistance to Shell.371  
Mr. C. T. Brant, of FCO, oil department, said that: 
We must admit quite frankly that our ability actually to induce the Libyans to pay 
compensation seems strictly limited at present; not only by the fact that our relations are 
already encumbered with the need to tie up the complicated and awkward issues arising from 
concealed British defence contracts with Libya, but also by the Libyans’ apparent indifference 
to their material interests, as evidenced by their campaigns against oil companies since they 
took office, and notably their enforcement of substantial cutbacks of company production in 
Libya.372 
On 26 August 1970 the British government handed the Libyan Foreign Ministry an 
aide memoire drawing their attention to the requirement of international law that 
compensation in such cases should be prompt, adequate and effective. It specifically 
asked ‘when the compensation committees specified in the decree would be set up and 
how the companies would have a formal opportunity to represent their case to the 
committees’.373 On 9 September 1970, the Libyan government replied to the official 
note made by the British government about compensation for Shell. The Libyans said 
that as soon as the process of the takeover was finished, the compensation committees 
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would be set up, and the committees would take into account the views of the 
companies. 374  On 25 February 1971, and following the nationalisation of four 
marketing oil companies, the Libyan Minister of Oil issued a decree establishing 
committees to assess the compensation due to the oil companies, including Shell.375 
According to the Under Secretary at the Libyan Ministry of Petroleum, the amount due 
to Shell would be paid by the end of March.376 About a year after the establishment of 
the Compensation committees the decision on compensation had been taken. The 
figure awarded to Shell by the compensation committee of about LD 2.65 million was 
the largest award.377 For Shell and the British government, the amount paid by the 
Libyan government was approximately half the value of the assets estimated by the 
company. The amount was accepted by the company, but under protest.378 
The nationalisation of British Petroleum (BP) assets in Libya 
Before 7 December 1971 there was no direct Libyan action against BP. The Company 
had suffered from the new Libyan oil policy, as all the other companies had done. BP 
and Bunker Hunt faced the same oil Libyan policy that the foreign oil companies faced 
during the negotiations of posted prices. Like all other companies, BP opposed the 
increase in the oil price, but eventually the company agreed to the terms when the other 
oil companies agreed to raise the posted price.  
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BP was the only one of the large oil producers in Libya that had not been ordered to 
cut back production, and along with Standard Oil (NJ) and Mobil, had not been given 
a deadline to accede to Libya's demands.379 However, BP had refused the new Libyan 
posted price and stood with the other oil companies against the Libyan demands. From 
the point of view of BP, such a price hike and increase in tax rates would pose a cruel 
dilemma and would significantly affect the interests of oil companies elsewhere.380 
Thus, the company rejected the Libyan demands. Sir Eric Drake, BP’s chairman and 
chief executive, “favoured strong resistance” against the Libyan demands. In a meeting 
in New York he hoped to obtain the support of the British and American governments 
to stand against what he called Libya’s unilateral demands. However Drake was to be 
disappointed. The American government announced that “there was little that the US 
government could do”.381 Later, and after breaking down Occidental’s resistance, all 
the oil companies apart from Shell agreed to the new Libyan price. It is clear that no 
particular action was taken against BP during the period of negotiations over the posted 
price. BP only faced the same difficulties that the other oil companies were faced with. 
The hostile Libyan acts against BP started in late 1971. In his speech of 11 June 1971, 
Gaddafi talked about the status of British forces in the (UAE) islands. Gaddafi warned 
Britain that the consequences of withdrawal from these islands might be that Iran would 
occupy them. Gaddafi went on to say that he would hold the British government 
responsible for developments in the Gulf over the UAE Islands. 382* 
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On 7 December 1971, the Libyan government declared that it had nationalised the 
assets of BP in Libya, in retaliation for Britain's failure to prevent Iranian occupation 
of the Islands in the Arabian Gulf.383 On the same day, a committee was set up to assess 
levels of compensation, to be provided within three months. A new Libyan company 
called the Arabian Gulf Petroleum Company was established to take over all the assets 
and operations of BP in Libya.384  Kekhiy, who was the Under Secretary, Minister of 
Unity and Foreign Affairs asserts that ‘The reason for the Libyan decision was HMG’s 
position over the Gulf Islands, which they had abandoned and had handed over to 
Iran’.385 
The Libyan decision was strongly rejected by BP, who requested arbitration, which 
was refused by the Libyans. Meanwhile the HMG’s reaction was immediate. In its 
support for BP, the Conservative government released the following statement: 
An act of nationalisation is not legitimate in international law unless it is for a public purpose 
related to the needs of the taking state, and is followed by the payment of prompt, adequate, 
and effective compensation. Nationalisation measures which are arbitrary, discriminatory or 
motivated by consideration of a political nature unrelated to the well-being of the taking state 
are illegal and invalid.386 
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In its response to the protests by BP and the British government, the Libyan Oil 
Minister said: 
No dispute has arisen over the application of the provisions of the concession agreement [...] 
the revolution had merely exercised a sovereign right which is not open to challenge or debate 
in any form whatever. Nationalisation is a legitimate course of action sanctioned by 
international law and 1society.387 
In these circumstances, and as the first direct British response, the British government 
had suspended its negotiations with the Libyan government over the outstanding issues 
and withdrew the offer to the Libyans. Britain announced that they would not enter into 
any further negotiations until a satisfactory solution could be reached with BP over the 
nationalisation. 388   The British also informed the Libyan government that ‘if an 
amicable settlement of the BP issue can be reached, our negotiations on the financial 
claims will have to start again from scratch’. 389  After this, no significant change 
occurred in the relations between Libya and Britain, and the problem remained 
unresolved until November 1974, when a settlement was reached between the Libyan 
government and BP. The relationship between the two countries had deteriorated 
following the nationalisation of BP. This was mainly reflected by the failure of the 
negotiations to resolve any outstanding problems and on the British-Libyan relations 
as a whole. 
The Libyan Minister of Oil related the nationalisation of BP to the desire of the Libyan 
government to control its own national resources. He went on to say that ‘We are 
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building our policy of mutual relations with the Western oil companies operating on 
the territory of the Libyan Arab Republic[...]our second action was to introduce 
efficient government control over the activities of Western oil monopolies’.390 
The policy against the oil companies was driven by both the Libyan desire of limiting 
the control of foreign oil companies over the oil industry in Libya which involved 
nationalising the interests of these companies, (Libyan national self-interest) and 
British-Libyan dispute over these issues. Thus, one argument that can be raised against 
the nationalisation as being a response to the withdrawal of British troops from the 
UAE islands and their turning a blind eye to the Iranian occupation of these islands, is 
that the nationalisation was strongly driven by both Libyan national self-interests and 
British-Libyan disputes over outstanding issues. The nationalisation process did not 
end with BP. In June 1973 the Libyan government nationalised the American firm 
Bunker Hunt, a partner of BP.391 On September 1, 1973 the Libyan government issued 
decree number 1966, by which 51% of the American company LIAMCO was 
nationalised and replaced by the national oil corporation NOC.392 This nationalisation 
also included the TOPCO and CALASIATIC companies. In February, 1974 another 
nationalisation degree was issued nationalising the remaining 49% of LIAMCO, 
CALASIATIC and TOPCO.393 
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The failure to reach a solution to the British-Libyan disputes had thus led the Libyan 
government to take hostile action against British interests in Libya, especially its oil 
interests, and to protect the Libyan national self-interest. The negotiations between the 
two countries over the outstanding issues had taken a long time, and had not resulted 
in any noteworthy results. This had led to a sense of frustration on the Libyan side, 
which sensed that the British government was not serious in its stated desire to reach a 
solution. This reflected negatively on British interests in Libya, as well as the relations 
between the parties in general. The British government also strongly believed that the 
process of nationalisation of BP was not in fact due to the withdrawal of Britain from 
the UAE islands and their occupation by Iran as the Libyan government claimed. The 
British saw the Libyans’ intransigence as being more related to a lack of resolution 
over the issues related to the Anglo-Libyan treaty, with particular reference to the 
Chieftain and BAC contracts and related financial liabilities. 
Libyan government views the British government as a shareholding in BP.394 Thus; it 
was not unlikely that the Libyans used BP to encourage the British government to agree 
to the Libyans demands over the outstanding issues. This also made BP expecting 
action that the Libyan government would take against the British government in case 
of failure of the negotiations between the British and Libyan governments.  
In March 1971, the FCO Oil Department warned both BP and Shell companies that the 
negotiations between the British government and the Libyan government was about to 
reach an impasse and it could result in disaster. These seem likely to come to action 
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being taken by the Libyans against British oil interests.395 
Mr Hannam, of the Department of Oil Distribution believes that the Libyan government 
moving against BP was one of the Libyan possibilities which would be used against 
the British government and which had been suspected for a while. He writes that ‘The 
decision to take over BP was on the cards since before the first moves by the Libyans 
to convert their foreign currency balance and the local BP manger was so warned by 
me (Hannam)’.396 
Jim Black of the US State Department argued that the Libyan decision to nationalise 
BP was not directed against the British government because of the Gulf Islands dispute. 
In his view, the dispute merely provided Gaddafi with a pretext to nationalise BP.397 
Black went on to say that: 
The RCC has suffered on major setback of any kind since they took office. In their eyes 
HHG’s refusal to refund the advance deposit on the Chieftain and BAC contract and our denial 
of any financial liabilities under the Anglo-Libyan treaty were inexplicable and a constant 
affront to Libya’s forward progress […] both Blake and (Newsom who was also from the US 
State Department) personally believe that the nationalization of BP was the direct result of 
Libya’s bitterness over past British actions in Libya.398 
Ben Amir, the Libyan Ambassador related the BP nationalisation to the slowness of 
the British government in negotiations about outstanding problems. He said that: 
Libyan policy makers were young, quick and keen to score successes to show off to the Arab 
world and to the Libyan people. The British government on the other hand was slow and 
ponderous [...] this slowness was incomprehensible to Libyans who interpreted it as 
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hypocritical, even deceitful. The machinery of government had been moulded in the Victorian 
era, and that in the later twentieth century, treating revolutionaries on a medium to long time 
scale sometimes paid off.399 
Ben Amir concluded that the slowness of the negotiations certainly led the Libyans to 
lose their patience, so nationalisation of BP was a direct consequence of that.400    
Jallud strongly expressed his irritation that the negotiations between British and Libyan 
governments took more than two years which was far too long, did not result in ending 
the dispute about the Libyan British outstanding issues. He also added that ‘At times it 
had seemed to him (Jallud) that Libya was more conscious of British interests here than 
were HMG.’401 
In the opinion of Mr Hannam, there was a strong link between the nationalisation of 
BP and the outstanding issues. He adds that the ‘action against BP would have enabled 
them to reclaim the money they allege we owed them and at the same time give a 
suitably revolutionary lead to other OPEC nations on the participation issue’. The issue 
of the UAE islands enabled the Libyans to put another label on their action. Hannam 
goes on to state that ‘I very much doubt however if, when they come to calculate 
compensation to BP they will pass up the chance to lay hands on HMG’s supposed 
debts to them’.402 
The British Ambassador in Tripoli, Mr Peter Tripp, stated that Libyan dissatisfaction 
with the British government’s response to their claims had led the Libyans to adopt a 
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more hostile attitude towards British interests in Libya as well as other issues in the 
region, such as Malta, the UAE islands, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.403  As Jallud 
states, ‘unless the British government gave the Libyan government satisfaction over 
the major issues outstanding between the two governments, the Libyan government 
would take action against British interests in Libya’. 404  
In February 1973, Jallud stated that the Libyan BAC and financial claims were much 
larger than any British claim. When the negotiations resumed, the two governments 
should agree all outstanding claims. Thereafter, the matters would be settled quickly.405   
A conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the Libyan government may have 
created this situation in order to force the British government to accept their demands, 
and pay what the Libyan government claimed was payable by the British government. 
On 13 December 1971, the British government required from the Libyan government 
that the compensation for BP should be quick, just and satisfactory. Jallud stated that 
‘Payment of compensation would depend on a settlement of our financial negotiations 
under the air defense contract and financial agreement’.406 
This clearly shows that the Libyan government had linked any compensation with 
Libyan obtaining a satisfactory settlement to its outstanding issues. The British 
Ambassador said ‘It seemed that something other than Arab idealism now motivated 
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Libya’s action. i.e. a traditional desire to acquire more money.’407 
Mr Suleiman Ghradah, Minister at the Libyan Embassy and previously private 
secretary to Colonel Gaddafi, said that Gaddafi strongly believed that resolving the 
problem of the BAC contract was the way to better Anglo–Libyan relations. A failure 
to settle this question played a part in the nationalisation of BP.408 Mr Tiny Rowland 
of Lonrho and Mr Marawan, who were mediators between the British and Libyan 
governments when resolving the outstanding issues, both agreed that the 
nationalisation of BP would not have taken place if the British government had made 
an acceptable offer to the Libyans. In the point of view of Mr Rowland, the British 
government missed a great chance of taking advantage of the possibilities he had 
opened up for a negotiated settlement with Libya.409 He strongly believes that the 
nationalisation of BP would not have taken place if the British government had at least 
used the role of Mr Marawan (the Egyptian mediator) in a good way. Rowland writes 
that:  
The minister of state’s meeting with Marawan, according to Rowland, had left Marawan with 
the conviction that HMG was not really interested in a settlement with Libya.  Marawan 
agreed with Rowland that, if the British Government made the offer of a £25 million package 
to the Libyan Government before 7 December, the BP nationalisation would never have 
occurred.410 
Only shortly before the nationalisation of BP, the British government told the Egyptian 
mediator, Mr. Marawan, that the British government would discuss raising the offer of 
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the British settlement of outstanding issues to £25 million. Yet on that day the Libyan 
government had nationalised BP. This behaviour seemed to be inexplicable. It seems 
to be that the new initiative came from the Libyan government; why had the Libyans 
not waited for its outcome? Mr Ghradah said that ‘the news that a decision was to be 
taken on 7 December had not reached Tripoli until after BP had been nationalised’. 411 
Between 1970 and 1974, no compensation was paid to any of the British companies 
nationalised in Libya. Negotiations between the Libyan government and BP on 
compensation took around 3 years until the settlement of this problem was reached. BP 
estimated the value of assets nationalised as being more than £115 million, outlined as 
follows: ‘50 million Pounds worth of crude oil over 2 years. 46 million cash. The write 
off of 19 million which BP owes in tax and royalties’.412 In November 1974, the matter 
between the Libyan government and BP was settled for £62 million and BP withdrew 
all its claims against the Libyan government.413 
The value of British oil interests in Libya and the impact of British-
Libyan disputes over these interests 
Perhaps British oil companies were the most familiar with the nature of Libyan oil in 
terms of quality, quantity of production and strategic reserves, as they were among the 
first to explore for oil in Libya. Thus, the British oil companies, along with the 
American companies, were the leading companies in the Libyan oil industry.  
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If we take into account the fact that the oil industry in Libya has from the outset 
depended on the corporations and technology of Britain and America, this could lead 
us to assume that the adoption of Libya was significant to these countries. It is also a 
fact that the engagement of these companies on the oil industry in Libya led them to 
spend a lot of money in Libya, and therefore, the size of their investments was large. 
Thus, the British had great self-interest in Libyan oil and the loss of their oil interests 
in a country like Libya, which was the third-largest oil exporter in the world in late 
1969 and early 1970, would significantly affect future relations between the two 
countries. 
This table shows the rapid rise of Libyan oil production in the period from 1961 to 
1970, by which time Libya had become the third largest oil exporter in the world.414 
Year Barrels per day 
1961 18,000 
1962 179,000    
1965 1,219,000 
1967 1,744,000        
1969 3,111,000 
1970 3, 321,000 
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Another table shows Libyan oil exports to Europe.415  
Countries          Imports from 
Libya Barrels 
per day 
Percentage of 
consuming countries’ 
imports 
Percentage of 
Libya’s Oil exports 
 
West Germany      820,000 41 25.1 
Italy 737,000 32 22.5 
United Kingdom 474,000 23 14.5 
France 357,000 17 10.9 
Netherlands 260,000 21 8.0 
Spain 190,000 30 5.8   
It is clear from the above table that the United Kingdom was the third largest Libyan 
oil importer in Europe after West Germany and Italy.      
In 1970, Libya reached its highest level of oil exports at 160m tons (3, 320, 000, b/d). 
In 1972 Libyan production of oil was reduced to 111.3m tons (2, 239, 400 b/d). In 1973 
oil production was reduced to 109m tons (2, 185, 000, b/d).  Production fell by 19% 
between 1970 and 1973. This was the result of intervention and production restrictions 
imposed by the Libyan government during disputes with the oil companies.416    
The assets and expenditure of BP in Libya included exploration, drilling, pipelines and 
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terminals and appear to have been worth around £75m. The net book value of BP’s 
assets there was some £30m, though expected future profits from oil in the ground 
enlarged this figure to about £230m. The assets of Shell in Libya were estimated as 
being about a half of the Amerada Hess stake in Oasis. The net value of Shell’s assets 
in Oasis was about £18m.417  The value of the oil in the ground owned by BP and Shell 
was estimated at around £10-15 m.418  The increase in the oil price which was first 
demanded by the Libyan government and later followed by the oil producing countries 
had a significant effect on the world price of oil and in particular on Britain’s attitude. 
By the end of 1969 Libya was the largest single supplier of oil to the United Kingdom, 
and by 1970 Libya had become the third largest oil supplier in the world.419 This would 
have a significant effect on the oil price in the United Kingdom. The Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) said that the foreign exchange costs of oil would cost the 
United Kingdom about £40 million a year, and this would be just about half of the 
additional cost which would result from acceptance in full of the demands of the oil 
producing countries.420  DTI added that acceptance in full would cost Britain £150 
million. Also, the Libyan government was pushing for more increases.421 After the 
signing of the Tehran agreement to increase oil prices, the Libyan government stated 
that this agreement did not meet its demands. It declared that there must be a special 
price of oil for the Mediterranean region. In February the negotiations in Tripoli began 
between oil companies and the Libyan government as the representative of the 
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Mediterranean oil producers. Later negotiations resulted in the signing of the Tripoli 
Agreement. A British report said that the Tripoli agreement would probably prove very 
expensive for the British government in terms of both the additional cost to the balance 
of payments, which it was estimated might be in the order of £70 million, and the risk 
that it might provoke the reopening of the settlement which had recently been signed 
with other oil producers in Tehran. 422  In April 1971 the Tripoli agreement was 
concluded. As the DTI stated, this agreement would cost the British government some 
£45-50 million a year, and if the other Mediterranean countries concerned adopted it, 
this would cost the British government another £30 million a year. It would also lead 
to higher oil costs throughout Europe. 423 
Differences between the British and Libyan governments on outstanding issues, as well 
as the reduction of Libya's oil production, led to a sharp decline in Libyan oil exports 
to the United Kingdom and made the British government urgently reassess its foreign 
policy towards importing oil. The following table shows the decline of British oil 
imports from Libya.424 
Year  m. Tons % of all crude oil imports 
1968 21.5 26% 
1969 21.5 23% 
1970 25.6 25% 
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1971 20.2 20% 
1972 14.7 14% 
1973 11.4 10% 
As a result of the increase in oil prices as well as the policy of reducing production 
followed by some oil producing countries such as Libya, the British had to pay more. 
This led the British government to implement plans for rationing. The need to reduce 
the degree of Britain's dependence on oil from the Middle East and North Africa 
became important. The British Prime Minister said that ‘We (the British government) 
must [...] increase the pace of development of our own resources of power, including 
North Sea oil, natural gas and nuclear energy.425 
This may explain the low level of imports of Libyan oil to Britain in the period from 
1971 to 1973. The tension in relations between the two countries and the reduction of 
Libya's oil production were also key factors in this. The conclusion that can be drawn 
is that the national interests of the Libyan government clearly clashed with British 
interests. The Libyan government’s desire to raise oil prices cost the British 
government a significant amount. The Libyan action was seen by many as pushing 
world oil prices to the point of instability. Moreover, the nationalisation by the Libyan 
government of the British oil companies in Libya led to the loss of Britain’s oil interests 
there and forced Britain to look for new sources of oil. Also, the amounts of 
compensations paid to the companies nationalised by the Libyan government were seen 
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as being neither effective nor satisfactory from the point of view of both the companies 
and the British government. 
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Conclusion  
The reasons for the British-Libyan dispute over British oil interests in Libya, and 
strained relations between the two countries regarding the nationalisation of British oil 
assets in Libya, were a direct result of two main factors, and the dispute over the UAE 
islands was secondary. 
The first reason is that Libya desired to extend its control over the oil sector and limit 
oil foreign companies’ control. The second reason is that Libya was disappointed with 
the outcome of the outstanding issues negotiations, and responded by nationalising 
British oil assets. 
By tracking Libyan negotiations with the oil companies through the price negotiation 
period, it seems clear that the Libyan government's goal was to raise prices and reduce 
the control of the oil companies. These were goals were shared with other countries, 
including Algeria. 
It also seems that the process of the first nationalisation of Shell was a selective order 
used to put pressure on other companies; it also appears that there was no intention to 
nationalise the entire sector. Negotiations with oil companies over prices were carried 
out at the same time that Britain and Libya were negotiating their outstanding issues. 
Therefore, the outcome of negotiations for the settlement of the outstanding problems 
directly affected the negotiations with oil companies, and specifically the British oil 
company BP, which led to the decision to nationalise BP’s assets in Libya. This can be 
clearly seen by the fact that Libya did not take any action against BP, despite its 
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opposition to increasing prices, until after the failure of British-Libyan chieftain tank 
negotiations in mid-1971. This resulted in Britain’s refusal to deliver tanks and the 
return of the deposit (for more details see chapter 2). In addition, Libya was satisfied 
with the Tripoli agreement, and oil prices were resolved. This strongly shows that the 
nationalisation of BP was not an outcome of oil price issues which already resolved, 
and was not an outcome of the UAE islands. The nationalisation of BP was a direct 
result of the collapse of the negotiations regarding the tanks deal. Unresolved issues 
between the two countries strongly weakened the position of the oil companies in 
negotiations to raise the price of oil between Libya and oil companies. This also 
constrained British Government help to its oil companies in Libya. The linkages 
between issues made the negotiations more difficult, but on neither side were the 
linkages arbitrary or accidental: they were all part of a politicised negotiating strategy. 
The nationalisation of BP led to a deterioration of the relations between the two 
countries, and delayed the solution of the outstanding issues until late 1974, when 
Libya paid compensation to BP and the British government agreed to resume 
negotiations. The outstanding issues which were central between the two countries 
remained unresolved because of this, and resulted in more Libyan hostile action against 
British interests, such as Libya turning to the Soviet Union for arms.426  
The British government later suspended all negotiations with Libya, withdrew its offer 
to settle this problem and linked resuming negotiations to a just compensation for BP. 
This kept relations static for three years from November 1971 to November 1974, when 
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the solution was finally reached between Libya and BP. This also led the Libyan 
government to put a ban on British firms working in Libya and British goods being 
sold in Libyan markets. The British government and BP were not satisfied with the 
compensation paid by the Libyan government: while BP estimated its assets in Libya 
at £115 million, Libya only paid £62 million. 
These tensions led to a rapid decline in Libyan oil exports to the United Kingdom. In 
1970, Britain was importing 25% of its oil from Libya, whereas by 1973 this rate had 
dropped to only 10%; this in turn led Britain to urgently seek new sources of oil. In 
addition, the Libyan desire to raise oil prices was considered as pushing world oil prices 
to the point of instability, and cost the British government a significant amount. All of 
these matters pushed relations between the two countries to a high level of tension. 
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Chapter Four: The Soviet-Libyan relationship and its impact on 
British-Libyan relations (1969-1979)  
This chapter discusses Soviet-Libyan relations and their impact on British-Libyan 
relations. It investigates the role of the Soviet-Libyan rapprochement in the worsening 
relations between Britain and Libya from 1969 to 1979. It examines the strength of 
Soviet-Libyan relations, and whether Libya's rapprochement with the Soviet Union 
was built on a positive desire by Libya for a closer relationship or was the result of 
political, strategic or economic factors forcing Libya to turn to the Soviet Union. The 
chapter also explores the extent of Soviet-Libyan cooperation in the strategic and 
political fields and the supply of Soviet arms to Libya, and whether this cooperation 
threatened the security of NATO and Western interests in the region, especially British 
interests.  
The Soviet-Libyan rapprochement was widely seen as significant in the 1970s.427 Some 
previous studies contended that Libya adopted certain policies unacceptable to the 
West, such as closer links to the Soviet Union, and supported the increasing Soviet role 
in the region. Some of these studies went on to argue that the Soviet Union succeeded 
with its arms deliveries in extending its influence in Libya.  Similarly, other studies 
claimed that after the USSR withdrew personnel from Egypt in 1972, the Soviet interest 
in Libya heightened significantly.428 Others argue that Libya was facing difficulties in 
getting weapons from the West and only turned to the USSR as a result. Moscow fed 
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Libya massive quantities of sophisticated arms, military training and technical 
assistance. In return, Gaddafi extended to Moscow access to Libya's military 
infrastructure, oil for energy-hungry Soviet satellite states and hard currency.429 A 
number of other previous studies stated that the delivery of Soviet arms to Libya in 
1972 and 1974 marked Libya’s shift towards the Soviet Union. Some Egyptian and 
British media went on to claim that the Soviet Union obtained naval and air bases in 
Libya in return for large arms deliveries. 430 In addition, some studies picked up what 
the media said about Soviet military bases in Libya without confirming or denying 
those reports. However, other texts in primary sources show that there was a 
misunderstanding in these accounts about the Soviet-Libyan relationship in the 1970s. 
Thus, the other main purpose of this chapter is to explore how British documents view 
these claims. 
Before engaging in the discussion of Soviet-Libyan relations and their impact on 
Anglo-Libyan relations, it is necessary first to examine Soviet foreign policy towards 
the Middle East and the Mediterranean. This is to ascertain the priorities of Soviet 
policy in the region, how the Soviets implemented their policy, the importance of each 
of the countries in the region for the Soviet Union, the extent of success of Soviet policy 
in the region, and finally, the obstacles that limited Soviet influence in the region. This 
firstly will show how the Soviets classified the countries of the region according to 
their respective importance to Soviet policy. Secondly, this will also show the degree 
                                                 
429 Metz, H C., Libya, p 244, and Phillips, J A., Moscow’s thriving Libyan connection  
430Soviet arms for Ethiopia 'sent through Libya, The Times, 6 October 1977; Pact for Soviet bases in 
Libya reported, The Times, 23 May 1975  
  
161 
 
of Soviet-Libyan cooperation, as well as the impact of ideologies and political variables 
in the region on the earlier lack of rapprochement, followed later by the actual 
rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Libya.  
Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean in 
the 1970s  
It is clear that throughout the period of the 1960s and 1970s Egypt, Syria and Iraq 
received a great deal of Soviet attention in the Middle East and the Mediterranean 
basin. Libya was until late 1969 ruled by a pro-Western monarchy, and therefore had 
no significant relations with the Soviet Union until the early 1970s. However, this 
changed gradually after Gaddafi seized power in Libya, for several reasons. These 
reasons will be discussed later in this chapter.  
Analysts agree that there was a significant change in Soviet foreign policy towards the 
Moscow’s changing  431Stalin, especially after 1956. Third World after the death of
stance came as a response to, and in defiance of, American efforts to exclude the Soviet 
Union from the Middle East and manage the conflict in the Middle East 
                                                                                                                   432unilaterally. 
After Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev abandoned Stalin's hostile attitude towards 
non-communist Third World nations and decided to build good relations instead, 
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aiming to extend Soviet influence to these nations.433 From then on Soviet foreign 
policy towards the Third World countries was built on two main tools: military and 
economic assistance. 'Through these programs the Soviet Union delivered the 
equivalent of $49.4 billion in military assistance and $9.8 billion in economic 
assistance to the non-communist developing countries between 1954 and 1981'.434 The 
Soviet Union concentrated on key influential countries in the Arab region, Egypt, Syria 
and Iraq.435 
The United States had military bases in Morocco, Libya, Turkey, Pakistan and the 
Arabian Gulf and Iraq; there were British military bases in Libya, Egypt, Cyprus, Sudan 
and Jordan; 'moreover, the Baghdad Pact, signed on 24 February 1955, grouped Iran, 
Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan under a British umbrella in an anti-Soviet alliance'. 436 Thus, 
most of the region’s countries were under the influence of the United States and Great 
Britain.   
The first Soviet contact with the region was Egypt. After the failure of Egypt to obtain 
arms from America in 1955, Nasser turned to the USSR, which led to the beginning of 
the Soviet presence in Egypt and the region. At the initiative of the USSR, the first 
Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal was signed in 1955. This 'constituted a dramatic 
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Soviet entry into the Middle East great-power competition'.437 Thereafter, from the 
mid-1950s until 1972, the Soviet Union concentrated on consolidating its influence in 
Egypt. In 1958 Egypt received a $175 million Soviet loan 'as well as $100 million for 
the building of the Aswan dam […] Between 1955-60 Egypt received over $500 
million of military aid, making it the largest Third World recipient of Soviet aid at the 
time […] between 1961-64 Egypt received $700 million worth of military aid'.438  
To secure its presence and to help Nasser's regime survive against Israel, the Soviet 
Union increased military and economic assistance to Egypt after the 1967 defeat. 
'Between 1967 and 1973 the Soviet Union supplied some 42.96 billion in arms to 
Middle East countries, of which 41.77 billion went to Egypt'. In return, the Soviet 
Mediterranean fleet was granted the right to use Egyptian ports in Alexandria and Port 
Said, the equivalent of naval base rights. In addition 'Soviet pilots were allowed to fly 
Soviet-made planes with Egyptian markings on Soviet missions in the Mediterranean, 
representing the equivalent in Egypt of airbase rights'.439 However, after the death of 
Abdel Nasser and Sadat’s accession to power in Egypt, Egyptian-Soviet relations 
cooled, leading to the expulsion of Soviet experts from Egypt in 1972.  
On 15 May 1971, Egypt had signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. Sadat 
had hoped to obtain Soviet weapons which he could use to renew the war with Israel 
and secure the return of occupied Egyptian territories. However, this treaty did not 
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succeed in dispelling Soviet suspicions about Sadat, and Sadat did not obtain the 
weapons he wanted. From May 1971 to April 1972, Sadat made many visits to 
Moscow, and expressed his concern that the United States was modernising Israel’s 
forces. Sadat told the Soviets that the United States had provided Israel with the latest 
Phantom jets and ‘other advanced weapons were being extended to Israel’. If the Soviet 
Union did not do the same for Egypt, this would cast doubts over Soviet commitments 
to Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. 
In late 1971, the Soviet Union also questioned Cairo about a meeting held between 
Egyptian and United States officials ‘in which reports were circulated that an 
agreement behind the back of the Soviet Union was a distinct possibility’. Another 
reason for the split between the two countries was their views on the Arab-Israel 
conflict. The Soviets encouraged a peaceful resolution, ‘fearing that a strong Egypt 
would wage war against Israel which in return would result in a superpower conflict 
because of Washington's commitment to Israel’, whereas Sadat believed in military 
action which would lead to liberating Egyptian territories and strengthening Egypt’s 
position in negotiations.440 When Sadat could not obtain the weapons he wanted, he 
ordered Soviet experts to leave Egypt in 1972. 
A conclusion that can be drawn here is that from mid-1955 until 1970, the USSR won 
a foothold in the Middle East and Mediterranean via Egypt. They succeeded in 
extending their influence in Egypt through economic and military support provided 
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until the death of Abdel Nasser. However, Sadat's accession resulted in strained 
relations between him and the Soviets and led later to the collapse of Soviet-Egyptian 
relations. The Soviet Union moved quickly to compensate for its losses in Egypt. Libya 
was an alternative to Egypt for the Soviets because of its position. However, many 
factors stood in the way. Libya was not in need of economic aid, and there were 
political and ideological differences, as well as the ultimate aim of Soviet policy to play 
a major role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. For all these reasons, Syria and Iraq 
were more important for the Soviet Union. Soviet moves in the area throughout the 
period of decline in Soviet-Egyptian relations demonstrated the Soviet continuing 
search for an alternative to Egypt. 'During this period the Soviets also undertook a 
major effort to diversify and solidify their bases influence in the region as a whole… 
[they] sealed a large arms deal with Syria. During 1971 they used a variety of means 
to upgrade their ties with South Yemen, Morocco, and Algeria, while simultaneously 
offering economic assistance to the conservative monarchies in the region… 
strengthened their ties with Libya and Algeria, and signed a Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation with Iraq'.441 
Iraq was viewed as the natural alternative to Egypt as a great Arab power. In addition, 
Syria became 'the Soviet Union's most important ally in the Middle East - a status 
formalized in October 1980 with the signing of a 25-year Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation'. The collapse of the Soviet alliance with Egypt was partially balanced by 
a growing Soviet relationship with both Syria and Iraq. 442 Unpublished British 
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documents show that during the period from the beginning of 1970 to the end of 1971, 
no evidence showed that the Soviets were doing the same with Libya. The archive 
material heavily indicated that Libya was negotiating with Britain on resolving 
outstanding issues regarding former arms contracts. Libya hoped to get weapons from 
the West, especially Britain. Until after the end of 1971, there was no political or 
military cooperation between Libya and the USSR. However, the collapse of the 
British-Libyan negotiations on arms contracts, notably Chieftain tanks, led Libya to 
turn to the Soviet Union. This marked the beginning of Soviet arms shipments to Libya 
in mid-1972.443 
Soviet relations with Syria and Iraq were established in late 1958, and then 
strengthened at the beginning of the 1970s. The coup in Iraq in July 1958 ended the 
Baghdad Pact and brought the radical Abdul Karim Qasim to power. In 1959, Iraq 
withdrew from the Baghdad Pact. This weakened Western influence and increased 
Soviet influence. On 29 October 1957 economic and technical aid worth $457 million 
was given to Syria.444 All of these events strengthened relations between the Soviet 
Union and Syria and Iraq. The pro-Western monarchy in Libya did not collapse until 
the end of 1969. The Gaddafi regime was initially against both Western and Soviet 
regional influence. 
Soviet large-scale military shipments to Syria started in 1971. In 1972, when the 
relationship with Egypt worsened and arms shipments to that country stopped, Russian 
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arms shipments began to flow rapidly to Syria. SAM-3 anti-aircraft missiles were 
delivered to Syria.445 Large quantities of Soviet arms were supplied to Syria during 
1973-74. Between 1975 and 1979 Syria received weapons from the Soviet Union worth 
an estimated $3.6 billion. 446  'Soviet arms shipments to […] Syria […] reached 
staggering proportions.’ The Soviet Union had replaced most of the military equipment 
Syria had lost in the October war by August 1974, extended Syria’s war debts for an 
additional 12 years and assigned Cuban and North Korean pilots to fly air defence 
missions in Syrian MiG-23s'.447 
Major Soviet-Iraqi military cooperation started in mid-1971; 'the USSR supplied Iraq 
with 100 MiG-21 and Su-7 fighters, over 20 helicopters and trainers, 100-150 tanks, 
some 300 armoured personnel carriers, and about 500 field guns and artillery 
rockets'.448 In 1971, 16 agreements were signed between Iraq and the Soviet Union, 
covering the military, economic, technological and cultural fields. Additionally, a 
relationship was established between the Soviet Communist Party and the Iraqi Baath 
Party leading to the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in April 1972. 
449  After its signing, Iraq received significant technical support, especially for oil 
production. Other economic and trade agreements were signed with the Soviet Union 
and Eastern bloc countries such as Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic 
Republic. Soviet arms shipments to Iraq 1975-79 were worth some $4.9 billion.450 
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British documents show that the kind of military equipment, missiles and aircraft that 
were delivered to Syria and Iraq were not received by Libya till late 1974 and the 
beginning of 1975 (discussed below). But did the Soviet Union succeed in making 
Libya one of the countries under its influence in the region in the 1970s?  
Despite all the Soviet Union’s economic and military support to Egypt, Syria and Iraq, 
a number of issues showed the weakness of Soviet influence in those countries. In 
Egypt, Abdel Nasser had strongly crushed the communist parties to limit the Soviet 
Union’s ability to transfer presence into influence.451  Although there was a treaty 
between the two countries and strong military cooperation, this did not prevent 
significant differences between the Soviet Union and Iraq, which again limited Soviet 
influence there. These differences were represented in an Iraqi-Soviet disagreement 
about the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine question, and Soviet support for 
Ethiopia against Somalia and Eritrea. The Iraqi Baath Party’s distrust of the Iraqi 
Communist Party led, in mid-1978 and later in April 1979, to the execution of 48 
members of the Iraqi Communist Party accused of establishing an underground 
organisation in the Iraqi armed forces. Finally, Iraq’s growing wealth gave it a greater 
measure of independence, which also limited Soviet influence. 452  The other very 
important issue that undermined the USSR's influence were political division between 
its regional friends, especially after the Camp David accords in 1978.  
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The intense rivalry between the Baath in Bagdad and Damascus had been one such 
obstacle. In addition, the position taken by Moscow on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
divergent view of Arab countries, especially staunchly rejectionist Iraq and Libya, also 
limited the Soviet Union’s influence in the region.453 Even with Syria, Soviet large-
scale economic, military and political support had not led to corresponding Soviet 
influence over Syrian policy. In 1976 the USSR failed to stop the Syrian intervention 
against the National Movement and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 
Lebanon. The Soviets strongly criticised the Syrian actions, and then slowed arms 
shipments to Syria.454 But the best example for the lack of complete success of Soviet 
policy in the Middle East is its expulsion from Egypt in 1972, and the collapse of the 
Soviet-Egyptian treaty less than a year after it was signed. Although the Soviet Union’s 
relations with Egypt started in 1955, they did not obtain access to Egypt’s facilities 
until 1967.455 Shortly afterwards, they were expelled in 1972.  
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the Soviet Union did not achieve any success in 
the region. Arms deals were one of the main sources of hard currency for the Soviet 
Union. The value of arms deliveries to Iraq from 1975-79 reached almost $5 billion. 
With Syria, the Soviets finally succeeded in October 1980 in signing a 25-year treaty 
of friendship and cooperation.  In addition, they obtained access to Egyptian facilities 
for a short period. In other words, the Soviet Union’s influence was limited but not 
wholly thwarted. 
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After 1967, the USSR aimed to play a bigger role in the peace process between the 
Arabs and Israel, on the grounds that the Soviet Union was one of the major powers. 
From this perspective, the Soviets marketed themselves to be a primary sponsor 
alongside the United States in a peaceful settlement. However, the inability of the 
Soviets to be a key player in the peace process showed the weakness of the Soviet 
Union’s influence in the region, and signaled a longer term failure.  'The first major 
Soviet plan [after the 1967 War] appeared in December 1968 and called for trading 
land for peace – Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and settlement 
of the Palestinian problem, in exchange for Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist 
and an end to the state of war in the region, would be guaranteed by the great powers'.456 
It was only after the failure of these efforts that the Soviets supported the large Arab 
coalition that came together in Baghdad in November 1978 to denounce the Camp 
David agreements. Despite its differences with Iraq, Syria supported this assembly. The 
USSR was willing to bring Iraq and Syria together, which would benefit it. On the other 
side, there was what was called the Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation, which 
included Libya, Syria, South Yemen, the PLO and Algeria. This more radical grouping 
also opposed Camp David. 457 'Moscow wants these states to bury their internecine 
rivalries and, along with such political organizations as the Arab Communist parties 
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), form a united front against what the 
USSR has called the linchpin of Western imperialism in the Middle East: Israel. The 
Russians hope that the Arab states will then use their collective pressure against Israel's 
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supporters, especially the United States'.458 
Despite all the military and economic support provided by the Soviet Union to Egypt, 
Iraq, Syria and even Libya, the policy of extending influence through supplying arms 
and providing economic support had little success in expanding long term Soviet 
influence in the region. Political differences over ideology remained, especially on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, which played a key factor in the constraining of Soviet influence. 
After all, it may be correct to argue that 'the economic imperatives to supply arms may 
confer on the recipient some considerable reverse influence on the supplier, in addition 
to the fact that the Soviet Union has found it extremely difficult to turn arms supplies 
into political influence'.459 Based on the discussion above on Soviet foreign policy 
towards the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, it can be concluded that by the 
beginning of the 1970s, most Soviet attention was centred on Egypt, Syria and Iraq and 
only to a lesser extent on Libya. This was because of the factors already mentioned, as 
well as other factors which will be noted shortly in this chapter.  
Gaddafi strongly criticised the communist regimes, invented a theory of socialism 
based on the principles of Islam, and refused to adopt communist ideology. Politically, 
Gaddafi criticised the policy of the Soviet Union in the region, which was based on 
alliances, and condemned the treaties signed between the Soviet Union, Syria and Iraq. 
Gaddafi also did not support the role of the Soviet Union in the Arab-Israeli peace 
process, and he was against the Geneva Conference. These differences will be 
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discussed below. 
Libyan attitude toward the Soviet Union after 1969 
 
The USSR wanted to counter-balance the NATO presence in the region. To achieve its 
aims, the Soviets supported nationalist governments, such as the one in Libya. Nikita 
Khrushchev declared that:  
The Soviet Union places a great importance on the struggle of the nations [...] and the Middle 
East and its policy on this is to participate in supporting the political and economic 
independence of the independent states until their freedom is secure, and we (the Soviets) will 
support all who struggle for their freedom until they achieve complete independence.460 
 
‘Moscow has also sought to solidify its influence through concluding long-term 
friendship-and-cooperation treaties such as those with Egypt in 1971, Iraq in 1972, [...] 
South Yemen in 1979’.461 The Soviet-Libyan relationship can also be understood in the 
light of political changes in Libya after 1969. The new rulers in Libya at the time were 
hungry for weapons in the wake of their failure to obtain them from the West. The 
United Kingdom suspended most arms contracts that had previously been signed with 
the regime of King Idris. Later, some of these contracts were cancelled as a result of 
the Libyan government's policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict462 (for more details, 
see chapter 1 and 2). 
Thus, for the same reason that prompted Egypt to gain weapons from the Soviet Union, 
an inability to obtain weapons from the West led Libya to buy weapons from the USSR. 
Its inability to obtain British Chieftain tanks led to Libya’s decision to buy Soviet tanks 
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in 1970.463 Libya took this step despite the fact that there was no military cooperation 
such as military agreements or a treaty of friendship between the two countries, as 
happened with Syria and Iraq.  
Hence it did not seem that there had been a major shift in Libya's policy toward the 
Soviet Union from 1970 to 1976. Perhaps the most important reason ideological 
difference. Libya had refused any kind of recognition of Israel. Accordingly this 
principle significantly affected the way according to which Libyan policy with the East 
and the West was formed. This clearly appeared when the Soviet Union called for a 
Geneva Conference, which Libya did not support. Another ideological disagreement 
occurred through Gaddafi's repeated criticism of the communist regime. These two 
main points will be explained in depth in the following sections. 
Ideological differences between the Soviet Union and Libya 
Gaddafi never accepted the Soviet communist ideology. He described Marxism as a 
product of 19th century Europe and accused it of being partially responsible for Arab 
disunity. Gaddafi also saw communism as atheistic and not in line with the values of 
the Islamic religion.464 “It is an invention which does not conform to our customs or 
national interests” Gaddafi said. 465  Political parties were banned after the 1969 
revolution, especially the Communist Party. Libyan newspapers such as Al-Jundi 
strongly attacked communist parties across the Arab world, accusing them of being 
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behind all the plots against the Arab nation.466 Khuweilidi Al-Humeidi, a member of 
the RCC and the Libyan Interior Minister, said that the Communists were truly traitors 
and agents of Moscow and Peking.467 Since the early days of his coming to power, 
Gaddafi was harshly critical of the Soviet Union, describing it as an imperialist power 
similar to America. Gaddafi had seen both as imperialist powers whose aim was to take 
over the Arab world and serve their own interests without consideration of the interests 
of Arab peoples. He dismissed them as two sides of the same coin,468 and so ideological 
affinity never played a role in Soviet-Libyan relations which ‘also retarded the 
development of closer political and economic ties’.469  However, Gaddafi said that he 
accepted the Soviet Union as a political friend and rejected it ideologically.470 This was 
reciprocated: the Soviet Union developed a policy of supporting non-communist 
nationalist anti-western governments for largely pragmatic reasons.471  
Political differences between the Soviet Union and Libya 
After he came to power, Gaddafi announced that the policy that would underpin the 
subsequent years of his reign towards the major powers would be based on that of the 
Non-Aligned countries. Gaddafi’s ideology of nonalignment is based mainly on his 
anti-capitalism and anti-communism. From his point of view, this rejection ‘stems not 
from any Maoist-type commitment that the US and the USSR are equally imperialist 
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super-states, but from nationalism and religion’. At a nonaligned states meeting in 
Algiers in September 1973, Gaddafi said: 
The true meaning of neutrality is the liberation of a state from all those types of ties and the defence of 
liberty in the Third World from both Eastern and Western influence. To be nonaligned is to be aware of 
the attempts made by the United States and the USSR to dominate the Third World. Both seek the 
realisation of their own self-interest economically and strategically; the big powers have no concern for 
the smaller powers.472 
However, Gaddafi described the Soviet Union as a friend to the Arab States. Gaddafi 
has been critical of United States and the West, accusing them of being on the Israeli 
side in the Arab-Israeli conflict, while he had the opposite view about the Soviet Union. 
Gaddafi believed that the Soviet Union was more supportive in the conflict between 
the Arabs and Israel, and supportive of Arab rights. Also, the Soviet Union had supplied 
the Arabs and Libya with weapons, while the West had not. Both parties, Libya and 
the Soviet Union, were against the US sponsored peace process. The USSR was 
opposed to the United States’ monopolising role in the biggest events in the Middle 
East and, particularly regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviets lacked a role in 
the Arab-Israeli negotiations. Gaddafi considered the peace talks between Egypt and 
Israel to be a betrayal of the struggle of the Arabs and Palestinians. Despite the 
ideological and political differences between the Soviet Union and Libya, this 
agreement was considered one of the best examples of mutual self-interest. 473 
However, the Suez crisis of 1956, Western military interventions in Lebanon and 
Jordan in 1958 had proved the limitation of the Soviet’s ability to deter such actions, 
                                                 
472 El-Warfally, M G., Imagery and Ideology in US Policy Toward Libya 1969-1982, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, (London, 1988), pp. 57-59 
473   Mets, Libya, p. 244 
176 
 
as well as the limits of Soviet willingness to act as a military protector and not just a 
military supplier its allies.474 
Gaddafi's policies were not consistent with Soviet policy in the Arab region, at a time 
when he was suffering from not making any progress in the relationships with Britain 
and America. Gaddafi personally called the Iraqi ambassador in Tripoli twice in mid-
February 1972 and expressed his deep concern over the government of Iraq’s intention 
to sign a friendship agreement with the USSR. Gaddafi considered the Iraq-Soviet 
friendship to be dangerous for the future of relations between Libya and Iraq as well as 
for the Arab unity. 475  Gaddafi took the same position over the Russian-Syrian 
Friendship Treaty.476 Gaddafi's policy was not just inconsistent with the policies of the 
Soviet Union in the Arab region, but beyond that it was critical of Russian policies on 
the Indian subcontinent. Gaddafi explicitly declared his displeasure of the Soviet 
intervention in the India-Pakistan war and the Soviet Union's support for India against 
Pakistan.477 On 2 February 1972, in an interview with the Lebanese weekly magazine 
Al-Sayad, Gaddafi was reported as saying that ‘The Soviet Union is pursuing an 
imperialist role similar to that of the United States in connection with the role played 
by the USSR in the Indo-Pakistan war’.478 
Later, Gaddafi sent a message to Indira Gandhi (Indian Prime Minister 1966-1977) 
strongly criticising the Indian-Soviet treaty.479The Libyan government newspapers, 
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particularly A-Thawra, waged a war on the Russian attitude towards the 1971 India-
Pakistan war, concluding that the Soviet Union was the chief culprit for supplying India 
with arms, for its treaty with India, and for supplying India with political support in the 
UN. 480  Unpublished British documents show that during the first visit of Libyan 
officials led by Major Jallud, the Soviet Union strongly criticised Libyan newspapers, 
which in turn had criticised communism and Soviet foreign policy.481  Gaddafi also 
criticized Soviet policy in Africa. He helped non-Communist countries, or those that 
followed a non-communist system. In August 1971, Gaddafi gave considerable 
assistance to President Jaafar Al-Nimeiry, former President of the Sudan, to foil a coup 
attempt by some members of the Communist Party there, which was believed to have 
the Soviet Union backing.  
It does not appear that the political and ideological courses of Gaddafi towards the 
Soviet Union greatly differ from those towards the West, but his disputes with the West, 
especially Britain, were sharper and deeper. While the situation between Libya, Britain 
and America went from bad to worse, even as far as the description of Libya as a state 
sponsor of terrorism, the situation was not comparable with the Soviet Union. At the 
political level, Gaddafi was against the Western and Soviet interference in the Arab 
region, and on the ideological level, Gaddafi considered communism and capitalism as 
equally major enemies of Third World countries. On several occasions Gaddafi was 
described by the Western governments as a terrorist supporter: he did indeed give funds 
                                                 
480 TNA, FCO 39/1067, Libyan relations with the Soviet, January 1972 
481 TNA, FCO, 39-1067, Davignon Committee, letter from J C Kay to P M Laver, 6 April 1972 
178 
 
to the IRA, Sinn Fein, the Red Army faction in West Germany and the Abu Nidal 
organisation.482  
Gaddafi believed that, in the issue of Arab-Israeli conflict, American and British policy 
was based on support of Israel at the expense of the Arabs, while he saw the position 
of the Soviet Union as the opposite. Another important point is that the policy of 
Gaddafi in fighting against American imperialism and limiting American and British 
influence was matched by the same goal on the part of the Soviets in the Arab region 
and in Africa. Policy towards the oil industry was also different, as described in the 
previous chapter. 
The Soviet Union's goal of rapprochement with Libya can be clearly seen in the light 
of Soviet goals in the Mediterranean region and efforts to find a foothold in the region. 
Moreover, the Soviet and Western governments were in conflict over spheres of 
influence, especially after the expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt and the extension of 
the US influence there. Thus Libya became more important to the Soviet Union.483 
Therefore, Soviet policy towards Libya was based on three elements:484 
• The supply of Soviet arms to break the dependence of the Arab states on the 
West and to create a new dependence. 
• The creation of a political and economic relationship with such states based on 
the calculated self-interest of each party. 
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• A vague ideological solidarity based on anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, 
anti-Zionism, revolutionary change and socialism. 
The success of the Soviet Union in this strategy would give them many advantages that 
would undoubtedly affect Western influence in the Mediterranean region. For the 
Soviet Union to obtain even limited access to Libyan port facilities would mean a major 
advance for the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean and enhance its ability to monitor the 
US Sixth Fleet there and oher allied navies. This could also lead to the Soviets gaining 
access to Libyan air facilities, which would threaten NATO and cause great concern. 
For instance, 'immediately after the 1967 war, the number of Soviet naval vessels rose 
to about sixty. Assuming the Soviet move to be an attempt to outflank NATO, the West 
established the Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean command which included the 
United States, France, Great Britain and Italy. This surveillance group was established 
to counter the Soviet submarine forces assumed to be the greatest threat to the U.S 
Sixth Fleet'.485  
The Soviet Union tried to extend its influence over sectors of the Libyan army by 
supplying arms and Russian experts to Libya, but this penetration was limited.486 Libya 
also relied on other foreign advisers, including Pakistanis and Cubans, which also 
limited direct Soviet leverage in Libya.487 
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Soviet-Libyan relations and the British view of this relationship 
1972-1975 
Since the collapse of the pro-Western Monarchy in Libya, the British government 
expressed its concern in relation to Soviet influence in Libya.488 However, during the 
period from late 1969 until 1975, there was no Soviet-Libyan significant cooperation, 
apart from buying arms. The British concern did not become serious until early 1976, 
when Libya began to change its perspective towards the Soviet Union. The first formal 
high-level visit of a Libyan delegation to the Soviet Union came in late 1972. The chair 
of the Libyan delegation was Jallud. It does not seem that the visit produced significant 
results in political matters. British documents regard this visit as having indicated that 
the biggest Libyan goal was to obtain Soviet support for compensation for the lack of 
oil production after the nationalisation of BP assets, as well as getting as much out of 
the Russians as possible, without compromising Libya’s basic position.489 This made 
things far from easy for the Libyan delegation, according to A .J. M. Craig of the FCO 
Near East and North Africa Department, who noted that before Jallud left for Moscow, 
Gaddafi had instructed him to enter no concrete political commitments with the 
Soviets. There was an urgent need for oil technology and weapons, but this was seen 
as an economic, not a political arrangement (perhaps naively).490 The visit did produce 
some positive consequences. An economic and technical agreement was signed to meet 
some of Libya’s needs, particularly in the oil industry. Soviet assistance with skilled 
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manpower and technology could provide the basis for the Russians to infiltrate Libya, 
British officials feared.491 Craig reported on the visit of Jallud to the Soviet Union: ‘We 
(the British) see no reason, therefore, to conclude that Gaddafi has softened his hostility 
to the Soviet Union, or modified his policy in any essential way. In the short-term then, 
the results of the visit are not likely to be of really great significance’.492 
Brezhnev and Jallud’s meeting took place on 2 March and it was described as a long 
and difficult one. Brezhnev strongly criticised the official Libyan line of anti-
Sovietism.493 Throughout the visit of Jallud to Moscow, there was a strong attack from 
the Libyan press on Soviet policy on some international issues, as well as criticism of 
communism. It was the view of the British government that Gaddafi himself was 
behind the anti-Soviet articles which appeared in Libya during the visit, and that this 
was probably a warning from him to the Soviets that their dealings should be based 
solely on business.494 This led to the two sides once more sitting down to finalise details 
of the economic and technical cooperation agreement.495 The British Ambassador in 
Tripoli, Mr Peter Tripp, writes that he ‘believe(s) Gaddafi will fight against any 
attempts by the Russians to infiltrate Libya directly or via the Egyptians’.496 
The foundations of Soviet-Libyan cooperation in the supply of weapons were laid 
during the visit of Major Jallud to the Soviet Union in late 1974. The most important 
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results of this visit, was the expectation of major arms deals. Many previous studies 
have highlighted Jallud’s visit to Moscow in 1974 as a first, significant change in 
Soviet-Libyan relations and a first approach by Gaddafi to changing his attitude 
towards the Soviet Union.497 There is no evidence so far that Jallud's visit to Moscow 
was accompanied by a major shift in relations between the two countries, as there is no 
evidence of the signing of a political agreement of any kind. Also despite many high-
level visits between the two, no treaty of friendship was signed between the USSR and 
Libya comparable to that with Iraq in 1972 and with South Yemen, demonstrating 
important limits to Russian-Libyan relations. 
Primary unpublished resources show that, at the beginning of 1974, there was a Libyan 
attempt to improve relations with the countries of Western Europe. The Libyan aim 
was to obtain needed technical assistance, and to balance between Libyan relations 
with the Soviet Union and with Western Europe, reducing Libya’s dependence on the 
Soviet technical assistance and diversifying Libyan sources for weapons.498 For these 
purposes, Jallud started a tour of many of the capitals of Western and Eastern Europe.499  
In January 1974, as part of his tour of Europe, Jallud told the British government that 
he wished to call on the Prime Minister and on the Secretary of State for three or four 
days. Because of the British General Election in February of that year, Jallud’s visit 
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was delayed. 500  Between 7 February and 7 March of 1974, he visited Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, West Germany, Sweden and France. This tour 
included the signing of several agreements that guaranteed European assistance to 
Libya in exchange for Libyan oil.501 
During the preparations for Jallud’s visit to Britain in January 1974, the Libyan 
government made a proposal to resolve outstanding differences, turning a new page in 
British-Libyan relations, and requested the signing of some military equipment 
contracts, including the purchase of arms in large quantities. The Libyan proposal 
included three main points:502 
• Payment of Libya’s financial claims. 
• Purchase of arms: submarines, patrol boats, minesweepers, landing craft, 
frigates, helicopters, fighter aircraft, artillery, possibly missiles;  
• The release of machine-guns, anti-tank rocket launchers and night vision 
equipment whose export licenses the British government cancelled because of the risk 
that they might be transferred to the IRA. 
Again in November and just before the end of 1974, Jallud’s visit to London was 
rescheduled, but in the end this visit did not take place. The British government was 
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not willing to welcome Jallud for many reasons.503 First, the aims of Jallud’s visit to 
London centred on two points: the first was Gaddafi’s main goal in sending Jallud to 
London, was to resolve the claims issue and to win a point which had so far eluded 
him. The second was for Jallud to achieve a personal diplomatic success. The British 
government had no interest in helping them further goals which would help the regime. 
Second, in the light of Libyan support for the IRA, any rapprochement would have left 
the British government open to attacks in Parliament. Third, the British government 
did not change its position on the ban on selling weapons to the Libyan government, 
especially those types of weapons that might be used by the IRA.504 For these reasons 
and perhaps others, Jallud's visit to London did not take place. The differences between 
the two countries remained and no progress in improving relations between Britain and 
Libya was achieved. This helped to push Libya further away from the West, and helped 
to foster the emerging Libyan Soviet rapprochement. 
At the same time, Mr R. J. S. Muir, FCO, Near East and North Africa Department, said 
that ‘Gaddafi privately still entertains considerable reservations about getting too 
closely involved with the Russians and that his relations with them are based on short 
term advantage […] rather than on any real shift of policy’.505 
Jallud’s two visits to the Soviet Union in 1972 and 1974 were mainly for arms supply 
purposes. These two visits will be discussed widely later in this chapter. From 12 to 15 
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May 1975, Alexei Kosygin, the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, accompanied by 
Kiselev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Byelorussia, Skachkov, Chairman of 
the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Foreign Economic 
Relations, and Ilychev, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Libya and met 
with Gaddafi.506 By mid-1975, after Kosygin’s visit to Tripoli, it still did not seem that 
significant change had occurred in Russian-Libyan relations. Both parties regarded 
each other with considerable reserve and caution. This was because of Gaddafi's 
resistance to Russian attempts to dictate policies and to install their own military 
facilities in Libya. There was some common interest, but little trust, in their 
relationship. Thus, the Russians seem to have had as little success as practically every 
other would-be ally with Gaddafi, failing to obtain any worthwhile undertakings from 
him507 
The FCO, considering Russian-Libyan relations in 1975, thought that ‘The substance 
of Russian/Libyan relations still amounts to little more than a limited number of 
arrangements of mutual convenience’.508 Meanwhile, the visit of Kosygin had slightly 
reduced Libya’s isolation from its neighbours, and it allowed the Russians to put some 
indirect pressure on the Egyptians by improving its relations with Libya as well as 
obtaining further Russian contacts with the Libyan armed forces.509 The FCO also 
added that ‘None of this means that the Libyans are yet on the slippery slope to Soviet 
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domination on which we once feared they might land should they have to turn to the 
Russians for most of the weapons they wanted’.510 
Thus, one of the conclusions which can be drawn here is that until Gaddafi's visit to 
Moscow in 1976, there had been no significant cooperation between the Soviet Union 
and Libya which could have threatened the Western interests in Libya.  
The British view of Soviet-Libyan relations and the Libyan shift 
(1976-1979) 
Gaddafi's change toward the Soviet Union was not due to a change in his political or 
ideological view, but it is clear that it was the outcome of other factors dictated by 
international political conditions, and political changes in the Middle East in particular, 
as well as other changes on the Soviet side. 
After the 1973 war between Egypt and Israel, the American administration began a 
new policy aimed at finding a new basis on which to base a comprehensive peace 
between the Arabs and Israel, and specifically between Egypt and Israel. This 
American policy energetically pursued Egypt to hold peace talks with Israel, and 
resulted in reaching in late 1978 the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. 
Gaddafi strongly rejected the peace process with Israel, and in particular the Sadat 
agreement with Israel. Gaddafi was very concerned and afraid of growing American 
influence in the region, especially the growing influence of America in Egypt, which 
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shares with Libya a very long border. In Gaddafi’s view this threatened his very 
existence in Libya. Moreover, after Egypt signing a peace agreement with Israel, 
Gaddafi got into a feud with Sadat which led to a skirmish on the Libyan-Egyptian 
border in 1976. 
Therefore, the existence of a state on the eastern border of Libya in agreement with 
Israel and on good terms with America and even serving US interests in the region was 
undoubtedly a threat to the security of Gaddafi in Libya and a source of constant 
concern to Gaddafi. As for the Soviet Union, it lost much of its presence in the region, 
especially in Egypt, so the Soviets were looking to compensate for the losses in the 
Middle East and North Africa, especially in the Mediterranean region. 
Unpublished British materials show that the change in Gaddafi's relationship with the 
Soviet Union, especially in the political arena, started in 1976. Gaddafi visited Moscow 
from 6 to 9 December 1976. In November, just a month before this, the Libyan General 
People’s Congress held a meeting and issued a statement strongly supporting friendship 
with all socialist countries and especially the Soviet Union.511 The statement said that 
‘it was necessary to give this friendship its strategic dimension’.512 This put their 
differences aside and showed a change from the hostility Gaddafi displayed towards 
the Soviet Union when he first came to power in September 1969. 
Mr Ali Belkheir, Deputy Secretary General of the General People’s Congress of Libya 
said that ‘The masses of our people […] value highly their friendship with the Soviet 
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Union because both our countries are on the same side of the barricades in the struggle 
against world imperialism, Zionism and reaction’.513 Thereafter, from 1976 onwards, 
Gaddafi's attitude changed, on the surface, sufficiently for him to approve the formation 
of a Libyan-Soviet friendship society.514  Also, in November Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir, 
the Commander in Chief of the Libyan Armed Forces, preceded Gaddafi’s visit to 
Moscow and visited the Soviet Union. Jabir delivered a message from Gaddafi to the 
Soviet Prime Minister, Kosygin, and held talks with the Soviet military authorities.515  
One conclusion that can be drawn here is that the General People’s Congress and the 
recommendations that came out of it were to give a green light to some of the important 
decisions which were expected to be taken during Gaddafi's visit to Moscow. It seems 
to be the case that these decisions had been made in advance and the meeting of the 
General People's Congress came to ratify it and to give legitimacy to the status of the 
statements which would be issued during Gaddafi's visit to Moscow. Thus, the visit of 
Jabir to the Soviet Union seems to have been a preparation for this. However, points of 
disagreement between the two parties continued. These disagreements were 
particularly based on the Middle East question. A change in Gaddafi’s political tone 
towards the Soviet Union was clear, as shown in the statement of the General People's 
Congress in November 1976, as well as the easing of Gaddafi’s criticisms of the Soviet 
Union.  
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Meanwhile, this change was not significant because of some other factors: first, 
Gaddafi's distaste for communism, his distrust of the Russians and in particular his 
resistance to the installation of a major Russian presence in Libya.516 Second, Libya's 
new nationalism, its highly individualistic style of leadership and its financial 
independence made its position strong and difficult to influence.517 
A report by NATO said that: 
No treaty of friendship was signed, but this has not prevented the Russians from sending a 
representative of the Libyan Arab-Soviet friendship to Tripoli for talks at the end of Gaddafi’s 
Moscow visit. Seen from here the results of the visit do not represent a significant drift to the 
East.518 
The change of both sides in general and Gaddafi in particular was with regard to some 
of the regional and international issues of interest to both parties. These purposes were 
as follows:519 
• The fact that the Soviet government and the Libyan government shared similar 
attitudes towards many international questions, in particular those opposed to Western 
policies. 
• Gaddafi had bad relations with all his Arab neighbours (perhaps apart from 
Algeria). In particular, Gaddafi's improvement in his relationship with the Soviet Union 
coincided with the decline of both countries’ relations with Egypt. By developing 
Libya’s relations with the Soviet Union, Gaddafi may have thought he was 
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demonstrating his opposition to the Egyptian government, its policies of cooperation 
with the West and its process for a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israel dispute. 
• Gaddafi seems genuinely to have feared intervention by the United States to 
change the regime in Libya as a result of his hostile policy towards the American 
interests in the region. Thus, he hoped that by developing friendly relations with the 
Soviet Union this would bring him the protection he needed. 
• Gaddafi had received large quantities of weapons which he could not expect to 
obtain anywhere else, although the Libyan armed forces had not had the ability and did 
not have the technical capacity to use them. However, by this large quantity of 
sophisticated weapons Gaddafi would be able to supply liberation movements, 
especially the Palestinians, and would be in a position to supply the Arab side in any 
future conflict with Israel.   
• Gaddafi probably also considered the supply of military equipment as a tool for 
expanding his influence in other parts of the world, such as Africa.  
The Soviet motives for supplying arms of such a degree of sophistication to Libya can 
be understood in the light of several reasons as follows:520 
• Gaddafi's apparent hostility to the West gave the Soviet Union many benefits; 
perhaps the most important was that it encouraged the Russians to deal with Gaddafi 
and to overlook his antipathy to communism. Moreover, Libya's shared border with 
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Egypt also lent particular force to a demonstration of the rewards which could be 
expected by a country which was friendly to the Soviet Union. 
• Moreover, the sale of arms to Libya brought the Russians large sums of hard 
currency, since the Libyans did not require credit. The Russians may also have taken 
into account that by selling Gaddafi the arms he wanted, they might improve their 
chances of more penetration in civilian sectors as well. 
• The Russians probably thought that Gaddafi might reduce his hatred of 
communism one day, or that a successor to Gaddafi might be hostile to communism 
and the Soviet Union. Thus, the Russians might have hoped to increase their influence 
in Libya through military training and through their contribution to the Libyan 
economy. This might give them more advantages in the future. 
• Libya is one of those countries which rejected reliance on the United States to 
make a settlement between the Arabs and Israel, thereby excluding the Soviet Union 
from the peace-making process in the Middle East. The Russians had no trouble in 
having friendly relations with other countries which rejected the Geneva conference 
(e.g. Algeria, Iraq) and so there was no need for them to persuade Gaddafi on this point 
to outweigh the other advantages they stood to gain from a closer relationship. 
 In spite of the marked shift in the political public speech of Libya towards the Soviet 
Union in 1976, British government was optimistic that there was no change in the 
Soviet-Libyan rapprochement, which would affect the Western interests in the region. 
Perhaps what explains this was the belief of the British government that this 
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cooperation was a result of the political isolation of the Libyan regime in the region, 
fear of growing U.S. influence in the region, and desire of the Soviets to act against 
Egypt after being expelled from it and excluded from the peace process in the Middle 
East. Therefore, from the view point of Britain, this cooperation would not reach to the 
extent, which might harm Western interests in the region. Moreover, this cooperation 
would not lead to any deal that would allow Soviets to use the Libyan facilities. Perhaps 
the British government's view of the media on the Soviet-Libyan cooperation, explain 
this British attitude.  
The media role in exaggerating the Soviet-Libyan rapprochement  
The media, namely the British and Egyptian media, played a major role in inflating the 
relationship between the Soviet Union and Libya, especially in the period of the 1970s. 
The media portrayed the Russian-Libyan relationship as a threat to the interests of the 
West and America in North Africa and the Mediterranean, and even in the Middle East. 
How, why and who was behind this exaggeration in the media, particularly the 
Egyptian media, will be discussed below. The media also gave an inaccurate picture of 
the Soviet influence in Libya increasing dramatically, threatening the balance of power 
in the region, especially the Egyptian media, which amplified in the dissemination of 
news that Libya had signed with the Soviet Union confidential agreements allowing 
the Soviets to use Libyan airports and ports in any confrontation which might occur 
between the Soviet Union and America or the West, which largely threatened the 
presence of the US and the West in the region.  
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However, there is no evidence to confirm that this news was true or that there was an 
agreement between the Soviet Union and Libya on this basis. This explains the degree 
of hostility between Egypt and Libya in the mid-1970s, as well as an Egyptian-
American rapprochement as a result of the process of peace negotiations sponsored by 
the United States between Egypt and Israel. What appeared in the media about Russian 
Libyan cooperation in the mid to late seventies gave an exaggerated picture of this 
cooperation, which led to the existence of an inaccurate picture of the condition of 
Russian-Libyan relations, and portrayed them as a threat to the US and Western 
interests in the region.  
Both the Western and pro-Western Arab media started to draw attention to the Soviet-
Libyan relationship, claiming that it “was putting its land, air and naval bases at the 
service of the Soviets”.521 Gaddafi became known in the West as the first defender of 
the interests of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.522 
In the middle of 1975, the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Alexei Kosygin, visited 
Libya. This was the first visit by a senior Soviet official to Libya since Gaddafi had 
come to power. Perhaps this is what stirred up all the hype about the visit. The English 
documents heavily argued about this visit, and came to the conclusion that there were 
two reasons for it. The first was that Russia owed the Libyan government a return visit 
following Jallud's two visits to the Soviet Union in 1972 and 1974. The second reason 
and the main purpose of the visit was to talk to Gaddafi directly and convince him not 
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to stand up against the Soviet Union's call for a resumption of the Geneva conference, 
sponsored by the Soviet Union for peace.523 
After the visit of Kosygin, the Los Angeles Times of 28 May 1975, regarding its 
interview with President Sadat, reported that the Soviet Union and Libya had secretly 
signed the biggest weapons deal in the history of the Middle East. The agreement was 
valued at $12, billion worth of the most sophisticated arms.524 On 24 May the Egyptian 
newspaper Akhbar Al Yom (News Today) reported that the agreement between the 
Soviet Union and Libya during the visit of Kosygin included a supply of 2,000 tanks 
from Russia to Libya. Akhbar Al Yom claimed also that the agreement included bases 
for the Soviets and the presence of hundreds of Russian advisers who would definitely 
constitute complete military bases.525The famous Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram and 
the others followed the same pattern, declaring that an agreement had been concluded 
between the Soviet Union and the Libyans granting air and sea bases to the Soviet 
Union on Libyan territory.526 One outcome of what has been mentioned above is that, 
at this stage, Egypt had a strong interest in exaggerating quantities of the USSR arms 
to Libya, in order to obtain as much economic, political and military support as they 
possibly could from the US. Terence Garvey, the British ambassador to Moscow, at 
that time said that: 
There is evidently no containing the imagination of that newspaper [...] in itself, this falsity 
does not add anything new to the ratings the Western reactionary press. However, when one 
reads it, one cannot avoid the conclusion that the above mentioned paper and those who 
encourage it in this kind of inimical fabrication vis-a-vis the Soviet Union are pursuing well-
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defined objectives.527 
It seems also clear from the words of the Ambassador that the European newspapers 
were following the same line as the Egyptian newspapers, and published the same 
claims that there were Soviet bases on the Libyan territories. N C R Williams, FCO, 
Near East and North Africa Department, said ‘The Russians seem to have had as little 
success [...] with Gaddafi and in obtaining worthwhile undertakings from him’.528 
By mid-1975, the FCO assessed Russian-Libyan relationship saying that the 
discussions which took place during Kosygin's visit to Tripoli in the middle of May 
1975 concerned very largely, if not exclusively, the implementation of arms deals that 
had been signed the previous year during Jallud’s visit to Moscow.529 
Williams, the head of the FCO, Near East and North Africa department went on to say 
that:  
Egyptians have every interest in playing this up in Ahram not only for the Americans’ benefit 
but also in order to support the argument that the Libyans, who have vociferously criticised 
Egypt for succumbing first to Soviet and then to American domination, are now succumbing 
to Russian influence themselves.530 
Donald Murray, the British Ambassador to Tripoli from 1974 to 1976, indicated that 
there were no Soviet bases in Libya and that the story in the Al Ahram newspaper was 
untrue.531 On May 1979 a report in the Daily Telegraph claimed that Gaddafi has 
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agreed to provide the Russians with port facilities in Libya. P. M. Nixon from the 
British embassy in Tripoli said this was untrue. 
From what has been discussed, it appears that most of the claims published in the media 
that Libya had granted the Soviet Union air or naval bases were not true, but led only 
to creating an atmosphere of anxiety about Soviet-Libyan relations, and increased the 
tension between America and the West and Libya. This also inflated the picture of the 
Libya-Soviet rapprochement, which reflected negatively on American-Libyan relations 
and Libyan-Western relations. 
Political cooperation 
Soviet-Libyan policy toward the peace settlement in the Middle East 
Throughout the 1970s the Soviet Union and Libya shared very similar perspectives 
towards the peace process in the Middle East and support of various liberation 
movements in the world, particularly in Africa. The two parties announced after 
Gaddafi's first visit to Moscow in late 1976 that they supported the world anti-colonial 
liberation movements. However, they disagreed in practice, particularly on the issue of 
the peace settlement in the Middle East. 
Thus, Soviet-Libyan policies in Arab matters can be widely discussed in the light of 
two main points. First, the attitude of both towards the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks after 
the 1973 war; and second, Gaddafi’s attitude towards the Geneva Conference. The 
Soviet Union and Libya each held a hostile position towards the peace process between 
Egypt and Israel. Although the Soviets and the Libyans had their own reasons to be 
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against these negotiations, and despite their ideological and political differences, the 
interests of the two parties were matched in their opposition to Egypt and the United 
States. It is clear that the USSR’s goals were based on compensating for its loss of 
Egypt, and limiting the further spread of American influence, in addition to 
strengthening the Soviet regional influence; the Libyan objectives were first to secure 
itself from any potential danger from Egypt or the US, fighting the peace process 
between Israel and Egypt, reducing the influence of the United States in the region, 
achieving a balance of power based on the Soviet Union and obtaining Soviet 
protection against any Egyptian or American threat. Thus, it does not seem that the 
strategy of Libya was based on the service of Russian interests in the region.   
The Soviet Union was angry because of the central role the United States played in the 
peace process and in the expulsion of the Soviets from a significant role in it. Sadat 
declared: ‘the Soviet Union has little in its hands regarding the peace process. This is 
the opportunity of those who hold 99 percent of the solution in their hands, namely the 
United States’.532 The USSR seized the opportunity to support Libya against Egypt in 
order to consolidate its presence in Libya.533 Following the Soviet absence from the 
peace process, they also missed out in its efforts to promote a new Geneva Conference, 
which did not receive a support from the states concerned, not even from countries that 
had been seen as being on the Soviet side, such Libya and Iraq. The United States 
accounted for the biggest role. ‘Consequently, in 1978 and 1979, Moscow and 
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Washington stood firmly behind their Libyan and Egyptian protégés, which they 
regarded as spearheads for their own interests in the region and beyond’.534 The failure 
of the Soviet Union to find a role in Middle East talks was reflected in Soviet support 
for Libya. This support was also demonstrated in military support for Libya in the 
clashes that took place on the Libyan-Egyptian border from 21 to 24 July 1977 which 
ended only after mediation by Algeria, Kuwait and the PLO.535 The four days of these 
clashes showed the strength of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet 
Union protégé, and how each sought to manage the conflict behind the scenes. The 
Soviet Union’s assistance to Libya also reflected Moscow’s anger about its loss of 
Egypt.  
As for Gaddafi, he held Sadat responsible for damaging vital Libyan interests by 
undermining his own pan-Arab ideology and political prestige. He had inherited 
Nasser’s legacy and leadership role in the Arab world and established the diplomatic 
and strategic foothold of the United States in Egypt, serving the interests of America 
in the region.536 Therefore, the signing of the first Egyptian-Israeli disengagement 
agreement in January 1974 increased Gaddafi's concerns.537  Jallud visited Moscow for 
the second time from 14 to 24 May 1974 and signed a new Soviet-Libyan arms deal 
worth $1.2 billion.538   
One of the main reasons for Kosygin’s visit to Libya in 1975 was to talk with Gaddafi 
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about the Geneva Conference. Kosygin tried hard to persuade Gaddafi not to impede 
the resumption of the talks. Kosygin was willing to draw on Gaddafi's influence over 
some elements of the Palestinian movement. 539  Soon after Kosygin left Tripoli, 
Gaddafi delivered a bellicose speech to the Palestinian Seminar where he said that the 
Arab-Israeli problem could not be solved by any conference, any third party or the 
United Nations, but only by the gun.540 A report from the British embassy in Tripoli 
said that ‘Kosygin’s visit from 12 to 15 May was an indicator not a watershed: he failed 
to shift Gaddafi’s hostility to the Geneva Conference’.541 
Gaddafi’s visit to Moscow in 1976 marked the beginning of the actual shift in Gaddafi's 
view of the Soviet Union, not ideologically, but politically. Both parties declared that 
they stood together in fighting American imperialism, colonialism and Zionism. 
However, disputes continued over the Arab-Israeli conflict and Libya continued to 
oppose the Geneva Conference for peace with Israel.542  
The signing of the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel raised fears in Libya of 
a possible invasion of Libyan territory by Egyptian forces with the help of the United 
States, because of the Libyan hostility towards Egypt and American interests in the 
region. Perhaps the greatest concerns were the Egyptian troops along the border and 
the state of high alert among them. In May 1979, the Libyan confrontation with Egypt 
made Gaddafi aware of the need to bolster Libya’s army. Thus, ‘in May 1978, he 
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announced the initiation of compulsory conscription for the first time….and increased 
the annual budgetary allocations for the armed forces which constituted only part of 
the total military expenditure as follows: from LD72 million (Libyan dinars; $1= 0.296 
LD in 1977-1978) in 1976 to LD 80 million in 1977 and LD 130 million in 1978’.543 
One might conclude from this that for Libya, the rapprochement with the Soviet Union 
was mainly because of the desire to obtain weapons for its conflict with Egypt. All 
these events show the impact of the Cold War conflict, and how this was reflected in 
relations between the countries of the region. 
Strategic cooperation 
Although diplomatic relations were established in 1955, Libyan-Soviet interaction was 
minimal until the pro-Western ruler, King Idris, was overthrown in 1969.544 However, 
this changed after Jallud’s visit to Moscow in 1972. Mr K. E. H. Morris of the FCO 
North African Department said ‘This visit has raised several intriguing questions’.545He 
also asked ‘Did it (Jallud’s visit to Moscow in 1972) represent a drastic shift in Libya’s 
foreign policy?’546 Later Morris said ‘Lebanese and Egyptian pressmen, Lonrho and 
one of Chancery Tripoli’s “usually reliable sources” all agree that a far-reaching 
agreement was concluded, involving Soviet purchase of BP oil’.547 It is quite likely that 
Jallud’s visit to the Soviet Union at this early stage after the coup of 1969, did not 
produce any significant results that might be seen as important, as the British 
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documents indicated above. There was another factor which increased the concern in 
Britain over the Soviet-Libya rapprochement. This was the absence of a unified policy 
in NATO to keep the Soviets out of Libya, but the policy of each country in dealing 
with the Libyan government was to maintain its interests in Libya, particularly the 
economic ones. The French had kept a good relationship with the Libyan government, 
especially in the field of arms trade: France had sold 100 Mirages to the Libyan Air 
Force at that time (though this was changed later). Italy suffered severely from 
extremist Libyan politics, the expropriation of Italian property and the expulsion of 
Italian nationals. The Italians had clearly decided that the only way to deal with Libya 
was to swallow this and butter the Libyans up. Britain had stuck with the outstanding 
issues and the nationalisation of BP, and no progress could be made until these logjams 
were broken. The rest of NATO had kept a low level of relations with Libya.548   
Fears of increased cooperation between the Soviet Union and Libya escalated after the 
second visit of Jallud to Moscow in 1974 after the signing of comprehensive arms 
contracts between the two countries. Libya had a severe shortage of skilled manpower, 
offering the Soviets a great opportunity to offer a longer-term training presence and 
gain political influence in the armed forces and other fields. By the end of 1974 and the 
beginning of 1975 between 500 and 800 Soviet military technicians went to Libya.549 
The anxiety of the Western powers, especially the British, rose again in 1975 after 
Kosygin's visit to Tripoli. Britain expressed concern about this, starting extensive 
investigations into the impacts of the Soviet delegation's visit to Libya,550 especially 
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when the Soviet Deputy Chief of Staff visited Libya twice, the first time in April as the 
head of a Soviet military delegation and the second time in May with Kosygin.551 
The FCO expressed British fears to the Americans of the Soviet-Libyan rapprochement 
and the possibility of significant cooperation. The British Foreign Secretary James 
Callaghan wrote that ‘We (the British) are concerned about the implications of recent 
Libyan purchases of large quantities of arms from the Soviet Union. There now seems 
a distinct possibility that the Libyans may be persuaded to make facilities available for 
Soviet warships or military aircraft’.552 
For instance, in mid-1975 there was concern about reports indicating that there was 
huge cooperation between the Soviets and Libya, especially in the field of armaments. 
Israeli reports were worried about Soviet activities in Libya. The Israelis said that: 
Work was starting on new military encampments that would hold tens of thousands of men. 
The Libyan army was not big enough to need so much accommodation or to use the immense 
amount of material […] the Soviets had contracted to sell to Gaddafi. If their information was 
correct it seemed as if a Soviet military and naval presence in Libya was being planned. The 
target could only be Sadat’s regime in Egypt.553 
Other Italian reports indicate that there were some Soviet military air movements in 
some Libyan military airports, which might mean preparations to establish a Soviet 
naval and air presence in Libya. The Italians reported to NATO that: 
Sixteen Soviet manned aircraft (probably TU-16 Badgers or IL-180s) which are reported 
recently to have arrived at Misurata airfield. Soviet pilots have also been noticed in the 
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Wheelus air base. According to the report, the aircraft and pilots are probably intended to 
perform air reconnaissance in the Mediterranean basin.554 
On 10 July 1975, the Italian foreign minister asked the British Secretary of State to 
raise the Soviet arms supplies to Libya with Henry Kissinger, as well as the consequent 
threat to NATO in the Mediterranean region.555 After that, a very close watch was kept 
on Libya by NATO, stressing Libya’s key position on NATO’s southern flank,556 even 
though Urwick, the head of the FCO Near East and North Africa Department wrote 
that ‘there is absolutely no hard evidence as yet that the Russians have in fact 
established any base facilities in Libya’.557 
The number of visits between the Soviet Union and Libya increased in the period from 
1974 to 1976. This fuelled the worries about the expanding scope of the successful 
development of bilateral Soviet-Libyan co-operation, especially after Gaddafi's visit to 
Moscow in 1976. However, a NATO report showed that Moscow and Tripoli still did 
not agree with each other on everything.558 Despite a number of meetings between the 
two parties, it seems likely that the Soviet-Libyan cooperation did not exceed what 
Gaddafi had said earlier, that the friendship and cooperation between the two countries 
was built on mutual interests of business and not on the match in their policies. There 
was an agreement in a number of areas in principle, such as support for revolutionary 
movements in the third world. However, it was also clear that Libya had built its 
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relations with the Soviet Union on short-term cooperation, depending on the 
supplement of arms needed. Thus, there was no question of the Soviet Union being 
able to rely on Libyan support.559 In addition, after the European tour by Jallud in 1974, 
in many European capitals and particularly the Western ones, it seemed clear that there 
was a kind of balance in Libyan policy between Libyan rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union and Gaddafi's attempt to improve his relationship with the West.560 It does not 
appear that 1979 Soviet-Libyan relations had exceeded more than cooperation based 
on a commonality of economic interests. The primary domain of relations between the 
two countries was the sale of weapons. Thus, Russian ability to influence Libyan policy 
was strictly limited. Nor did Moscow obtain military bases or other privileges using 
Libyan territory.561 In March 1979, M. K. Jenner, head of the FCO North East and 
North Africa Department reported that ‘it is hard to believe that the Russians have any 
prospect of establishing a base in Libya and we have not seen evidence that they are 
seriously trying. If they have, it is without success: they have not been granted port 
facilities for their fleet’.562 Although there was no evidence that the USSR obtained a 
military base in Libya during the 1970s, the British documents show that officials were 
optimistic (from a UK point of view) about Soviet-Libyan relations. FCO officials 
came to the conclusion that Soviet-Libyan relations had not reached a level of 
cooperation threatening British interests in the Mediterranean region. 
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Cooperation in the military sphere 
Most previous studies addressed the issue of Soviet-Libyan relations, and in particular 
the issue of Soviet-Libyan military cooperation, by focusing on the type, value and 
quantity of arms obtained by Libya.563 However, these studies failed to raise questions 
such as why the Soviet Union became the main source of Libya's weapons. Was the 
dependence of Libya on Soviet Union arms deliberate policy, or were there other 
reasons which forced the Libyan government to turn to the Soviets? In addition, these 
studies did not show whether Libya had tried to obtain arms from the West and 
specifically from Britain. In other words, to what extent was the failure of Libya to 
acquire weapons from the West, the main reason to turn to the Soviet Union? Why was 
Libya unable to acquire weapons from the West, specifically Britain and perhaps 
France and the United States? After all, how did all this reflect on British-Libyan 
relations? 
The largest Soviet-Libyan cooperation was in the field of military cooperation and the 
supply of weapons, but when and how this cooperation began must be determined. In 
addition, the factors must be identified that may have led Libya towards the Soviet 
Union in order to obtain weapons, as well as the aim of the Soviet Union in supplying 
Libya with all these large quantities of weapons. Moreover, to see the whole picture, it 
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needs to know the British attitude to supplying arms to Libya. The dependence of Libya 
on buying Russian arms can be interpreted in the light of the failure of Libya to obtain 
weapons from the West, specifically Britain and America. The three great powers, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union had adopted different policies 
in the supply of arms, especially to the Middle Eastern countries.  The British 
government was concerned about the breach of the balance of power in the Middle 
East. The Foreign Secretary said that ‘The balance of the military power in the Middle 
East could very easily be disturbed, and it was important to maintain careful scrutiny 
of all major arms sales to the area’.564 He added that:  
The problem posed by requests for the sale of Chieftain tanks illustrated this, if we were to 
agree to supply them to the present Libyan regime he was in no doubt that the Israelis would 
also want them notwithstanding the acquisition of the inferior American M60 tank, arguing 
that the military balance had been disrupted. It was noteworthy in this context that the 
Russians had withheld their T62 tank (a near-equivalent to the Chieftain) from the United 
Arab Republic565 
As for the United States, the policy stated in the supply of weapons to the Middle East 
was to maintain the balance of power in the region which, in effect, meant in practice 
to ensure Israel's military superiority over its Arab neighbours. This policy meant 
providing Israel with sophisticated weapons to preserve their superiority. ‘However, 
the United States also supplies arms to certain Arab States whose attitude towards them 
is relatively friendly, e.g. Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Jordan’.566 The Soviet Union had 
a quite different policy; it used the sales of weapons, particularly in the Middle East 
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and other Arab countries, as a means of extending its influence and penetration in these 
countries. While the Soviet Union’s stated policy was not to prejudice the balance of 
power in this region, the Soviets gave arms to countries such as Syria, Algeria and Iraq 
to defend themselves against Zionist and imperialist aggression.567  
The condition of the Libyan army at the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s was 
very weak. It was a small force, with poor higher military training and ill-equipped, as 
well as depending almost entirely on the British and American military forces which 
existed in Libya at the time to deter all potential aggressors. When Britain and the 
United States withdrew their troops from Libya, the Libyan army had had only six 
elderly Centurions tanks. The new rulers of Libya in 1969 realised that, after the 
withdrawal of the American and British troops from Libya, Libyan territory would be 
dangerously exposed, particularly in the light of the oilfields which made Libya a 
tempting prize. Therefore, the RCC made every effort to receive military training and 
obtain weapons.568 Very early after the change of regime in Libya, Gaddafi regime 
entered into negotiations with Britain for the arms and military training the Libyan 
forces needed. Libya justified its need for arms as being an urgent need to build up its 
military to defend its territories. Jallud said that ‘Libya needed to build her army and if 
the British government was ready to supply weapons and training, Libya British-
Libyan negotiations with respect to Libya obtaining the weapons that were needed did 
not succeed due to the factors’.569 
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 Mr Maitland said:  
We (the British delegation) have now completed the present phase of our discussions with the 
Libyans. In these talks our aims were, to explore the attitude of the revolutionary command 
council (RCC) to the Arab/Israel conflict, with particular reference to the role they envisaged 
for the armed forces as ready as she had previously been to accept them.570 
British-Libyan talks did not reach any solution over this matter because of the 
outstanding issues and particularly the Chieftain tanks. Maitland added that ‘Their 
desire (the Libyans) to acquire Chieftains inevitably made them take the line that no 
future relationship between us would be possible unless we agreed to supply these’.571 
In early 1972, the Libyan government again pressed for Chieftain tanks, the Libyans 
giving assurances that Chieftains would not be deployed outside Libya. However, they 
were turned down for the same reasons as before.572 In the same context and at the 
same time, the Egyptian government asked to buy 15 Jaguar aircraft as an initial order. 
The Libyan government had also asked to buy 60-80 Jaguar aircraft ‘and it seems likely 
that the Libyans will finance both deals’. The Egyptians and the Libyans were turned 
down, for the reasons that have been mentioned, by the British Foreign Secretary. He 
said the Russians had played a role in the failure of this deal. They were not pleased 
with the deal, because this would affect their influence over Egypt, thus they tried to 
scupper the deal.573 The Minister also said that: 
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The Americans would also oppose the deal. The Israelis would regard the deal as a highly 
unfriendly act on our part. They would react violently both here and in the United States and 
would probably bring us under pressure to supply them with some sophisticated 
counterweight, thus involving us in the arms spiral.574 
Libya also had a problem in obtaining a radar system from Britain because of a 
disagreement over a radar-integrated system with BAC. Negotiations with France over 
air defence radar requirements did not succeed.575 After the failure of Libya to solve its 
problem with a radar defence system with the British government, Libya tried to obtain 
an air defence system from France. Negotiations over this took around a year, but in 
April 1972 negotiations were broken off and Libya failed to obtain an air defence 
system from France.576 Libya also tried to get arms from the United States. The Libyans 
asked to buy F5 aircraft, but America refused to sell them.577  
The repeated attempts from Libya to acquire arms from Britain and America did not 
succeed, which was the main reason behind the visit of Jallud to the Soviet Union in 
1972. In other words, the lack of access in obtaining arms from the West, specifically 
from Britain, was behind the turning of Libya to the Soviet Union. The Russians were 
waiting for this opportunity and they did not miss it. Thus, very soon after Jallud's visit 
to Moscow, Russian arms began to arrive in Libya. 
On 30 June 1972 a Russian Ship (Demyan Bedni) arrived in Tripoli. The ship was 
carrying weapons and military equipment and was taken later to Okba Ben Nafi base 
during the nights of 1 and 2 July. The shipment included a number of tracked armoured 
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vehicles, ZSU 23 self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery and T34 tanks. The Russian ship 
left Tripoli on 2 July.578 There was concern that the Soviet Union may have agreed to 
supply Libya with advanced hardware, such as MIG 23 missiles and T62 tanks.579 The 
biggest concern was about MIG 21s and whether the Soviet Union had agreed to supply 
these to Libya. There was a doubt that some or all of the MIG 21’s which might be 
bought by Libya could eventual be delivered to Egypt.580 It was later proved by the 
French Ambassador in Tripoli that during Jallud’s stay in Moscow he had indeed asked 
the Russians for T62 tanks but that they had been turned down.581 
The Soviet-Libyan arms deal that took place in 1972 was as large as the size of the deal 
signed between the two countries in Jallud's second visit to Moscow in 1974. 
Apparently, Libya did not get in 1972 all the weapons requested from the Soviets. For 
example, the deal signed in 1972 did not include MiG-21 or 23 aircraft or T-62 tanks. 
It was certain that these types of aircraft and tanks were not obtained by Libya until 
1974-75.  
What supports this view is that, in 1972, Libya had obtained 100 Mirage aircraft from 
France, thus it did not seem that Libya was in need of MiG-21 or MiG-23 at the time 
as the Soviet Union had refused to provide Egypt with this type of aircraft and also 
refused to provide Egypt with T-62. Therefore, there was no evidence that the Soviet 
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Union had agreed to supply these aircraft to Libya.582 Douglas-Home the Foreign 
Secretary said ‘we are fairly certain that the Soviet Union did not agree... to supply the 
Libyans with advanced hardware such as MIG 23’s and T62’s’.583 
The biggest Soviet-Libyan agreement over arms suppliers was signed in 1974 during 
the visit of Jallud to Moscow. The value of the deal is not precisely known, but the 
British documents show that, from reliable reports and observed deliveries, the cost of 
equipment and training would amount to a minimum of $580 million. ‘Soviet sources 
are said to have mentioned a value of $800 million but this figure may include earlier 
contracts’. This disproves Egyptian claims that $12,000 million worth of arms were 
ordered at the time of Kosygin’s visit.584 
The following table shows the Soviet arms supplied to Libya between 1970-1975.585 
Bloc equipment 1970 mid-1975       apparent targets 
T-62/55/54 medium 
tanks       
130 850 1420 
APCs 60 350 500 
Scout cars 25 150 n/k 
MiG-23 (Flogger)                        - 13 40 
TU-22 (Blinder)                          - - 12 
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SA-2 Batteries                              - 1 4 
SA-3 Batteries                              - 2 4 
SA-6 Batteries                              - 1 3 
SA-7 Portable                               - ?200 ?500 
 
Andrew and Mitrokhin (2005) mention that, the Soviet Union and Libya also 
cooperated in intelligence and security field. A secret intelligence and security 
agreement was signed in 1979. However, it does not seem that the cooperation 
continued for a long period. 
The KGB provided training for Libyan intelligence officers in Moscow, gave advice on 
security and surveillance inside Libya, and supplied intelligence on US activities in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. In return, Libya provided intelligence on Egypt North Africa and 
Israel, as well as assisting the KGB in targeting Western diplomatic missions in Tripoli.586   
Libyan-Soviet cooperation in the field of nuclear technology 
Libya had tried to obtain nuclear technology since the beginning of 1970s.587 However, 
according to the US intelligence reports, Libya's nuclear program was in its infancy, 
and it was not developed to the extent to manufacture a nuclear weapon, as well as the 
lack of expertise in this area. 
A number of studies indicate that the Libyan nuclear program started at the beginning 
of the 1970s.588 Since the early of the 1970s, Libya tried to obtain nuclear technology 
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wherever it could with an aim of developing nuclear weapons. "Unsuccessful attempts 
to acquire nuclear energy technology […] were subsequently made through contacts 
with the Soviet Union, the United States, France, India, Pakistan, Japan, and 
Argentina".589 Although a numbers of studies indicate that the Gaddafi regime tried to 
obtain nuclear technology for the development of nuclear weapons,590 the available 
British documents open to the public do not include papers concerning this matter. 
There was a belief that Gaddafi was trying to manufacture a nuclear weapon, or at least 
was able to do so. A US report indicates that ‘We (the Americans) believe Libya wants 
to develop a nuclear weapon. The Libyan program is so rudimentary that is not yet 
clear whether plutonium or uranium will be chosen as the basis for a weapon’.591 
In the mid-1970s, Gaddafi approached the Soviet Union for developing unclear 
program in Libya. However, the Soviet delayed signing a contract to provide Libya 
with its first nuclear facilities until Libya became a member of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).592 In late 1975, Libya and Soviet Union 
signed a contract to build Tajura unclear Research Centre whose construction started 
in late 1979, with expectation to be handed to the Libyan government in 1981.593 
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The same US report points out that “the program (the Libyan nuclear program) has 
major problems, including poor leadership and lack of coherent planning, as well as 
political and financial obstacles to acquiring nuclear facilities”.594 Overall, the report 
expressed the lack of Libyan capability to develop an advanced nuclear program in the 
following 10 years. The report also mentions that the Libyan research centre was small 
and, thus would find it very difficult to develop a nuclear weapon in such a small centre. 
“As is the case for all of the activity at Tajura, none of this research is directly related 
to nuclear weapon development, but it would give the Libyans fundamental nuclear 
knowledge needed by personnel working in a nuclear program”.595 
Economic cooperation 
In the economic field, several agreements were signed between the two countries. On 
4 March 1972 and during Jallud's visit to Moscow an economic and technical 
cooperation agreement was signed. The agreement concentrated in particular on 
developing Libyan energy resources, oil, training and other branches of the Libyan 
economy as well as trade cooperation.596 Other joint cooperation agreements were 
signed in 1975 during Kosygin’s visit to Tripoli in the field of economic and cultural 
cooperation.597 However, it does not seem that these agreements had a significant 
impact on any Soviet-Libyan cooperation in the field of economic cooperation. The 
figures and extent of economic cooperation between the two countries do not show 
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strategic economic cooperation. The size of Libya's cooperation in the economic sector 
with Western Europe and, in some cases, with Britain in particular remained much 
bigger than trade and economic exchanges with the Soviet Union. Despite the apparent 
rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Libya in the political sphere and in the 
larger field of military cooperation, the figures and data show that the magnitude of 
economic cooperation between Libya and the Soviet Union remained small compared 
to the commercial and economic exchanges with the countries of Europe. 
Throughout the 1970s, Western European countries, namely Italy, Germany, France 
and Britain, were the biggest economic partners to Libya and the biggest exporters to 
the needs of the Libyan market. In the period from 1972 to 1974, Italy, Germany, 
France and Japan increased their exports to Libya by 184%, 284%, 215% and 111% 
respectively; British exports in the same period grew by 31% and in 1974 by only 
2.4%. 598 Italy was the biggest economic partner to Libya, followed by Germany, 
France, Japan and Britain; sometimes Britain came fourth behind Japan. The following 
table shows the figures of exporters to Libya by different countries.599 
Country           1973 1974 
Italy                   $176           $353 
Germany          $102           $170 
France              $87            $164    
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Japan coming up fast with 1974 estimated figures of 40 (200 per cent over 1973), and 
43 respectively.    
Trade between Libya and Britain declined in 1973 as a result of the ban on British 
imports. The ban was because of the failure to resolve the outstanding issues. However, 
the trade between Libya and Britain continued to be better than the Libyan trade with 
the Soviet Union. It had even started to improve by 1974 because of the attempts of the 
Libyan government to improve its relations with the West in general and Britain in 
particular. 
In 1973, British exports to Libya at about £61 million increased in 1974 to £62.5 
million. These British exports were mainly machinery (£28 million), transport 
equipment (£5.6 million), and medicinal and pharmaceutical products (£4 million). 
"The annual rise of only 2.4% reflects in part the direct effect of the discriminatory 
embargo against UK consumable goods imposed at the end of 1973".600 Between 1974 
and 1976 the balance of trade saw a clear growth in British exports to Libya. British 
exports were running at an annual level of £120 and 130 million. The number of Libyan 
students studying in Britain was rising. There were close links between the medical 
professions in both countries, and there were developing links in the areas of 
agricultural and engineering consultancy.601 This perhaps reflects the Libyan attempt 
in 1974 to repair its relationship with Britain. By the end of 1976 British exports to 
Libya increased to £134 million and in 1977 the annual rate was £167 million.602 Frank 
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Judd from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has described British trade with 
Libya in 1977 and said ‘Our trade (British trade) with Libya is currently doing well and 
exports this year are some 26% above last year’s figure’.603 
When considering the extent and size of the economic and trade exchanges between 
the Soviet Union and the countries of the region, it seems clear that Libya is the smallest 
partner in terms of economics and business with the Soviet Union. Within the Middle 
East, Egypt stands as the most important economic partner to the Soviet Union. Soviet 
loan agreements with Egypt started in 1955. It also seems clear that the economic 
company between the Soviet Union and Egypt was built on a long-term basis. Soviet-
Egyptian economic agreements were aimed at developing the Egyptian economy 
through the development of energy sources and the foundations of strategic industries 
such as mining, oil, steel and textile industries. "Aside from the Aswan Dam, one of 
the most significant projects financed with Soviet loans was the $400 million expansion 
of the Helwan steel mill into a complex including a steel rolling mill, and coking, tar 
distillation and sheet metal plants". By 1968, the value of Soviet loans and aid to Egypt 
exceeded more than a billion dollars. In the field of trade, Egypt has exported cotton 
and rice in exchange for Soviet crude oil, steel, timber and wheat. ‘By 1971, Soviet 
exports to Egypt amounted to 37% of total Soviet exports to the Middle East’.604 
However, this was affected gradually after Sadat's expulsion of Russian experts from 
Egypt. Syria is also one of the biggest economic partners to the Soviet Union. The first 
                                                 
603 TNA, FCO39-1009, Letter from Frank Judd to the Rt. Hon Lord Houghton of Sowerby CH Chairman, 
24 November 1977 
604 Schoenberger, E. and Reich, S., Soviet Policy in the Middle East, No. 39, Middle East Research and 
Information Project, (1975), pp. 3-28. 
218 
 
Soviet credit extended to Syria was in 1957. Trade increased rapidly between the two 
countries in the period between 1965 and 1968. By 1971 Soviet exports had jumped to 
Syria, ‘valued at 51.9 million roubles, [they] were roughly double Syrian exports to the 
USSR’. In the beginning of the 1970s, as difficulties mounted with Egypt, Syria 
received correspondingly greater attention. In the period 1971-73, Soviet trade with 
Egypt declined and with Syria it grew steadily from 78.3 to 118.8 million roubles.605 
Iraq was the second Soviet trading partner in the Middle East after the UAR in the 
period 1959-62. By the beginning of the 1960s, more than 20% of Iraq's trade was with 
the Soviet bloc. The USSR military aid was valued at $300 million and $183 million 
in economic aid. ‘By 1970, Iraq was eighth among Soviet Third World trading partners 
and fifth among aid recipients’. In 1971 Iraq obtained a $222 million loan from Soviet 
Union to be repaid in oil. Iraq was also a trading partner with Hungary, Poland, 
Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. In the 1974-75 trade agreement, $1.3 billion was signed 
between Iraq and the Soviet Union. 606  Whatever political differences might exist 
between Iran and the Soviet Union, they did not affect economic interests. ‘Iran is the 
USSR's third largest trading partner in the Third World and the second largest customer 
for Soviet exports in the Middle East’. The Soviet Union has supported several projects 
for the development of the Iranian economy. In the period between 1963 and 1970, the 
Soviets extended credits to Iran were worth over $500 million. In 1975 an agreement 
was signed between the two countries worth $3 billion and exchanges of $2.5 billion 
over five years.607 In North Africa, Algeria is an important trade partner to the Soviet 
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Union. Between 1963 and 1964 the credits extended were valued at $250 million. In 
the period 1966-69, trade grew rapidly between the two countries, increasing by a 
factor of ten in the period 1966-69, to over 100 million roubles per year. As for trade 
with Morocco, the biggest agreement between the two countries was the deal concluded 
in May of 1974, ‘for the construction of phosphate extraction and processing facilities 
with most of the output until 1990 going to the USSR in payment. The total value of 
the project is said to exceed $5 billion’.608 There was no mention of trade between 
Libya and the Soviet Union before 1969 and this continued at a very low level at the 
beginning of the 1970s. Soviet imports from Libya were largely Libyan oil valued at 
30 million roubles. ‘But there is nothing to indicate that the USSR going to become 
heavily involved in the Libyan economy, except through the medium of arms, in the 
foreseeable future’.609 
Apart from military trade with Libya, only a few studies show figures of other field of 
Soviet trade with Libya, even the British documents do not show any high level of trade 
between the Soviet Union and Libya during the 1970s. Studies which analyse Soviet-
Libyan relations are almost agreed that the trade between the two countries is only huge 
in the field of military trade.610 Trade between the two countries during the 1970s and 
1980s was estimated at $100 million per year, in all different field of trade, apart from 
military trade.611 
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The following table shows the Soviet-Libyan trade in 1970s ($US).612 
Years  Export to the USSR Import from the USSR 
1976 -------------- 20,371 
1977 104,292 20,042 
1978 156,228 29,791 
1979 427,318 130,399 
1980 443,072 251,676 
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Conclusion  
Throughout the period between the collapse of the monarchy in Libya in September 
1969 and 1975, there was no strategic rapprochement between the Soviet Union and 
Libya that was considered a threat to Western interests in the region. Until the end of 
1972, Gaddafi was trying to obtain weapons from the West, namely Britain, France and 
America, to avoid depending on Soviet Union to supply arms. But he failed to resolve 
the issues of arms contracts with Britain. In addition, France refused to sell Libya a 
French air defence system instead. All these factors made Libya turn to the Soviet 
Union to buy arms. The period from 1970 to 1975 did not mark any Soviet-Libyan 
strategic cooperation, apart from supplying weapons. This was because ideological and 
political differences strongly affected the close cooperation between the two countries. 
In short, the main purpose for Libya to turn to the Soviet Union at this stage was to 
obtain weapons. 
No change occurred in Soviet-Libyan relations until December 1976, when Gaddafi 
visited Moscow for the first time. The visit marked the first shift in Libya’s attitude 
towards the Soviet Union. This change was clear in the tone of political discourse in 
Libya. The General People's Conference (Libyan Congress) for the first time called for 
strong friendship with all socialist countries, and especially the Soviet Union.  Both 
sides had their own reasons to cooperate. For Libya, Gaddafi was afraid of the growing 
US presence in Egypt, which might have led to the overthrow of his regime in Tripoli 
because of his hostility to both the Sadat regime and the peace process with Israel. The 
Soviet Union was expelled from Egypt, excluded from the peace process in the Middle 
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East, and wanted to limit US influence in the region. Hence the interests of both 
countries were aligned to be against Egypt and American influence in the region.  
In other words, Libya’s cooperation with the Soviet Union at this stage was for 
protection, and was not developed to be directly against or to confront Western interests 
in the region, even if it was considered to be a service to the Soviet Union in the area. 
Therefore, the Libyans’ cooperation with the USSR was for their own protection 
purpose and not to oppose Western interests in region. Surely it was to counter-balance 
US support for Egypt. In other words, whatever was said, it was indeed anti-Western 
as well as anti-Egyptian. 
Despite all this, this did not translate on the ground into any action that would alter the 
balance of power in the region, nor did it reach the point of threatening Western 
interests in the region. Until the end of 1979, there was no proof that the Soviet Union 
received any privileges on Libyan territory or acquired military bases in Libya. In 
addition, what was promoted by the media about the existence of a Soviet base in Libya 
and the presence of some secret agreements between the Soviet Union and Libya has 
not been proven. 
The poor nature of Soviet-Libya cooperation emerged clearly two years after 1979, 
when US aircraft shot down two Libyan aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra. This incident 
showed how limited Soviet support for Libya was. Therefore, this Soviet support did 
not reach the degree of changing the balance of power between the East and the West.  
Based on this, what promoted by the Egyptian media and the West, especially the 
British was not true, but led only to amplify the Soviet-Libyan rapprochement without 
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any evidence.  Moreover, what occurred in the region in general was fundamentally a 
result of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union to secure their 
interests, rather than a shift in Libyan policy. In other words, the competition to control 
the areas of influence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin was the main 
motive. Thus, this was one of the effects of the Cold War era on the region. In short, it 
is clear that the policy of Libya at this stage was mainly of two dimensions: one was 
directed against Egypt and the peace process between Israel and Egypt, while the other 
sought Soviet protection. 
Regarding the influence of the Soviet -Libyan relations on the British-Libyan relations, 
the biggest loss to Britain was the major arms contracts with Libya to the benefit of the 
Soviet Union, such that the Soviet Union became the largest exporter of weapons to 
Libya instead of Britain. This led to the collapse of the British project which began in 
1968 and aimed to develop the arms trade with Libya to stimulate the falter British 
economy. In other words, the effect of Soviet-Libyan relations in the 1970s on British 
was more economic than strategic or political. Libya was not any more an important 
strategic place; after British withdrawal from East of the Suez Canal, while when the 
United States replaced Soviet influence in Egypt, a further weakening of the logic of 
Libyan-Soviet collaboration occurred. 
In relation to the Soviet-Libyan unclear technology cooperation, it should be 
mentioned here that despite repeated attempts by Libya to obtain advanced nuclear 
technology from different sources particularly the Soviet Union, the Gaddafi regime 
did not succeed in this. Libyan Soviet cooperation in this area did not start until the 
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late 1970s.  As stated in the CIA report, the nuclear research centre, which provided 
by the Soviet in Tajura has no capability to develop a nuclear weapon.613 In addition 
to the Libyans’ lack of ability to produce nuclear weapons, the Soviets started to their 
concern about Gaddafi's international policy. "Collaboration, however, steadily 
declined as Moscow became increasingly concerned by Gaddafi’s reputation as the 
godfather of international terrorism".614
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Chapter Five: Libyan-Irish Republican Army (IRA) relationship and 
its impact on British-Libyan relations 1972-1979 
The issue of Libya’s support for the IRA has been one of the main points of contention 
between the British and Libyan governments. Very few studies have discussed this 
matter or even made reference to this dispute, which is perhaps due to the lack of 
archival material available on this subject. Previous studies of this subject, which are 
very limited, did not explain the nature of this dispute, why Gaddafi supported the IRA 
or what Britain’s position on this Libyan attitude was. In addition, the previous studies 
did not indicate the extent of damage caused to British Libyan relations as a result of 
Libya’s support for the IRA. Additionally, no study has accurately reported data on the 
extent of the support Gaddafi actually provided to the IRA. There is a difficulty even 
in this study to determine the size of support as a result of the lack of archival material 
in this regard. There are also no previous studies that have discussed the negotiations 
that took place between the British and Libyan governments to resolve this matter, nor 
what the outcomes of these negotiations were. This chapter will explore all of this, and 
highlight the most important reasons for this absence of information. The chapter will 
attempt to answer all of these questions through available archival material. In other 
words, the main aim of this chapter is to trace the dispute’s stages of growth, causes, 
its impact on British-Libyan relations, the size of Libyan support for the IRA and 
whether Britain succeeded in stopping Libyan support for the IRA and what tools 
Britain used in order to do so, and what was the impact of Libyan-IRA relationship on 
the British-Libyan relations in 1970s. 
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Libya’s early relationship with the IRA 
Gaddafi declared his support for the IRA in June 1972. This event came at a time when 
British-Libyan relations were almost at a complete standstill. It also came at a time 
when the conflict in Northern Ireland, which began in August 1969, had reached an 
acute point. When Gaddafi announced his support for the IRA, there was a problem of 
outstanding issues that had not been resolved, and negotiations in this regard had come 
to a dead end, as discussed in the previous chapters. Then there was also the issue of 
the nationalisation of BP assets in Libya, leading to the effect that all of the negotiations 
were aimed at resolving outstanding issues between the parties and, as a result, 
establishing new relations between the two countries was suspended. In all of these 
circumstances, Gaddafi declared his support for the IRA. This caused relations between 
the two countries to descend to an even worse level. The British government even 
considered cutting diplomatic ties with Libya, but did not do so. The British 
government considered that breaking the diplomatic relations with the Libyans would 
strongly affect their remaining trade interests in Libya. The FCO expressed its view 
that ‘A break in diplomatic relations would probably only lead Gaddafi to take further 
damaging measures against our remaining interests in Libya, especially Shell's 
investment[…]and our lucrative export trade[…]we would only succeed in hurting 
ourselves more than we could hurt the Libyans’.615 The FCO added that ‘Gaddafi's 
statement should therefore be treated with the contempt that it deserves but no steps 
should be taken which would be likely to damage our own interests either in Libya or 
in the Arab world’.616 In June 1972, Gaddafi announced his support for the IRA in a 
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public speech. He strongly criticised Britain, said he considered Britain to be an 
imperialist state, and accused Britain of handing Palestine over to the Jews in 1948. 
Gaddafi went on to say that Britain was working against Arab interests, having handed 
Palestine over to the Jews, then giving the islands of the Arab Emirates to Iran in 1971. 
Therefore, Libya saw nothing wrong with supporting the IRA against British 
colonialism.617 
Unpublished papers show that there were inconsistencies between copies of Gaddafi’s 
speech. Joseph Godber, who was the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, said that, according to the British transcript of the live broadcast of the speech, 
Libya stands by the IRA and supports their struggle against British colonialism. 
According to Gaddafi, there were weapons available and significant support within 
Libya for the revolutionaries of Ireland.618 However, the British ambassador in Tripoli 
said that ‘His copy of Gaddafi’s speech did not include any passage about arms’.619 
Colonel Dakhil, the head of Libyan Military Procurement, also said that there was 
misunderstanding of Gaddafi's speech that was resulted from the misinterpretation of 
his speech.620 Dakhil added that ‘when Colonel Gaddafi had spoken of arms for the 
Irish revolutionaries he had not meant, as Craig would know from his knowledge of 
Arabic, arms, but only moral support’.621 
Also according to the British transcript, Gaddafi said that he would fight Britain in its 
own backyard, and would create problems within the country itself. The Ambassador 
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had a different view on this subject. He argued that this passage could refer to political 
support: it did not necessarily imply a war or the supply of arms. These differences of 
interpretation also suggest differences of approach to Libya in the UK. They perhaps 
tell us more about divergent policies and mind-sets than they do about British 
Government’s intentions. A British transcript of the live broadcast of the speech 
Gaddafi gave about his support for the IRA also included indistinct words.622 This 
shows that confusion was likely in terms of the understanding of certain words or 
phrases in the speech. Mr W R M Michel, a managing director, had supported a similar 
view of the Ambassador. He stated that he did not believe that Gaddafi was serious 
when he said that there were arms and support for the IRA. Michel went on to say that 
by “arms” Gaddafi was more daydreaming than anything else.623 Michel wrote that: 
I do not imagine that he (Gaddafi) has actively considered supplying “weapons”, but he may 
well have considered putting money in the hands of the IRA […] would it not be better to 
realise that Gaddafi is unstable and whilst he has to be watched, his words must not be taken 
at face value.624 
Gaddafi’s speech, in regards to Northern Ireland, in the British translated version, is as 
follows: 
At present we (the Libyan) support the revolutionaries of Ireland, who oppose Britain and 
who are motivated by nationalism (Arabic: qawmiyah) and religion (applause and cheers). 
The Libyan Arab Republic has stood by the revolutionaries of Ireland. It maintains strong ties 
with the Irish revolutionaries. There are arms and there is support for the revolutionaries of 
Ireland.625 
Gaddafi went on to say ‘We (the Libyans) have decided to fight Britain in her own 
home. We have decided to create a problem for Britain and will wake up and realize 
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(words indistinct) on her own territory. We still proclaim on this day that we are with 
the revolutionaries of Ireland’.626 These different readings of Gaddafi’s speech show 
that there was probably some misunderstanding of what Gaddafi exactly said. He later 
denied that he had sent any material support to the IRA.627 Regardless, there was a 
strong belief on the British side that he had indicated support would be provided to the 
IRA. Regardless of whether this support was moral or material, Gaddafi’s speech came 
at a time when British-Libyan relations had been at their worst since September 1969. 
Gaddafi’s reasons for supporting the IRA  
Previous studies argue the issue of Gaddafi’s support for the IRA very briefly, and no 
significant details were found in the literature review in this regard. In addition, these 
studies did not provide a clear reason for Gaddafi’s support for the IRA.628 Therefore, 
the documents available, some of which have not been previously published, will shed 
light on the causes of Gaddafi’s support for the IRA. However, these documents do not 
refer to the particular reasons behind his support. Therefore, it is very complex and 
difficult to nail down specific reasons. This study will examine Gaddafi’s speech 
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supporting the IRA in June 1972, the stage of British-Libyan relations at that time and 
any particular issues between the two countries which may have led to hostile Libyan 
acts. This thesis will point out the most likely reasons behind Gaddafi’s support for the 
IRA. The author’s command of Arabic enables him to compare the actual test of the 
speech with the diverged interpretation debated within the FCO. 
In his speech Gaddafi argued that he had two reasons for supporting the IRA. He stated 
that he supported the IRA, African Americans and African American Muslims, and 
other liberation movements. He claimed that his view was predicated on the basis that 
this was one of the most important principles of the September 1969 revolution.629 The 
previous studies argue this point of view as a reason behind Gaddafi’s support for the 
IRA.630 However, this study does not strongly support this, as it will be discussed below. 
On 13 June 1972 the Libyan government’s news agency extensively backed Gaddafi’s 
IRA speech by saying that ‘The attitude of the Libyan Arab Republic on the question 
of Northern Ireland was one of these stands which gave a clear idea of the committed 
policy of supporting the issues of liberation from colonialism in the world in 
accordance with the revolutionary principles of the revolution’.631 On October 7, 1972, 
Gaddafi explained Libyan policy towards the subject of Ireland by saying that Libya 
does not interfere in British affairs but cannot ignore what goes in Ireland. As such, 
Libya’s position toward the issue stems from the right that people have toward self-
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determination and that the issue of the Irish people is one case of advocating self-
determination. Thus, it is a positive and just stand, Gaddafi said.632 Subsequently, 
Gaddafi continued to declare and refine his position towards the Irish cause, not as an 
act of aggression against Britain, but as support of the right of the Irish people toward 
self-determination, which he stated was one of his personal principles. 
What Gaddafi said here contradicts with the claims that he said he would cause trouble 
within the UK in response to the UK handing Palestine to the Zionist movement.633  
In an interview which Gaddafi gave to Italian Channel 2 in March 1978 concerning the 
IRA, he again said ‘We believe it is just (the Irish struggle) and we always support just 
causes’.634He also again talked of the issues of the UAE islands and Palestine. He said 
‘If they (Irish rebels) want to achieve freedom for Ireland, then we are with them. If 
they want to fight Britain, then we are with them, because Britain handed Palestine 
over to the Jews and handed the Gulf Islands to Iran’.635 
Gaddafi had created a link between the Palestinian issue, the UAE islands issue and his 
support for the IRA. In other words, he said his support for the IRA was a response to 
Britain handing over the UAE islands to Iran and Palestine to Jews.636 This gave him 
popularity in Libya, and perhaps in the Arab world, which no doubt he needed at the 
beginning of his rule. However, it cannot be taken as the only and actual reason behind 
                                                 
632 TNA, FCO 39/1088, A Libyan view of the Irish problem, letter from I L Blackley, K E H Morris, 16 
October 1972  
633 See page276 
634 TNA, FCO 93-1379, Libya and the IRA, 27 April 1978 
635 TNA, FCO, 39/1087, Gaddafi’s evacuation day address 
636 Ibid 
232 
 
his words. Gaddafi had done such a thing previously when he tied Libyan 
nationalisation of BP assets to the issue of the UAE islands, and this was proved wrong 
(see chapter three). Considering what Gaddafi said, it can be clearly noted that his 
speech was full of emotional slogans, which strongly supported the theory that he was 
seeking a popularity increase in the Arab world in particular and the Muslim world in 
general.  
Gaddafi argued that: 
After these national victories the people of the Libyan Arab Republic went to fight battles not 
only on the domestic level but also on the national level; from the first day this people raised 
the slogan of the pan-Arabism of the battle and declared that their freedom was incomplete 
and would remain incomplete as long as there was a single Arab people still enslaved.637 
He used phrases and slogans, such as freedom, socialism, supporting liberation 
movements and support of the self-determination of people. These slogans were widely 
known in the Third World, widely used by many leaders, such as Nasser, Egypt’s 
president, in the 1950s and 1960s, and were then used by Gaddafi in the 1970s and 
1980s. Thus, it was clear he was using both issues emotionally in order to influence 
people. It is a fact that Gaddafi wanted to become an international leader, and he tried 
hard to replace Nasser in the Arab Nation, though he failed to do so.638 His ambition to 
become an international leader had strongly affected his foreign policy. This led him 
to commit some acts that were considered to be actions of terrorism, such as his support 
for the IRA. Gaddafi’s foreign policy and his ambitions argued widely in chapter two. 
It can be also noted that he had tried hard to look like a champion who was defending 
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the rights of the Arab people, so he linked the question of Palestine and the UAE islands 
with support of the IRA. Undeniably, the Palestinian issue is a very sensitive issue for 
Arabs and Muslims. Thus, Gaddafi used these two issues in order to gain the support 
of the Arab and maybe even the whole Islamic world. He stated that ‘Libyans were 
martyred on Palestine territory […] Hundreds of Libyans are in the ranks of Palestine 
resistance […] Libyan blood mingled with Palestinian blood for the sake of 
Palestine’.639 
Again, he expressed a view on the UAE islands: 
As for the Arabian Gulf problem, we announced last year that we could never ignore 
developments in and Arab country, whether in the Gulf or the Ocean […] We declared at that 
time that if Britain did not want to withdraw from the Arabian Gulf, we would become a party 
to the fighting against the British presence in the Gulf.640 
His speech was clearly directed to both Libyans and the Arab people by saying that: 
However, and true to her treacherous habit, just as she had handed Palestine over to the Jews 
[…] Therefore, the Libyan deals two blows to imperialism in return for each blow received, 
and gives it tit for tat[…]We do this and we announce it because we want to affirm to the 
world that the Arab nation is capable of moving from the defensive to the offensive.641 
Therefore, the conclusion that can be drawn is that Gaddafi’s support for the IRA was 
related to more than just the principle of both Palestine and the UAE islands. This 
strongly supports the idea that there was something else behind Gaddafi’s support for 
the IRA. His principles led to his support of liberation movements including the IRA. 
However, there was a clear difference between what he was saying to the media, and 
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what he was saying to the British Ambassador in Tripoli privately. While he was saying 
publicly that his stand for the IRA was because he supported liberation movements, he 
was saying privately to the British that British-Libyan relations were more important 
to Libya than Libyan-Irish relations.642 This will be deeply discussed in this chapter. 
So, if Gaddafi’s principles were not behind his support to the IRA, then what was the 
reason for this public show of support? To investigate this, one needs to explore the 
period of tension on the subject of the IRA. Subsequently, one can come to see if there 
were any reasons for the disagreements that existed between the two parties and if these 
may have led Libya to adopt a position of hostile behaviour toward Britain. Documents 
indicate that the problem of outstanding issues had continued and even became 
increasingly complex, especially in light of the lack of access to a solution. In addition, 
Britain refused to supply weapons to Libya because of its hostile attitude towards 
Israel.643 Thus, these two factors will be discussed, in order to explore whether these 
moves were behind Gaddafi’s hostilities towards Britain and whether this caused him 
to support the IRA.  
The third reason was continued unsettled outstanding issues, particularly the air 
defence issue, and the Libyan failure to obtain arms from Britain. The British 
government refused to recognise the outstanding Libyan issues, and refused to supply 
Chieftains and Jaguar aircrafts. These matters had an impact on British-Libyan 
relations, leading the Libyans to act in a hostile manner against the UK. Unpublished 
documents indicate that both the unsettled outstanding issues and the turning down of 
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Libyan requests for arms were the main reasons for such hostile Libyan acts against 
Britain, including their support for the IRA.  
Indeed, what was missed out in the literature review is that in his speech in June 1972, 
Gaddafi mentioned the air defence system dispute, and described it as one of the two 
main disputes between Britain and Libya. Gaddafi argued that ‘There were two issues 
between us (the Libyans) and Britain, a domestic and a national issue. The domestic 
problem was one of air defence and the relations which existed between us and Britain. 
The other problem was that of Britain's presence in the Arab Gulf’.644 
The failure of the Gaddafi regime to settle the issue of the air defence system resulted 
in the loss of its £32 million contract deposit. The tension over this matter grew during 
the period between December 1969 and December 1971. The Libyans demanded to get 
their £32 million deposit back, which BAC refused to pay.645 No solution was reached 
until BP was nationalised in December 1971, and the British suspended the outstanding 
negotiations. Thus, it can be assumed that both the nationalisation of BP and the 
rejection of British government to resume outstanding negotiations made the situation 
between the two countries even worse. 
Mr Suleiman Grada, a Minister at the Libyan Embassy in 1972 and previously a private 
secretary to Colonel Gaddafi, said ‘Colonel Gaddafi feels very strongly about the BAC 
contract, according to Grada. A failure to settle this question was for him an obstacle 
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to better Anglo-Libyan relations’.646 
At that time, both Gaddafi and Jallud stated that, if the British government would give 
a satisfactory settlement to the Libyan government on the subject of the outstanding 
issues, Libya would give a satisfactory settlement to the British government on the 
subject of Northern Ireland. In a conversation between Jallud and Peter Tripp, the 
British Ambassador in Tripoli, Jallud said that bilateral problems between the two 
countries remained without a solution. Tripp states that the reasons for this were two 
distinct issues. First, Libyan support for the IRA, and second, progress on the BP 
compensation issue. The Ambassador said that Gaddafi’s attitude to the IRA was not 
helping to normalise the relationship between the two countries. Jallud clarified that, if 
the British government provided positive responses and practical steps in regard to the 
outstanding financial and military issues between the two parties, then the other 
problems he had mentioned previously would be solved.647 In a letter from Tripp to 
FCO he said that:  
At no time did Jallud raise the matter of compensation for the BAC air defence contract as a 
pre-condition for talks. As regards our own two requirements – the abandonment of Libyan 
support for the IRA and satisfactory progress on BP – I gained the impression from Jallud 
that these would not be forthcoming before the Libyans had proof of a positive attitude on our 
part to the subjects he had raised.648 
In the same context, Gaddafi met Donald Murray, the British ambassador, in April 
1975. Gaddafi told Murray that if the relationship improved between the two countries, 
and Libya received a full normalisation of relations, he could help the British 
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government solve the Irish matter.649 It can be added that, from the Libyan side, there 
were no problems with the British government apart from the aforementioned 
outstanding issues. At the same meeting, Murray asked Gaddafi for a public assurance 
that he would not give arms, money or moral support to any of the extremist groups in 
Northern Ireland, which the British government could then use to justify its position 
when normalising a relationship with Libya.650 Gaddafi said to the British Ambassador 
that:  
If HMG were seeking friendly relations with Libya this would be sufficient for British 
ministers to use in the House of Commons. It was in the interests of the HMG to move forward 
in this way. The better our relations became, the better we could understand each other “and 
the better he (Gaddafi) would understand the Irish problem”.651 
It was probable that Gaddafi and Jallud were bargaining to stop their support for the 
IRA in exchange for settlement of outstanding issues and full normalisation in relations. 
In other word, it can be concluded that through the signals that were sent by Gaddafi 
and Jallud to the British government in relation to the problem of outstanding issues 
and the issue of supporting the IRA, it does not seem that Gaddafi's support for the IRA 
is related to his ideological principles, as much as it was quite likely a bargaining, to 
settle the Libyan claim. However, there was a misperception of both sides on what was 
negotiable, and what was not. 
In the context of the Libyan-British disputes on arms contracts, Britain’s refusal to 
supply arms to Libya was considered by the Libyans as evidence of British support for 
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Israel. One cannot separate this from Libyan hostilities against Britain, and this more 
likely fostered Libya’s support for the IRA. Since the early days of the British-Libyan 
negotiations over the Chieftains, the Libyans said that not supplying the Chieftains 
would be considered as evidence of supporting Israel.652 Thus, there is no doubt that 
the dispute over the arms supplies had a significant impact on the British-Libyan 
relationship. In other words, it drove some of the hostile Libyan actions against Britain. 
At the beginning of 1972, the British government suspended its sub-machine guns deal 
with Libya and stopped the delivery of the rest of this arms shipment, because some of 
these guns turned up in the hands of the Palestinians.653 As such, the Libyans viewed 
this as indirect support to Israel. The Libyan Ambassador in London told the FCO that 
‘The British are not prepared to sell Sub-Machine guns to us, yet they sell submarines 
to the Israeli […] the feeling against the submarine sale was growing in Tripoli’.654 In 
addition to that, at the beginning of the Libyan British negotiations on the outstanding 
issues, Jallud confirmed that British rejection to supply Chieftains tanks would be 
considered as a support to Israel.655 
At the beginning of March the Libyans had formally requested to buy the Chieftains 
tanks again.656 These tanks were a touchstone in the view of the Libyans. Mr Michel 
from United City Merchants expressed that in a conversation with Gaddafi by 
emphatically stating 'that he was willing to sign a state treaty guaranteeing that the 
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Chieftains would not be allowed out of Libya'. According to Michel, Gaddafi 'implied 
in the event of a satisfactory Chieftain he deal was willing to offer BP participation – 
presumably in the running of the Sarir field'.657 This clearly reflected that Gaddafi was 
still willing to obtain the Chieftains. K E H Morris in the North African department 
argued that ‘Chieftains also reared their ugly head again. Grada said they still wanted 
them. When it was suggested that their 200 T54's and 55's were sufficient he said no 
and in any case they could afford more and Colonel Gaddafi did not trust the 
Russians’.658 
In early 1972, both Libya and Egypt formally requested to buy Anglo-French Jaguar 
aircraft. Egypt requested 15 aircraft; the Libyans 60-80.659 All of these requests were 
turned down. The distrust the British felt for the Libyans was the main reason.660 The 
FCO emphasised that ‘We can never guarantee positive results from gestures designed 
to improve our relations while he remains in charge in Libya. Gaddafi's assurance about 
the use of Chieftains could not be trusted. If we accepted it we should appear 
disingenuous unless we offered Chieftains to the Israelis also’.661 
The FCO was against the supply of aircraft to Libya and Egypt, stating that this would 
be viewed as a significant threat to Israeli cities, and would have increased Sadat’s 
capacity to negotiate the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. The FCO added 'the Americans 
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would also oppose the deal […] the Israelis would regard the deal as a highly unfriendly 
act on our part'.662 Godber, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs added that ‘They (the Israeli) would react violently both here and in the United 
States, and would probably bring us under pressure to supply them with some 
sophisticated counterweight, thus involving us in the arms spiral. They would not 
scruple to punish us commercially’.663 
Thus the Libyan and Egyptian requests were turned down. Craig, of the FCO Near East 
and North Africa Department noted: ‘We have also been very restrictive on larger items 
because of Libya's intransigent attitude towards Israel. In the last year we have turned 
down Libyan requests for Oberon sub-marines, Sea King helicopters, naval mines, 
Sterling submachine guns and a variety of small arms and explosives’.664 
It can be concluded that there was no doubt the Libyans were well aware that Britain 
had put restrictions on the export of arms because of their position on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, and they considered this as evidence of British support of Israel. This in turn 
had an impact on Gaddafi’s policies towards Britain, leading him to adopt hostile 
actions against British interests, including support of the IRA. Indeed, Gaddafi had 
mentioned this in his speech in June 1972, where he spoke of a link between his support 
for the IRA and the Palestinian issue. He said that ‘the weapons used in the Dayr Yasin 
[…] were British weapons […] when we offer […] arms to the Irish revolutionaries 
[…] so that the freedom of the enslaved man in Ireland can triumph with these arms’.665 
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Deliberately or inadvertently, the outstanding financial and military issues between the 
two countries were increasingly linked to political problems between the two. While 
Libya was demanding a separation of the financial claims from the political matters, 
the British government was concerned with a financial settlement that depended on 
satisfactory assurances from the Libyans about Northern Ireland. Thus, the British 
considered that, if the Libyan government would not accept the British view on this 
subject, this meant that Libya had no intention of satisfying Britain on Northern Ireland, 
and the British government would do the same on the outstanding financial claims.666 
From the above discussion it is clear that there are three factors that were behind 
Gaddafi’s support for the IRA. However, it is more likely that the dispute relating to 
Ireland was based on unresolved financial and military issues, and the Libyan failure 
and disappointment in obtaining the arms they wanted, than on other factors.  
The British government response to Gaddafi’s support of the IRA 
As a first reaction from the British government, the FCO summoned the Libyan 
ambassador to Britain, and made a strong protest against what Gaddafi had said in his 
speech.667 The British government stated to the Ambassador that Colonel Gaddafi was 
becoming increasingly unbalanced. On June 15 the cabinet suspended negotiations 
between the two countries regarding the sale and delivery of certain types of weapons, 
which they had previously agreed to sell to Libya.668 The military equipment and 
weapons delivery that was suspended as a consequence of Colonel Gaddafi’s speech 
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on June 11 was as follows: 
10, 000 Mark IV Sterling Sub-Machine guns; Carl Gustav anti-tank launchers and 
ammunition; 300 individual weapon sights out of a total order of 2,400 sights for Libya 
and Egypt, manufactured by Rank Precision Instruments.669 In August 1972, and as a 
result of the strong protest by the British government, Libya made a statement about 
Gaddafi’s speech. They stated that Libya’s attitude toward Northern Ireland could not 
in any way be considered as interference in the internal affairs of the United Kingdom 
or Northern or Southern Ireland while declaring that it [was] a principle of the 
September revolution to stand on the side of absolute right.670  
Libya later requested the British government to resume deliveries of small arms, which 
it had suspended. The Libyan foreign minister demanded that Britain treat the Libyan 
statement as a retraction of Colonel Gaddafi’s earlier speech, and that he regarded it as 
an assurance that Libya would not provide arms to the IRA. However, the British could 
not regard the statement as a satisfactory and sufficient response that allowed them to 
resume deliveries of small arms.671 On 25 August, the British government informed Mr 
Kikhiya, the Libyan Foreign Minister, that the Libyan statement was a step in the right 
direction; however, it was inadequate as grounds for resuming deliveries of small 
arms.672 The British Ambassador Mr Tripp wrote ‘We [the British government] could 
expect further oral or written assurance on the use of these weapons. This was needed 
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before supply could recommence’.673 
In October, Mr Macdonald, who worked in defence sales, handed a draft assurance to 
Mr Dakhil, the head of Libyan military procurement. Macdonald explained that the 
British government would accept the signature of the Chief of Staff, another member 
of the RCC or the Foreign Minister.674 The requested assurance was accepted by the 
Libyan government, signed by the Foreign Minister, returned.675 In November, the 
British government accepted the Libyan assurance and removed the ban on the export 
of the Carl Gustavs, Sterling Machine Guns and Night Weapons to Libya.676 The 
British decision to resume the delivery of small arms was driven by two factors; first, 
it had been allegedly proven that there was no evidence that any Libyan weapons had 
reached the IRA.677 Second, the Libyan government had offered to place three orders 
of military equipment worth about £57 million with the United Kingdom if the 
restrictions on small arms were removed. Thus, the Secretary of State and the Minister 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Joseph Godber, agreed that if Libya 
gave assurances then British ministers would be prepared to remove restrictions on the 
sale of small arms.678 The Libyan statement and their written assurance was driven by 
the government, which was anxious to secure the supply of small arms.679  
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Arms to the IRA and Libyan involvement  
Following Gaddafi’s declaration of IRA support, a ship, the Claudia, was seized 
carrying five tons of arms off the Irish coast in March 1973. It is believed that the arms 
were loaded in Tripoli. However, although it is generally believed that Libya was the 
source of the weapons, the literature review on the Claudia ship was very limited, and 
not able definitively to prove or deny Libyan involvement.680 British documents show 
that the FCO had doubts about where the arms came from. Even so, Mr N C R Williams 
from the FCO Near East and North Africa Department said that ‘Following the Claudia 
incident in March 1973, there was strong evidence that the Libyans were involved’.681 
However, this evidence (no doubt from intelligence sources) has not yet been published, 
and was not found in the documents currently available to view.  Unsurprisingly, no 
intelligence information has been published that confirmed Libyan involvement in the 
Claudia affair. The British government was under public pressure to take action vis-a-
vis the Libyan government, but had no evidence it was willing to publish to do so.682 
At the same time, there were British fears that, if Libya was accused without hard 
evidence, this would put Gaddafi in a position where he would be able to deny 
complicity and accuse Britain of fabricating charges against Libya, damaging British 
interests in the Arab world.683 Thus, the British government took a decision that the 
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evidence should come through the Irish, and the ideal evidence would be either an 
official statement by the Irish government or the emergence of clear evidence in the 
trial of the IRA men who were arrested in this matter.684 Mr A D Parsons wrote that: 
This kind of line is likely to catch on in the Arab world and could do us damage. It is therefore 
most important that the evidence against the Libyans should surface on the Irish side in a 
sufficiently incontrovertible from to put us in an unassailable position to take steps [...] 
without giving Gaddafi a chance to turn the tables on us.685 
Mr Craig, of FCO, Near East and North Africa Department said that ‘It was 
agreed[…]that we should not tackle the Libyans about their involvement in IRA gun-
running until the Irish government had produced, publicly, firm evidence that the 
Libyans were so involved. Without that evidence it would be difficult for us to tackle 
them formally’.686 
At the end of April 1973, the British government requested that the Irish publish their 
evidence on the Claudia arms shipment. Mr W K K White called upon the Irish 
ambassador to reveal their evidence since ministers faced increasing pressure to act 
against the Libyans.687 White went on to say that ‘I asked him (the Irish ambassador) 
to impress upon Dr Fitzgerald (the Foreign Affairs Minister from 1973 to 1977) the 
importance of having the Libyans named, and promptly’.688 
However, the Irish side had not published any evidence against Libya. In a conference 
in London on April 4, Dr Fitzgerald refused to say anything about the Libyan 
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involvement. 689 The Irish explained this by saying that declaring any evidence in 
advance of the trial would prejudice the chance of securing a conviction.690 However, 
two pieces of evidence against Libya were then published by the British press: the first 
was the statement from the captain and crew of the Claudia. This statement claimed 
that they all alleged that they loaded the arms in Libya. The second were photographs 
published by the Irish Independent on 30 March showing the name ‘Tripoli’ on some 
of the boxes on the Claudia.691 Craig said ‘It is not a clear copy but it reveals the name 
Tripoli unmistakably’.692 
Even with the statement of the captain and crew of the Claudia there was a doubt and 
it was a weak piece of evidence. The Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, wrote 
that ‘Given the rather sensational circumstances in which these statements were 
obtained, they can hardly be presented as a reliable foundation for a formal 
protest’.693The Irish published no accusations or hard evidence and, as such, the British 
government lacked a firm base from which to make an approach to the Libyans.694  J 
H G Leahy from the News Department said that ‘As the days go by it is becoming 
clearer and clearer that the Irish are a “busted flush”, insofar as the public naming of 
the Libyans is concerned’.695Leahy added that ‘The statements made to the press by 
the owner, the captain and members of the crew of the Claudia [...] given the rather 
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sensational circumstances in which these statements were obtained they can hardly be 
presented as a reliable foundation’. 696  Furthermore, Irish counter-terror legislation 
meant that convictions could be obtained if necessary without the detailed use of 
intelligence-sourced evidence. 
Following the lack of any evidence from the Irish on Libyan involvement in the Claudia 
affair, the British government tried to persuade the captain of Claudia to make a more 
formal statement on the record confirming that the arms were picked up in Libya.697 
On April 9, the British government made a formal request to the German government 
in order to obtain this statement.698 On April 12, the Germans replied, stating that, for 
various reasons, relating to the German domestic, political and technical intelligence 
fields, Germany could not do this.699  Because of the absence of publishable hard 
evidence, the British government could not prove that Libya was behind the arms 
shipment on board the Claudia. Thus, only a request for clarification from the Libyan 
government was made about what was published in the press and no formal protest was 
made to them. W.K.K. White wrote that ‘Although there has never been any official 
public confirmation that the arms on Claudia came from Libya, it is generally believed 
that this was the case’.700  On 12 April 1973 the British government demanded a 
clarification from Libya about the reports of Libyan involvement in the Claudia 
shipment,701 but did nothing more. They never received any such clarification. The 
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only response from the Libyan government stated that ‘The affair had been exaggerated 
by the press and the story was unsubstantiated’.702 
Five years later, in 1978, during a conversation between Mr Mallet, in the FCO 
Republic of Ireland department and Mr Sean Donlon, Assistant Secretary at the Irish 
Department of Foreign Affairs concerning Libyan involvement in the affair, Mr 
Donlon said ‘In fact he had seen no evidence of Libyan involvement’.703At the time of 
writing, the intelligence documentation to confirm generally held suspicions is 
unavailable. 
Despite all of this, the British government took several unilateral measures. All arms 
shipments that could have been of use to the IRA were suspended. Minsters of the FCO, 
MOD and Northern Ireland Department were questioned in Parliament about the sale 
of arms to Libya.704 FCO and MOD replied that all the arms that were due to Libya 
were withheld; no arms of use to the IRA would be supplied to Libya. The MOD put 
all the arms due for delivery to Libya under embargo:705 ‘no arms of any sort are being 
shipped to Libya in the future without ministerial permission’. 706  The MOD had 
‘reviewed all Libyan orders in the pipeline, and anything conceivably of use to the IRA 
has been with-held’.707  
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Thus, the sale of the Sterling Sub-Machine guns and Carl Gustav anti-tank missiles, 
which had been released for delivery to Libya, was suspended again. Some of these 
shipments were due to be delivered on 3 April 1973.708 The British government also 
called off any negotiations on agreement with the Libyans over shared inter-
governmental problems.709  
At the beginning of 1974 the British government started trying to convince other 
European countries to put a ban on the sale to Libya of any weapons which might 
conceivably be of use to the IRA. On 25 January 1974, at the European Economic 
Community (EEC) Middle East exports meeting in Bonn, the British member present 
mentioned to the other members of EEC the British ban on the sale to Libya of any 
kind of small arms which might be of use to the IRA.710 Most of these countries had 
had trade relations in the field of weapons with Libya, particularly Italy and France, so 
it was difficult to persuade them to follow Britain’s policy. After the EEC meeting in 
Bonn, the British government started a campaign through its European ambassadors to 
persuade these countries of the British policy of seeking to prevent the sale of the types 
of weapons mentioned above. Italy, France, Belgium and the Netherlands showed little 
willingness to follow the same British policy; however, they agreed to follow the 
British if the government could prove that any of these weapons might have found their 
way into the hands of the IRA.711 In general, most of these countries did not reject the 
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British demands; for example, the Dutch said they would further examine the few 
weapons they exported to Libya. The countries most likely to supply arms to Libya 
which could be of use to the IRA were France, Belgium and Italy. France and Belgium 
"might be prepared to put a stop on future exports if we can come up with proof that 
equipment previously supplied by them to Libya had fallen into the hands of the IRA". 
The Italians were particularly prone to Libyan pressure; as such, it was unlikely that 
the Italians would subscribe to any ban unless the other members of EEC were all 
strongly for it.712 It is clear that the absence of strong evidence presented to these 
countries made it very difficult to apply any policy of banning Libyan arms exports, as 
the diplomat Richard Muir noted.713 
The image of Gaddafi in relation to British public opinion and 
government policy towards Libya’s IRA support  
The Irish issue was a sensitive point for the government and the British people; 
therefore, the announcement of Gaddafi's support for the IRA further damaged public 
opinion on Libya in Britain, and led to a widening gap between the two countries.714 
The British media looked at Gaddafi's regime as a financial and military supporter to 
what they considered as terrorist organizations in Northern Ireland, particularly the 
IRA.715 
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Gaddafi had been seen in the British media and by the British people as a political 
fanatic who had failed to create unions with all of the countries around him and, further, 
as a paymaster for international terrorism. In addition, his hand was seen to be behind 
every act of Palestinian extremism, and he was perceived as offering the IRA material 
and moral support. In general terms, this was how Gaddafi was viewed publicly. He 
was also seen as having a peculiar code of values, and it was probably this single-
mindedness that distinguished him from his contemporaries.716 The British government 
had the same view. The British Ambassador, Donald Murray, said it was a fact that 
Libya had a bad reputation in the British press. The consequence of this was that very 
many people in the UK believed that Libya was supporting the IRA in a way that was 
construed as clear interference in Britain’s internal affairs. This made it very difficult 
for Parliament to accept any rapprochement with the Libyan government.717 
Because of all these reasons, the FCO took the position that it was difficult for the 
British government to accept any settlement with Libya on the subject of the IRA. 
There was also mistrust between the two sides, which resulted in the weakness of any 
assurance that the Libyans would offer to settle the dispute over the IRA issue. In 
addition, there was a risk of heavy attacks in Parliament if the Libyan word was 
accepted. The FCO warned that the acceptance of the British government on any 
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Libyan assurances would be followed by a Libyan request to remove the British ban 
on small arms. In addition to that, there were elements of the British government who 
did not support any agreement with Gaddafi in the light of his policy toward the British 
interests in Libya.  For instance, Mr A J M Craig from the FCO said that ‘On the IRA 
we are inclined to think [...] even a specifically worded assurance could not be trusted, 
and ministers would be heavily attacked in Parliament if they based their arms sales 
policy on it’.718 
This British mistrust later came to include all of Libyan foreign policy, as it argued in 
chapter two. However, the British government reconsidered Anglo-Libyan relations 
later in the light of Britain needs to secure its commercial interests with Libya. 
Therefore, it was clear that, after 1975, Britain’s economic condition strongly drove 
the UK to review its relations with Libya, providing that Libya must stop all kinds of 
support to the IRA. This will be discussed below. 
British-Libyan dispute over the IRA issue between 1975-1979  
Despite the high level of tension between the two countries because of Libyan IRA 
support from 1972 to 1974, unpublished documents show that there was a positive shift 
on the Libyan and British positions regarding their dispute on the subject of the IRA. 
At the end of 1975 the British government began to reconsider its relations with Libya 
regarding its IRA support dispute. British reconsideration came as a result of three 
reasons. The first reason was Britain’s keenness to secure its business interests with 
Libya in light of the growth of British trade with Libya since 1975. The second was to 
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convince Gaddafi to abandon completely the idea of supporting the IRA in the light of 
his repeated declarations that he could no longer offer them any support. For these two 
reasons, in mid-1975 the British government took the decision to re-negotiate with the 
Libyan government for the purpose of resolving the outstanding issues and stopping 
Libyan support for the IRA. Third, there was no evidence that Gaddafi was giving 
support materials to the IRA.719 In fact the British economy by the mid-1970s was in a 
terrible mess.720 Thus, anything that could be done to improve the British economy was 
important.   
The British government was not willing to lose its commercial interests within Libya, 
which had been growing since the beginning of 1974. As a result, some restrictions 
were lifted on business dealings with Britain as part of a plan to improve the 
relationship, through Gaddafi’s initiative (opening a new page in British-Libyan 
relations). The export figures to Libya then jumped from £107 million in 1975 to £200 
million in 1978. The ban on British consumer goods was gradually withdrawn and the 
remaining restrictions were effectively removed. Thus, the FCO wanted to secure 
British growing trade.721 On the issue of the IRA, Gaddafi publicly announced in 1975 
that he was not providing any material support for the IRA.722 So it is clear that the 
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FCO policy at this stage was based on to secure the improvement of trade. This policy 
was recommended by the FCO and agreed by the ministers on 22 of July 1975.723 
The FCO insisted that any settlement with Libya must be based on providing specific 
assurances about certain political issues, in particular the IRA, stating that ‘any deal 
with the Libyans would include specific assurances about political activities currently 
unwelcome to us’.724  
British documents show that, from late 1974 up to 1979, the IRA had received no 
Libyan support. 
Libya's record in recent years is better in this respect than its general reputation. Despite 
Colonel Gaddafi's past statements of support for the IRA and earlier Libyan arms and other 
material assistance (e.g. the attempt to ship weapons to the IRA on SS Claudia in 1973) we 
have seen no real evidence of Libyan financial support for the IRA or the Provision of arms 
in the last few years.725 
However, it was agreed not to seek a clear Libyan assurance that would put the British 
government under an obligation to settle the outstanding issues, including those of arms 
contracts.726 On 18 June 1974 A J M Craig of the FCO North African Department 
informed the British Ambassador in Tripoli not to seek a clear Libyan assurance about 
the IRA. Craig wrote:  
It would be better not to have a clear assurance of the withdrawal of Libyan support for the 
IRA and certainly not to seek it. This would not preclude our inducing Libyan support for the 
IRA as an obstacle to the resolution of Anglo-Libyan difference but if we got an assurance 
the Libyans would expect us in return to lift our embargo on, for example, the Sterling 
machine guns, mines, rocket launchers, etc.727 
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British policy now came to be based on bypassing the claims dispute and improving 
British commercial conditions with Libya, on the condition that Libya must stop all 
kinds of support to the IRA including moral support.728 This was an implicit agreement 
rather than a formal settlement. To establish this, the Ambassador met Gaddafi and told 
him that if the Libyan government showed goodwill, why could Gaddafi not say 
publicly that he was not sending money or arms to the IRA?729 
Gaddafi tried to clarify his position on the Irish issue, saying that he had no aggressive 
intentions against Britain, and his support to the Irish was just a support of the principle 
of helping independence movements everywhere. Gaddafi gave an example of his 
support of the Palestinians and African peoples, and had recognised Sihanouk’s 
government and North Vietnam. He added that he supported the Kurds even though 
they fought against other Arabs. However, he assured the ambassador that this did not 
mean that he was hostile to Britain. In addition, he stated that Libyan support was only 
moral and that he was not sending weapons or money to the IRA. In his meeting with 
the British Ambassador, Gaddafi repeated many times that he had no hostile feelings 
against Britain and that no arms or money was being sent to the IRA.730  
Gaddafi told Murray that the impression of the Libyan hostility towards Britain was 
one hundred per cent wrong. He was keen that Murray heard this from him directly and 
that the British government should be assured accordingly. He added that, for the 
Libyan government, relations with Britain were more important than those with 
                                                 
728 TNA, FCO 93/614, Libya and Ireland, TNA, FCO 87-785, letter from Secretary of State to the Rt. 
Hon Edmund Dell MP Secretary of State for trade, 1978 
729 TNA, FCO 93-611, Anglo/Libyan relations 
730 Ibid 
256 
 
Ireland. Gaddafi requested with emphasis from Mr Murray that their talk should stay a 
private conversation and not be published.731 Murray responded by arguing that the 
IRA is not a liberation movement, but a minority seeking to impose their will by force 
on the majority of Northern Ireland, who did not want to break away from Britain. He 
reiterated that the British government was working to find a solution and bring peace 
to Northern Ireland, but that the Libyan attitude was not helping this aim.732  
On 7 October 1975, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, sent a message to 
Gaddafi regarding his conversation with the British Ambassador. Wilson emphasised 
that the Northern Ireland matter is an obvious source of misunderstanding between 
Britain and Libya, and is of deep and urgent concern to the British Parliament and 
people. Therefore, the improvement of British-Libyan relations depends on finding a 
solution to this issue.733 Following the Prime Minister’s message to Gaddafi, the British 
Ambassador met with him and told him that:  
There was a wide-spread belief in the UK [whether rightly or wrongly] that Libya was 
supporting violence in Northern Ireland [...] no hope of HMG accepting an understanding on 
our bilateral differences [...] unless they could tell the British parliament and people at the 
same time, publicly, that the Libyan government had given assurance that they were not 
interfering in Northern Ireland affairs.734 
At the end of 1975, FCO was unsatisfied with these assurances and considered there 
was poor progress on the issue. They retained suspicions about what Gaddafi had said 
in the press, and questioned the assurances that he had given the British Ambassador 
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in October 1975.735 The diplomat Alan Urwick of the FCO Near East and North Africa 
Department wrote that ‘Colonel Gaddafi’s assurances on Northern Ireland do not yet 
seem sufficiently explicit to be used with the British public and parliament’.736 The 
British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, was also not satisfied with the outcomes of the 
conversations with Gaddafi, and went on to say that ‘[There are] doubts whether we 
shall get anywhere with Gaddafi, particularly on Northern Ireland, and had in mind the 
likelihood that any promises given by Gaddafi would be broken’. The Prime Minster 
also commented that there must in any case be doubts about Gaddafi’s own future.737  
It is clear that one of the main reasons for this dispute, the lack of confidence on the 
Libyan side, remained unresolved. The inflexibility of the Gaddafi regime in addition 
to the large differences between the two parties, as well as the reprisals that were carried 
out by Libya against British interests in Libya, such as the nationalisation of BP, had 
created a climate of mistrust of any Libyan promises. Edmund Dell, Secretary of State 
for Trade and President of the Board of Trade from 1976-78, wrote that, ‘Libya 
represents one of the faster growing export markets in the world. Until now, however, 
we have been reluctant to encourage our firms to seek business there partly because of 
the unpredictable nature of the regime but also because of the existence of a number of 
disagreements’.738 
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The British government stressed that an acceptable assurance would have to be public 
or there would be no possibility of an agreement on bilateral issues.739 Subsequently, 
on many occasions, Gaddafi denied providing any support to the IRA. In an interview 
with BBC Television on 21 July 1976, he said that Libya supported just causes and 
people struggling for freedom but denied sending any support to the IRA. In September 
1976 Gaddafi repeated these claims to Newsweek.740 On 28 November of the same 
year, he also said to the Observer that for him the IRA chapter is closed, repeat in that 
no support was sent to the IRA.741 A B Urwick of the FCO said there was no evidence 
that Gaddafi had given any arms or financial support to the IRA particularly in the last 
18 months after his assurance to the British Ambassador. Urwick, however, added that 
an IRA leaders’s known fund-raiser had recently visited Libya. Thus, ‘It would 
therefore be rash to state categorically in any reply in Parliament that we no longer 
believe material aid is reaching the IRA from Libya. We would also be ill-advised to 
indicate to Gaddafi at the present stage in our bilateral negotiations for a firm assurance 
that he will no longer give political or material support to the IRA’.742  
Gaddafi’s statements coincided with improvements in the commercial field, which 
reflected positively on British trade interests with Libya. The ban on British consumer 
goods was gradually withdrawn. This, on one hand, removed the pressure on the British 
to bring a quick settlement to the Libyan demands and resolve the issue of financial 
claims and Libyan IRA support. On the other hand, this increase in the balance of trade 
                                                 
739 TNA, FCO 93-612, Negotiations with Libya, letter from Murray to FCO, 13 October 1975 
740  TNA, FCO 93-836, Libya, letter from Crosland to British Embassy in Dublin and Tripoli, 16 
September 1976 
741 TNA, FCO 93-836, Libya and the IRA, letter from A B Urwick to Mr Weir 7 December 1976 
742 Ibid 
259 
 
with Libya put pressure on the British side to secure its trade interests.743 
Gaddafi had gone far to meet British demands on the issue of ending his support to the 
IRA, at least in his view; but he still saw the IRA as struggling legitimately for 
independence. Thus, from the British viewpoint, what Gaddafi offered was always 
going to be limited by his convictions. In his second meeting with Gaddafi on 13 
October 1975, Ambassador Murray said that ‘He [Gaddafi] still sees Northern Ireland 
as a classic situation of an oppressed people, striving for independence, no matter what 
rational evidence is produced, and I (Murray) fear he will always be eager to listen to 
any one who propounds this theory].744  
From Gaddafi’s viewpoint there was no inconsistency between his principles of 
supporting liberation movements, whether in Northern Ireland or elsewhere, as long as 
he did not provide any material support. This was completely contrary to the British 
point of view.745 Mr Murray went on to say that ‘In this light the formula I was able to 
get from Gaddafi is not wholly satisfactory [....] I doubt if it will be possible to get 
anything more out of him while he persists in his misconceptions’. 746  The FCO 
recommended at this stage to meet the Libyan desire for talks to settle their financial 
claims and normalise relations, at least for the time being, in order to put the relations 
of the two countries on a better footing. This could then secure British commercial 
interests, without the obligation to settle other outstanding issues. This would also keep 
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the Libyans in play, and allow both countries to benefit from the improvement in 
relations without putting forward a clear framework for a settlement.747 
This policy was approved because of the apparently changing internal situation in 
Libya. The British were willing to believe that the Gaddafi regime would not survive 
for long because of its increasing isolation and grumbling in the ranks of the armed 
forces, which had led to a failed military coup in August 1975. Thus, the British 
believed that Gaddafi’s fear for the stability of his regime and his preoccupation with 
internal problems made him less disposed to retaliate against the British for the failure 
to bring negotiations to a rapid conclusion.748 
 In early August 1975, a plot to overthrow the Gaddafi regime was discovered in the 
ranks of the army. Three active members of the RCC, as well as a number of free 
officers were involved. It dawned on Gaddafi that he could no longer rely on the 
subservience or trust of his chosen associates. A number of military officers and 
civilians were arrested. The loyalty of members of the middle-rank army was 
questionable and orders were issued that they should not obey their officers if they got 
anti-revolutionary orders.749 
The British Ambassador went on to say that: 
He has lost much of his essential power base in the armed forces by demoralizing the officers 
(and stamping on their bourgeois aspirations).750 By most political precepts Gaddafi should 
have been ousted or killed before the next annual review has to be written. He has no 
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worthwhile friends. The RCC, his own instrument of collective government, has collapsed, 
and there is no trust among the remaining members who still serve him.751 
It is true that Gaddafi had lost some of his authority and he had no friends, but not as 
much as this report says. The fact is that Gaddafi did not fall and his government 
remained strong enough for a long time after.   
Due to these factors, the British government continued with its previous policy. This 
aimed to prolong the talks with the Libyans in the hope that the Gaddafi regime 
collapsed before the British government was compelled to make concessions in order 
to settle all outstanding issues, including the issue of Ireland and other financial claims. 
Mr A B Urwick said that: 
The policy line which Ministers are now invited to approve collectively in OPD is that we 
should not contemplate making a new offer to the Libyans, but seek to maintain a dialogue 
with them through the embassy… our best interests at present seem to lie in spinning out the 
exchanges with the Libyans as long as possible. 752 
British policy regarding this matter succeeded and kept the Libyans in play from 1974 
to 1979. Additionally, between the end of 1975 and the beginning of 1976, British 
exports to Libya did particularly well. Libya became the 5th largest export market in 
the Middle East (after Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Iraq).753 There was of course a risk 
that relations could have worsened. Indeed, the regime survived and did not collapse, 
as the British had wished. Thus, before the end of 1976 the British came under pressure 
to meet the Libyan demand for re-negotiation, otherwise the growth in British trade 
would have come to be at risk. The risk of relapse in these relations could have led to 
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worse dealings than before. Mr Murray argued that: 
We [the British] have been talking intermittently with the Libyans about their claims for six 
years [….] I cannot see how we can even begin to consider a settlement approaching Libyan 
aspirations: they are demanding more than 50 million from Britain and expect us to bargain 
upwards from about 25 million.754 
The Ambassador went on to describe the situation between the two countries by saying 
that ‘There is little substance from the Libyans’ side to the oft-repeated assertion that 
they wish to turn a new page in relations with Britain, and correspondingly little scope 
for a British response which could put the two countries on better terms and thus 
safeguard our continued trading position here’.755 Mr P L Gregson argued that, ‘We 
(the British government) could not, however, honestly say as we did in 1975 that a 
measurable and substantial increase in trade would be likely to occur as a result of a 
settlement’.756 
In July 1977, and in order to prevent any tension that might hinder the growth of 
commercial interests in Libya, British ministers agreed to re-negotiate the outstanding 
issues, and also negotiate new arms deals.757 Edmund Dell, the Secretary of State for 
Trade and President of the Board of Trade 1976-78, said that: 
Notably a claims dispute, which have overshadowed our bilateral relations since 
1969[…]there now appear to be signs that the Libyan attitude is changing[...]and there have 
been enquiries about the possibility of purchasing defence equipment. An alternative 
approach would be to invite a Libyan minister to undertake a goodwill visit as a guest of HMG 
with the primary aim of introducing him to firms and organizations in the UK who could assist 
in Libya's development.758 
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On 24 February 1978, Edmund Dell wrote to the Secretary of State, stating the context 
of the decision reached by ministers in July 1977 to improve relations with the Libyans 
in the light of the growth of British exports. He encourages this line and suggests that 
a Libyan minister might be invited to Britain as a guest of HMG. The aim of the 
invitation, as Dell said, was 'to demonstrate our wish to improve relations with Libya 
and develop our trade there'. He explained that there were two reasons for this: the 
importance of the Libyan market to Britain and the amount of British exports to Libya, 
which were running at an annual level of £173 million. In addition, he added that 'there 
are grounds to hope that this could improve in the better climate created by our gesture 
on arms sales'.759 In spite of this British shift, it appears there was also British concern 
over Libyan foreign policy, which limited the rapprochement between the two 
countries. In his letter to the Secretary of State, Dell argued that ‘On the other hand, 
Libya's international policies remain hostile to our interests and Gaddafi makes trouble 
throughout Africa and the Arab world. Gesture and goodwill are difficult to justify, and 
the US and Egypt both regard Libya with deep suspicion’.760 The diplomat Roger 
Tomkys of the FCO Near East and North Africa Department, supported Dell’s proposal, 
stating that ‘We have no recent evidence that Gaddafi is providing material support to 
the IRA. I recommend therefore that we should respond positively to Major Jalloud 
with an invitation as proposed by Mr Dell’.761 
Subsequently, the Libyans were informed that the British government had no objection 
to the supply of frigates and Hawk aircraft (much more significant weapons than those 
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previously discussed), which the Libyans were very interested in purchasing.762 The 
Libyan government welcomed the British approach. In April 1978, they made requests 
to buy arms to both officials in defence sales organisations and in private firms.763 On 
6 October 1978, Gaddafi called the British Ambassador and offered to satisfy the UK 
regarding the question of Ireland. In return, he wanted the British government to satisfy 
Libya regarding the claims of outstanding issues.764 Gaddafi said that, ‘It would, in 
these circumstances be advantageous to get the financial claims issue out of the way. 
Since we would doubtless bring up the question of Ireland, he suggested that we might 
jointly prepare a document or declaration satisfactory to the UK while respecting 
Libyan view on liberty’.765 The offer was very good for both sides, if went through. 
Gaddafi’s response also showed that he did not care very much for the Irish issue or 
the IRA as a matter of principle.  He probably was prepared to chuck them away for a 
pragmatic settlement.   
It can be argued here that the British proposal to sell arms to the Libyans had improved 
the situation between the two countries, and led Gaddafi to offer to settle the IRA issue 
in return for settling the outstanding Libyan issues. This shows the impact of arms deals 
on the relations between the two parties. In addition, until late 1978, it was clear that 
Gaddafi was still keeping his moral support for the IRA while the outstanding issues 
remained unsettled. British motives clearly included the much greater economic 
pressure due to a weakened trade, sterling and employment position by this time.  
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The British government welcomed the Libyan desire to encourage more improvement 
on British-Libyan relations, particularly in regard to the question of the IRA. However, 
they rejected the offer to make any statement on the IRA matter. The British rejection 
to do so was explained in the light of both the British distrust of Gaddafi and their 
concern over Libya’s international policies and activities.766 In addition, the May 1979 
election was 7 months away: the closer it got, the less they could afford to seem to give 
way on Libya, particularly in the IRA issue.  
In late 1978, the Libyan government expressed a view that they had gone too far in 
meeting the British demands on the question of Northern Ireland. They began to 
criticise the British attitude, stating that the British were doing nothing to meet their 
demands on outstanding matters. In an interview with the Libyan Ambassador in 
London, it was stressed that Libya was no longer providing any support to the IRA, 
and in the light of this, the Libyan government hoped to see a settlement for its financial 
demands.767 In addition, Gaddafi thought that he had gone close enough to meeting the 
British demands in the context of ending his support to the Irish.768 However, by the 
end of 1978, Gaddafi was not satisfied with the progress in relations with the British. 
He emphasised that Libya had met all of the British demands over the IRA but that the 
British government was not doing the same to improve relations.769 
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In October 1978 Mr Williams, a British Ambassador, expressed his concern in the same 
regard, writing that ‘Any settlement of the claims dispute will result in substantially 
increased trade and are barely persuaded that our trade interests will suffer if we fail to 
keep the Libyan in play […] in these circumstances this is a weak ground on which to 
keep the Libyans in play’.770 
By May 1979, the Labour Party had been defeated and Margaret Thatcher, the leader 
of the Conservative Party, had become Prime Minster. Gaddafi again tried to settle both 
the outstanding issues and the IRA matter with Thatcher’s government. In July 1979 
Gaddafi passed a message through Bahrain to Thatcher that he wanted to resolve the 
problems between the two countries, particularly the IRA issue. Gaddafi stressed his 
disappointment, stating that although he had stopped all his support for the IRA the 
British government was not moving to clear up all the disputes and normalise 
relations.771 Regarding the value of Gaddafi’s support to the IRA, the Prime Minister 
of Bahrain, Sheikh Khalifa said: 
Gaddafi said he could assure the Bahrainis that for three years he had given no such assistance 
to the IRA, although morally he supported them in the same way he did other liberation 
movements [...] the (Gaddafi) had tried to get better terms with the last British government 
but his efforts had come to nothing. Now he wanted to try with the new British government.772 
The new British government was, however, unconvinced. The statement quoted above 
clearly indicates that Gaddafi still did not admit any material support to the IRA, but 
                                                 
770 TNA, FCO 93-1406, Libyan claims, letter from CD Powell to Mr Weir, 12 October 1978 
771 TNA, FCO93/1872, UK/Libya, letter from Walker, to FCO, 9 July 1979; TNA, FCO 93/1872, 
Prime Minister's meeting with the Prime Minister of Bahrain Sheikh Khalifa, at Bahrain Airport, Paul 
Lever, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2 July 1979 
772 TNA, FCO 93/1872, Prime Minister's meeting with the Prime Minister of Bahrain Sheikh Khalifa, 
at Bahrain Airport 
267 
 
that he kept his moral support to them; the London government were sure this was 
untrue. 
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Conclusion  
There is no exact figure, or even an approximation, of how much military or financial 
support Gaddafi gave to the secessionist movements in Ireland. In August of 1972, the 
Lebanese newspaper Al-Bairaq published what it claimed was the amount of aid that 
the Gaddafi regime allocated to third world nations. This aid included the IRA, the 
political opposition in Morocco and Tunisia, and African Americans in the United 
States, though most of the aid went to the Egyptian opposition. The newspaper also 
claimed that 30 million Lebanese Pounds was allocated to the IRA over two years.773 
Unpublished British documents show that the Lebanese newspaper, owned by Milhem 
Karam, the Chairman of the Lebanese Editors Association, had strong left-wing ties, 
and that what was published in this newspaper was far from accurate and based on no 
official statements.774 Regarding the amount given to the IRA, Craig argued that: 
We [the British] believe that the Libyan contribution to the proportion of the weapons in IRA 
is much less than £1 million and that only a very small proportion of the weapons in IRA 
hands come from Libya[…]and the figures given for Libyan financial assistance to other 
terrorist organisations reflect declarations of intent rather than cash hand over.775 
Equally, a senior officer in Scotland Yard’s anti-terrorist squad wrote that ‘Libyan 
support for the IRA has been very minor indeed. It can be counted in the thousands of 
pounds, but certainly not in hundreds of thousands and any talk of millions of dollars 
is ludicrous’.776 
Trade improved between the two countries, and Britain succeeded in reducing 
Gaddafi’s support for the IRA and neutralising the problem of outstanding issues 
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throughout this period. The problem of Libya’s support to the IRA was not fully 
resolved, and later became acute again. Other outstanding issues also remained 
unresolved. This was due to several factors. First, linking the resolve of both issues of 
the IRA and the outstanding issues to each other was the cause of many problems. Since 
the end of 1975 and throughout 1976 the British government insisted that any solution 
to the outstanding issues must be based on a Libyan assurance to renounce all forms of 
Libyan support to the IRA.777 Richard Muir, a diplomat at the Near East and North 
Africa Department, expressed the view that ‘Ministers agreed that... the possibility of 
a settlement based on the... and subject to a number of conditions including a 
renunciation by Libya of support for the IRA’.778 
Despite the success of the British government in limiting Gaddafi’s support for the IRA 
throughout the period from 1975 to 1979, they failed to convince him to abandon his 
moral support to the IRA. This was because the settlement of both problems was tied 
to each other, i.e. by linking the settlement of Libyan support to the IRA with the 
settlement of outstanding issues was something very serious, as the failure of the British 
government to meet the Libyan demands over the outstanding issues would lead to 
serious consequences. For example, the Libyans would lose patience, and thus Gaddafi 
would turn to his former statements and support to the IRA. Moreover, the Libyans 
would reinstate their ban on British exports to Libya; in other words, they would return 
to their starting point of December 1971, when Libya lost patience and nationalised BP. 
Second, there was suspicion within the British government of the Libyan government’s 
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intentions and a distrust of any guarantee from Gaddafi in that regard. Mr P J Parramore, 
from the Republic of Ireland department, argued that: 
We are aware that Gaddafi has made a number of public and private statements over the last 
few years denying that Libya is giving arms or other material support to the IRA, although he 
has reiterated his moral support for their objectives. We have, of course, approached the 
Anglo/Libyan claims dispute on the basis that a settlement would have to be associated with 
suitable assurances from the Libyans renouncing any support for the IRA.779 
Third, there was an increase in British concern about Libyan foreign policy, which was 
considered unacceptable to the British government. One of the main obstacles to the 
solution of disputes between Britain and Libya on the Libyan support for IRA, as well 
as a settlement of the outstanding issues, was growing concerns over Libyan foreign 
policy, which was considered as being hostile to British international interests.780 The 
diplomat Roger Tomkys, of the Near East and North Africa department, indicated that 
‘Libya's international policies remain hostile to our interests and Gaddafi makes trouble 
throughout Africa and the Arab world’.781 
A UK-Libya deal was not possible because of their different concepts about what was 
negotiable and what was not. Gaddafi kept a minimum of his moral support for the IRA 
in order to bargain with the British, and Britain had no intention to resolve the 
outstanding issues in the light of Gaddafi’s position on the IRA.    
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Chapter Six: General Conclusions 
This study re-examined knowledge of British-Libyan relationship during the 1970s. 
That has been a relatively neglected area of study. There was a worsening in relations 
between the two countries in this period. The decline was dictated by circumstances 
and by political and strategic shifts after September 1969. These included the change 
of regime in Libya, and the changes in foreign policy that followed. These events made 
it necessary for the British and Libyan governments to frame new relations between 
the two after 1969. The British government found it very important to evaluate its 
relations with the new rulers in Libya its own changing interests. The two countries 
agreed to enter into negotiations to lay the foundations of a new relationship between 
them, but the outcome of these negotiations was difficult and difficult to manage on 
both sides throughout the 1970s. The hostile Libyan attitudes towards British interests 
in Libya, the Mediterranean and Africa were one of the most direct causes of the failure 
of these negotiations, but so too were British ideas of their interests and British 
misperceptions of Libya.  
Arguments over British-Libyan relations in the 1970s have often been superficial, 
following prejudices and assumptions made in the media of the time. These urgently 
need to be reviewed, even if sometimes the conclusions are the same. The archive 
material does indeed reveal new knowledge about both British and Libyan policy 
management, as well as about the ways in which relations between the two countries 
changed. The new material, recently released, brings new understanding to British-
Libyan relations, how they existed, how they were managed, and how they worsened. 
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One key issue is the division between the specialist policy makers in the FCO 
Department concerned and their colleagues in other departments on how to work with 
the Libyan government after 1970. The best example of this was the support of the 
FCO and MOD to supply Chieftains to Libya and the opposition of other ministers to 
this, which led to a division inside the Cabinet. pp. 64-68. The leading players in the 
FCO maintaining for a long time a belief that they could influence or even possibly 
control Libyan policy, and then finally later moving to an angry and sceptical position, 
which may also have misunderstood the grounds of Libyan policy. Libyan and British 
officials repeatedly misunderstood, mis-communicated and mistrusted each other. For 
instance, in 1971, when the British government was preparing to increase its offer to 
settle the outstanding issues, the Libyans lost patience and nationalised BP assets in 
Libya. Another example was that, although the British documents show that Gaddafi 
may have been serious in turning a new page in his relations with Britain in 1974, the 
British government did not trust him. This thesis draws on the available company 
documentation to analyse relations between Libya and British oil and defence 
companies to explore the implications for state-to-state relations and to critique 
previous accounts of those relations. A good example for this are sources which 
indicate that the nationalisation of BP was due to the government-to-government 
dispute over the outstanding issues, not to the UAE islands dispute, as was assumed. 
pp. 137-146. The account given here is important and original, but may not be the ‘final 
answer’ in so far as we know already from newspaper revelations that the intelligence 
relationship between the two countries was complex and detailed, but we do not yet 
have clear evidence of those details, and when that evidence becomes available, these 
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interpretations will inevitably need to be revised again. The archives throw light on, 
but, again, may not definitively explain, relations between the UK and Libya over 
conflict in Ireland and over issues of arms sales.  The available archival material 
particularly the records of Libyan-British and Libyan-Soviet relations, bring new 
understanding to the Libyan-Soviet relations in the 1970s and its impact on the British-
Libyan relations during the same period, and corrected the misunderstanding over the 
Libyan-Soviet relations, which mainly played by the media (namely Egyptian media) 
because of the state of hostility between the two countries, and for the benefit of Egypt. 
On the archival material on Libyan-IRA relations, the available records bring some 
new facts, although it is still limited and does not paint the whole picture. Nor did it 
provide useful data about cooperation between Gaddafi and the IRA. 
This thesis shows that tension between the UK and Libya began over the negotiation 
of outstanding issues from January 1970 to December 1971, and then affected all later 
relations, not as the previous studies indicated, that tension started over the 
nationalisation of BP assets in Libya. The BP asset nationalisation was the first 
consequence of the outstanding negations failure.  
A study by Sean W. Straw (2010) clearly shows that British-Libyan relations were built 
during the 1960s on strategic self-interest, which became of increasing economic 
benefit to the British. However, how would Britain continue this? After September 
1969 the FCO MOD) outlined Britain’s key interests in Libya as being political and 
strategic, economic and military (arms delivery and training). This relationship was 
indeed based on self-interest but not based on strategic self-interest alone. Economic 
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and trade interest, the history of the relationship, and mutual misperception all also 
mattered, as this thesis has shown.  
After recognition of the new regime, the Labour government was willing to save its 
interests in Libya. This was driven by two main aims. The first was preserving oil and 
trade interests in Libya. In 1970 Britain was importing about 25% of its oil needs from 
Libya, and Libya also represented the second largest market for British exports in the 
Arab world.782 The second was to keep Libya loyal to the West, and to prevent the 
penetration of Egyptian and Soviet influence in Libya.783 The Labour government 
found that the best way to examine the intentions of the new regime, as well as to 
maintain its interests and continue its influence, was to use the arms contracts it had 
signed with the monarchy and not completed as a basis to negotiate. However, the RCC 
was a more pronounced Arab Nationalist movement, which did not bode well for 
British interests. British records on the issue of the Chieftain tanks show that the 
evaluation of British-Libyan relations was strongly affected by it, and that the Labour 
government’s decision in this regard was affected by Britain’s attitude to the Arab-
Israeli conflict, and by the Libyan regime’s harder attitude towards this conflict. The 
RCC made it clear that a new relationship was dependent upon the supply of Chieftains. 
British-Libyan relations broke down completely, British training missions were 
abandoned, and arms contracts and economic interests were all lost as a result of Tripoli 
turning increasingly to Arab Nationalist ideology while the strategic environment of 
the region moved further against the West. 
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Analysis of the data for the period covered by this thesis has shown that the 
deterioration in relations between the two countries did not come suddenly, and that 
Libyan hostilities against British interests in Libya and in the region were not only the 
result of the political transition in Libya after September 1969. It was a direct result of 
the failure of negotiations between the parties on outstanding issues, as well as the 
failure to find a common formula to build new relationships after 1969. (see chapter 
2). Data analysis also shows that, although relations were deteriorating, the British were 
keen to maintain their economic interests in Libya, and their decisions were mostly 
driven by this before 1976 at least. British documents clearly indicate that despite 
Britain’s relative success in increasing business with Libya, especially after 1975, up 
to 1979 it failed to prevent the rapprochement of Libya with the Soviet Union. This 
was a direct result of Gaddafi’s fears about Egypt and the US presence in Egypt, 
especially after 1976. pp. 194-208. Also, Britain failed to control Gaddafi, at least to 
follow a balanced policy to a minimum that was acceptable to Britain. British internal 
documents cited here repeatedly suggest that FCO officials over-estimated their ability 
to ‘manage’ Gaddafi and underestimated the real radicalism of his policies, but that 
they also missed important signals where some kind of deal might have become 
possible, despite the unreliability of the Tripoli government.784 
Successful analysis of a large number of key texts shows the failure of attempts to reach 
agreement. This was due to in large part to the dispute over arms contracts, namely 
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about the Chieftain tanks, linking British government delivery of the tanks to Libya’s 
position in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as the Libyan nationalist position and its 
hostility towards Israel. The new Libyan orientations, which the British government 
felt threatened its interests (surely rightly), related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and 
ultimately led to cancellation of the tank contract. Pp. 45-53 and 81-86. 
The FCO and MOD, supported the delivery of Chieftains to Libya, as there had been 
an existing contract with Libya. This would also secure British arms trade, keep the 
Soviet Union out of Libya, and maintain British influence in the country. For these 
reasons, two memoranda presented by the FCO and supported by the MOD (OPD (69) 
48, 3 October 1969 and OPD (69) 58, 31 October 1969 recommended the delivery of 
Chieftains to Libya.785 Other ministers in the Cabinet, including Wilson, had different 
views. This created a division on whether to supply the tanks to Libya or not, and also 
whether to supply them to Israel if the government agreed to supply them to Libya. 
However, this would put British interests in the Arab world at risk. Later the Cabinet 
made a decision not to supply the Chieftains to either Libya and Israel. The British 
made an offer to postpone the delivery of the Chieftains and supply other tanks. This 
offer was rejected by Libya; the negotiation came to a dead end, and the Chieftains 
contract was terminated. pp. 64-68.  
In conclusion, it is obvious that Libyan dissatisfaction over the settlement of the dispute 
(outstanding issues) and the British rejection of Libyan entitlement to these demands, 
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despite acceptance of the need to find a solution to these problems, led to negative 
British-Libyan relations as a whole. The question that can be raised here is, was there 
an element of British bad faith, in the management of these relations? The answer 
probably ‘no’, The British were not conspiring against the Libyan government, but 
their mistakes and misperceptions, and failures to pay attention to detail, often meant 
that they seemed to be deliberately misleading the Tripoli government, and that further 
encouraged a suspicion of bad faith in the Libyan government which already existed. 
The consequences of the failure of the two parties in resolving their outstanding issues 
can be clearly seen in subsequent years through Libyan hostility towards British 
interests in Libya and in the region as a whole. (see chapter 3, 4 and 5). A large number 
of British documents show this, and record British expectations of Libya’s hostile 
moves against British interests if negotiation over outstanding issues failed.786 (see 
Chapter 3, 4 and 5). This argument stands whether or not the differences between the 
two were actually capable of resolution: neither got close enough to finding that out.  
After the termination of the Chieftains contract and the breakdown of negotiations over 
the BAC contract, the Libyans seemed to come to the conclusion that they would never 
receive satisfaction over their claims, besides which they had poor experience in 
negotiating and solving such problems.787 Each of the disputes (nationalisation of BP, 
Libyan support for the IRA, the Libyan-Soviet rapprochement and Libyan foreign 
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policy opposition to the British) affected British-Libyan relations as a whole through 
the 1970s. In addition, the failure of the negotiations shows how the two countries 
became opposed to each other in the Mediterranean and Africa in relation to third 
parties as well as in direct exchanges.  
Records of the British-Libyan relationship clearly point out that the issue of BP asset 
nationalisation in Libya worsened the relationship between the two during the period 
from December 1971 to November 1974, when Libya then agreed to pay compensation 
to BP. The evidence suggests that BP assets were nationalised as a result of the failure 
of negotiations over the outstanding issues. The British government suspended all of 
its negotiations with Libya, and withdrew its offer to settle the outstanding issues. This 
continued to be the case until a settlement was reached between the Libyan government 
and BP in November 1974. The FCO, expecting Libyan action against BP and Shell, 
warned about this, but failed to secure British oil interests. The records of the FCO and 
the oil department clearly show the lack of the British government’s support to BP and 
Shell: they cared enough about the dispute over the outstanding issues to risk oil 
company assets but not enough to resolve the issues. The FCO and the oil department 
both admitted that there was a little influence to exert on the Libyans to protect oil 
companies by that time. Oil department records indicate this fact, noting: 
We have in the main left the two British companies to take their own decisions […] our part 
has mainly been confined to giving diplomatic support when required [….] There seems in 
fact to be little influence we could exert on the Libyans to protect Shell and BP.788   
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In addition, this study succeeds in proving that the Libyan nationalisation of BP assets 
in Libya was mainly due to the Libyan desire to control its oil sector and end foreign 
companies’ control of the field, as well as to take revenge for its failure to obtain a 
satisfactory settlement of the outstanding claims. The nationalisation of BP was not a 
result of the British handing over the UAE islands to Iran. It also proves that the 
nationalisation and the suspension of outstanding issues negotiations reinforced poor 
British-Libyan relationship for more than three years. pp. 136-146. 
From June 1972 to 1979 the IRA matter was the subject of tension between Britain and 
Libya. British documents related to Libyan support for the IRA are limited, and do not 
clearly indicate the reason behind this support –nor could they be expected to do so. 
However, through the available documents some suggested conclusions can be drawn: 
that Libyan support for the IRA was also a result of the collapse of negotiations over 
the outstanding issues and Britain’s refusal to continue negotiations after the 
nationalisation of BP. There is not much evidence to support this, however: Gaddafi 
and Jollud offered many times to settle the IRA issue if Britain agreed to settle the 
outstanding matters, but this may at least sometimes have been disingenuous. All the 
same, this conclusion contradicts previous studies which indicate that support was 
ideologically driven by Gaddafi’s principle of supporting liberation movements.789 
Another fact that can be highlighted here is that, the signals that Gaddafi and Jallud 
sent to the British government regarding to the problem of outstanding issues and the 
issue of supporting the IRA indicate that Gaddafi's support for the IRA was not related 
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to his ideological principles, as much as it was quite likely a bargain, to settle the 
Libyan claim. However, the two governments appeared to disagree about the issues 
that were possibly negotiable. pp. 227-231. To conclude, the issue of Libyan support 
for the IRA is very complex, and still lacks detailed information because absence of 
intelligence data. Even a more recent study by Andrew (2013) has failed to address 
such limitation as it provided very little about this issue.790    
 The document analysis of Libyan support for the IRA shows how this issue is 
complicated and difficult to investigate. However, it highlights some conclusions. First, 
it is a fact that Libya announced its support for the IRA, although limited data show it 
is hard to conclude how far that support went.791 Second, the declaration of Libya’s 
support for the IRA created great difficulty for the British government in defending 
any settlement with Libya in Parliament or the press that would recognise Libyan 
claims.792 Third, linking the British government to the settlement of outstanding issues, 
renouncing all forms of Libyan support to the IRA, including moral and verbal support, 
with the intention that Britain would not pay any sums of money on the settlement of 
Libyan claims, despite its significant success in reducing Libyan support for the IRA, 
added further delayed the solution. 793  Fourth, it is quite likely that delaying the 
settlement of the Libyan claims was behind Gaddafi’s maintenance of limited support 
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for the IRA during the second half of the 1970s, together with a lack of trust between 
both about their intentions or their ability to maintain their own security against UK 
agencies.794 Fifth, lack of confidence in the British government in Gaddafi’s promises 
and guarantees to withdraw all of his support for the IRA was important alongside the 
dispute itself.795 Although the FCO successfully limited Gaddafi’s support to the IRA 
later in the 1970s, they failed to persuade him to abandon all kind of support for the 
IRA. Linking the solution of both issues (the IRA and the outstanding issues) did not 
help resolve any of these problems. It only delayed hostile Libyan action against British 
trade interests. Therefore, the policy of the FCO in solving both of these problems 
failed; they were to benefit from the improving trade, but not resolve general 
outstanding issues. 
British documents indicate that Gaddafi’s coming to power promoted British fears that 
Libya would turn to a pro-Soviet posture, particularly after Jallud’s visit to Moscow in 
1972. However, this study suggests that the visit was mainly for military and economic 
purposes short of all-out cooperation. There was concern that in the event of a collapse 
in British-Libyan relations, especially in the field of supplying weapons, Libya would 
head for the Soviet Union to obtain weapons, and that this would establish the 
beginning of a Libyan-Soviet relationship which could threaten British and Western 
interests in the Mediterranean. The British officials under-estimated the continuing 
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distrust between Moscow and Tripoli, which limited the scope of their cooperation. 
They sought to prevent Soviet arms provision in exchange for bases, but had few means 
to promote this given the refusal to supply arms from the UK. 
However the British records of Libyan-Soviet relations show that they were quite 
optimistic that relations would not get to the point where they would threaten Western 
and British interests in Libya and the Mediterranean. This British view was due to 
ideological differences between the two countries, and Gaddafi’s criticism of the 
policies of the Soviet Union throughout the beginning of the 1970s. However, this 
optimism was sometimes logical, and sometimes not. According to the British National 
Archives, throughout the period from Jallud’s visit to Moscow in 1972 to Gaddafi’s 
visit to Moscow in 1976, it was not proven that the relationship between the two 
countries had reached a stage of strategic cooperation that threatened the interests of 
Britain, America and the West. There were no Soviet bases in Libya, and Gaddafi 
continued to criticise Soviet policy in the region. But on the arms trade, Britain was 
less successful. British refusal to supply the Chieftain tanks led Libya to turn to the T54 
Soviet tanks. Later, Britain lost most of its arms contracts apart from small ones, while 
the USSR became the main supplier of Libyan arms. 
This study also shows that after Gaddafi’s visit to the Soviet Union, and despite 
continuing ideological and political differences such as the position of Libya on the 
Geneva Conference, Libya became closer to the Soviet Union because of its growing 
fears about Egypt and the US presence there. However, this study shows that, although 
Libyan-Soviet cooperation did not greatly threaten Western strategic interest in the 
283 
 
region, the British loss in the arms trade field was huge. This brought the British project 
of developing an arms trade with Libya for the benefit of the British economy (1968) 
to an end, losing substantial sums for the British economy into the 1970s.  
British records show that mistrust of Gaddafi in London was the main obstacle to future 
negotiations. Since the early 1970s, the British considered Libyan foreign policy hostile 
to them, as well as unpredictable and unacceptable. Many times Gaddafi publicly 
announced his hostility to Israel and his willingness to be part of any war against Israel. 
This reflected badly on the British decision about British arms deals with Libya such 
as the Chieftain tanks deal. Records indicate a clear contradiction between what 
Gaddafi and other Libyan politicians were saying to the British during negotiations, 
and what Gaddafi was publicly declaring. This led to a lot of confusion, and showed 
how the Libyan government’s lack of experience affected its ability at that time to solve 
its problems. This, in turn, soured British government decisions towards Libyan policy. 
pp. 195-103 and pp. 90-94. The best example of this can be shown in what Gaddafi 
was publicly saying about the IRA, and what he was discussing with the British 
ambassador privately.  
Furthermore, documentary analysis shows that British decisions were affected by 
reports coming from Libya regarding domestic events there. The British were hoping 
that the Gaddafi regime would collapse during the coup of 1975, and there were 
demonstrations, especially in the ranks of Libyan university students, throughout 1975 
and 1976. We currently have no way of knowing if these had any backing from British 
or US agencies. A decision was made to delay talks with Tripoli and to steer 
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negotiations to different subjects, hoping that the regime would collapse internally. 
However, this did not occur. Another conclusion is that from 1976 to 1979, the British 
government completely lost trust in the Libyans, and a decision was made to save 
Britain’s growing trade there, showing goodwill in talking to the Libyans, but not 
engaging in any serious negotiations that would lead to paying Libya any amount of 
money to settle the outstanding issues. Relations were kept at a low level, avoiding 
normalising the relationship.  
In 1974, and in response to the request of Gaddafi to turn a new page in British-Libyan 
relations, the British government insisted that the basis of any normalisation of political 
relations must be based on abandoning Gaddafi’s illusions about Zionist control in the 
United Kingdom, and on stopping supporting terrorists in Ireland.796 The gap between 
the British and Gaddafi was very large. There was indeed a feeling among British 
officials that the UK could not have normal relations with Libya as long as Gaddafi 
was in power. However, at the beginning of 1975, a belief grew amongst the British 
government that Gaddafi was serious in turning a new page in British-Libyan relations. 
Mr. Muir from FCO argued that Gaddafi had been sending messages to the British 
government for a long time, since 1973, that he wanted to improve relations; he had 
previously made it clear that opening a new page in the British-Libyan relationship 
must be on the condition that the UK settle Libya’s claims.797 But there was a fear in 
trusting Gaddafi's approach.  Muir said that however, he [Gaddafi] is erratic and his 
position shifts from one day to another he is consistent in his long term aims’.798  
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Gaddafi’s initiative was interesting to the British government from a number of points 
of view: 
• Gaddafi was on his own and apparently at pains that word of his talk with Mr 
Murray should not get out or back to his colleagues. 
• He stressed the seriousness of his approach and the fact that he was giving an 
official view, which he wanted conveyed to HMG. 
• He emphasised his wish for good relations with us and did not make any prior 
conditions. He did not mention the claims issue and said that he regarded the Irish issue 
as the only matter on which there seemed to be differences between us.799  
From the viewpoint of the British government, Gaddafi was in necessary need of 
improving his foreign affairs image, as well as moving Libyan foreign policy forward. 
This was because of several factors: 
• He still felt isolated: the squabble with Egypt would have increased this feeling. 
• He wanted better press in the UK. A declaration by HMG that relations with 
Libya were improved would enable him to win a point over Sadat. 
• He wanted British firms to bid for Libyan military and civilian contracts (there 
is evidence that a number of Libyan organisations were seeking bids from British 
firms).800 
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However, the British government had no intention to normalise relations with Gaddafi's 
government for several reasons. In a letter from Mr. Craig, North Africa Department 
to the British Ambassador in Tripoli, he said ‘For Gaddafi the objective in sending 
Jallud here to resolve the claims issue it to win a point which has so far eluded him [....] 
We (the British government) have no interest in helping them towards these goals; it 
would help their regime and would cause us difficulty in Parliament’.801  
Indeed, the changes of British government in 1970 and 1974 did not bring much change 
to the British policy towards Libya. British government had no intention of paying any 
money for the settlement of outstanding issues, and insisted Gaddafi to abandon all 
forms of support to the IRA.  
Mr. Craig added that first any settlement with the Libyans would include payment of 
an amount of money; the British government had no intention of agreeing to any Libyan 
demand for the settlement of outstanding issues.802  Second any settlement with Libya 
would put the Secretary of State and other FCO ministers under strong attack in the 
House of Commons. 'Both sides of the House would challenge the justification and the 
need for any payment to Libya'.803 However, the British wanted to maintain a level of 
trade which had improved in recent years, and at the same time keep the relations at a 
low level. Therefore, the immediate British government’s objective was to keep the 
Libyans talking, and try to steer the discussions into other fields away from the claims 
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issue.804At the same time, they wanted the following: Not to pay the Libyans any 
money; dropping of the boycott; satisfaction over the IRA (a difficult one ideologically 
for Gaddafi); settlement of as many of the other issues as possible and assurances of 
Libyan goodwill in negotiating with BP and Shell.805  
For the British government it was difficult if not impossible to justify any 
rapprochement or normalising of relations with Libya to the public, because of 
Gaddafi’s speeches and acts against the British government and British interests. These 
actions helped stop British and Libyan negotiations from resolving the outstanding 
issues and establishing normal political relations between the two countries.806  For 
example, in December 1971 the British government suspended its negotiations with 
Libya to resolve the outstanding issues, which were not resumed until early 1975 when 
Libya paid compensation to BP. In June 1972, further deterioration in relations 
occurred because of Gaddafi's announcement to support the IRA. The British 
government stopped all its negotiations with Libya to sell weapons and military 
equipments until Libya withdrew all its support from the IRA and gave definite 
guarantees to this effect. Gaddafi’s declaration to support the IRA had expanded the 
gap between the two governments, and led significantly to a rift in British-Libyan 
relations. It also led to the creation of a climate of mistrust on the British side of any 
political normalisation with Gaddafi's government. 
British reports in 1975 say that despite Gaddafi's attempts to improve his image in the 
field of foreign policy because of internal and external isolation, this did not have the 
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effect of making Gaddafi any more reasonable or tractable on foreign policy issues of 
importance to the British government. ‘His capacity and inclination to make trouble in 
the Middle East and the Maghreb appear to be undiminished; he continues to declare 
support for the IRA; he appears to have become more deeply involved with the East 
European and Soviet camp at the same time to be losing interest in Western Europe'.807   
Events which took place in Libya in 1976 showed how the relations between the two 
countries were fragile, as it left mistrust, misunderstanding and the expansion gap in 
relations. Gaddafi accused the British government of standing behind and supporting 
student demonstrations against him at home and abroad. However, no proof was given 
by the Libyans to show that Britain was behind these events.   
In 1976, student demonstrations broke out against Gaddafi in Tripoli and Benghazi, 
and then expanded to include the Libyan students in many capitals around the world; 
the largest were in London and Cairo. In his speech at the national congress of the Arab 
Socialist Union, Colonel Gaddafi claimed that Britain and Egypt were behind the 
student demonstrations.808  Gaddafi said that 'Libyan students in Cairo, London and 
other reactionary capitals. These had been instigated by the intelligence organisations 
in Cairo and London'.809 Gaddafi also added that 'Instead of demonstrating, the Libyan 
students should have been proud that Great Britain was begging Libya to take its hand 
off Ireland'.810  
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The British government strongly rejected this claim, and considered Gaddafi’s 
accusation as unreasonable charges. In addition Britain expressed its deep concern over 
Gaddafi’s remark about Northern Ireland.811  
All Gaddafi’s attempts since late 1973 to improve and normalise his relations with the 
UK did not succeed. Another event increased tension in diplomatic relations between 
the two countries. In March 1976, a Libyan official, Al-Hadi Ahmad Jallud was 
arrested by the British authorities at Heathrow airport. The Libyan government claimed 
that Al-Hadi was arrested by six British intelligence officers and one Egyptian 
intelligence officer. He was interrogated for nine hours, insulted and sworn at. 'Some 
of these insults were damaging to the Libyan leadership'. The Libyan government 
strongly protested and requested a formal apology from the British government, 
otherwise from its side Libya would be compelled to apply the principle of 
reciprocity.812 The British government strongly denied the Libyan allegations, and said 
that Mr. Al-Hadi was not subjected to ill-treatment, and had not been interrogated for 
nine hours, it was only an hour and a half.813 Mr. Al-Hadi had before this time entered 
the British territory in February, accompanied by two Libyan men Majors Bibai and 
Hijazi who were known to the British government to be Libyan intelligence officers.814 
Major Hijazi was subsequently arrested in Tunis for his connection with some 
intelligence activities.815   
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At the same time when Gaddafi was attempting to improve his relationship with 
Britain, the British government had some strong reports suggesting that the Libyan 
government was planning to carry out some terrorist acts against some of the Libyan 
dissidents who were in the United Kingdom. The reports were to indicate that the 
Libyan government was preparing to abduct some of those opponents.816   
No change to the British-Libyan relations concerning full normalisation of relations 
between the two countries occurred. The events of the student demonstrations in Libya 
in early 1976, the arrest of some Libyan intelligence officers in London, and then some 
British intelligence reports, which refer to the planning of acts of terrorism on British 
territory against Libyan dissidents. These incidents showed how far the relations were 
fragile. All of these events were not to make it impossible to improve relations between 
the two countries, or to speed up any rapprochement towards the normalisation of 
political relations. By 1977 the British government was still considering Gaddafi's 
foreign policy as hostile to British interests. According to the British this was because 
of Gaddafi's desire to pursue his more radical objectives.817 In 1978 it seemed that 
Gaddafi was not satisfied with the progress toward the normalisation of British-Libyan 
relations. Through the British Ambassador in Libya, Gaddafi made an offer to the 
British government by saying that Libya wished to ‘make the United Kingdom the 
favoured vehicle for its relations with Europe and (sic) America’. Gaddafi added that 
it would be advantageous for both sides first to remove the financial claims issue out 
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of the way.818 Gaddafi went on to say that 'We [the British and Libya] might jointly 
prepare a document or declaration satisfactory to the UK while respecting Libyan views 
on liberty'.819 The British government did not reject Gaddafi's offer in full. There was 
full agreement in the British government, that it must push Gaddafi as much as possible 
to withdraw all kinds of support from the IRA. However, his offer to make Britain 
Libya's vehicle for relations with the United States and Europe was not accepted.820 
The British Ambassador said that 'in the context of Libya’s international policies it is 
hard to see much substance in better relations with Libya; and whether we should want 
to be the vehicle for Libya’s relations with the US and Europe – whether that means – 
must be doubtful'.821  
The foregoing is clear that Libyan foreign policy throughout the period of the 1970s 
would never be acceptable to Britain. The principle of supporting the liberation 
movements that Gaddafi adopted and was calling for had made Libya's foreign policy 
considered as a policy of violence and a call for terrorism. In addition Gaddafi's foreign 
policy was considered in many cases, as an intervention in some countries’ affairs, as 
was the case in support of the IRA, which was strongly rejected by the British 
government and considered interference in the internal affairs of the UK. Therefore, it 
can be argued that the relationship between the two countries, politically and 
diplomatically had not seen any rapprochement which would lead to full normalisation 
of the relations of both countries. Despite all this, the relations between the two 
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countries were not cut off completely, but Britain kept a low level of relations with 
Libya, to benefit from trade with Libya as much as it could. 
It also seems clear that the British were not confident in the policies of Gaddafi or any 
guarantee that could be offered by Gaddafi as a good intention. In addition to Britain, 
it had seen in the acceptance of any normalisation with Gaddafi that Britain would find 
itself forced to make a satisfactory settlement to Libya on the outstanding financial 
issue between the two countries, which was rejected by the British for the reasons 
already mentioned above. Thus, Britain acted not to cut political ties with Libya and at 
the same time not to pay any sums of money to settle outstanding financial matters. 
Moreover, it was considered by the British politicians that any agreement with Libya 
would lead to normalised relations and paying money to settle the outstanding issues, 
would lead to a heavy attack on the parliament.822 In relation to the Libyan support to 
the IRA, the FCO said ‘Colonel Gaddafi’s assurances on Northern Ireland do not yet 
seem sufficiently explicit to be used with the British public and Parliament in 
explaining our reasons for accepting a financial settlement. The available terms for 
such a settlement are still far from clear’.823 
To conclude, this study surely indicates that the damage to the relationship between the 
two countries after 1969 was economic on the British side due to: Britain’s huge oil 
interests in Libya (25% of British oil came from there), the growing arms trade, and 
Libya being the second largest British market after Saudi Arabia in a period in which 
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the British economy was suffering. Thus, the damage in relation to this was 
undoubtedly very large. British records clearly show that the British relationship with 
Libya during the 1970s, despite their disputes, was driven up and down, mainly for 
economic purposes. Even during the tension over the IRA, the British were negotiating 
arms deals with Libya, but not the arms that could have been used by the IRA.  
This study reliably points out that after British withdrawal from the East of the Suez, 
Libya was not a great location for British strategic involvement, taking into account 
that since then, Britain has been a member of NATO. (Blackwell 2003) argued that ‘In 
the context of overall British strategy in the Middle East, the importance of Libya to 
London was heightened following the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement in 
1954. This resolved the ongoing dispute between London and Cairo over the presence 
of British forces in the Suez Canal military base system that had be devilled London's 
plans for a regional defence system since 1945’. Blackwell added that ‘with regard to 
a rapid withdrawal from Libya became moderated by the pressing requirements for 
cost-cutting and military redeployment that accompanied the drafting of the 1957 
defence White Paper. In February Macmillan and his Minister of Defence, Duncan 
Sandys, privately agreed that a total British withdrawal from Libya had to be 
considered’. Later (Straw 2011) discussed the British withdraw from the East of Suez 
and its consequences on the British facilities in Libya. He indicates that: 
From 1965 to 1967 the Labour Government pursued reductions in defence expenditure and 
withdrawal from the Libyan facilities, as envisaged by the January 1965 Anglo-Libyan 
Review, was incorporated into the 1966 Defence Review. The Libyan cuts were part of a 
general reduction of forces in the Mediterranean which serviced the East of Suez defence 
strategy and which the Libyan facilities played a diminishing role in. However, the military 
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presence remained important to British interests. They served a limited strategic role and 
enabled the British to maintain their defence commitment to Libya.824 
Straw also wrote that by 1968, Libya’s strategic role in Britain’s East of Suez 
commitments was obsolete. The East of Suez strategy itself was to be formally ended 
in that year when further cuts in defence spending were necessary.825 
It is also clear that there was no strategic or political shift in Libyan-Soviet cooperation. 
Part of the British arms trade losses was to the benefit of the Soviet Union, which means 
that the damage was economic not strategic. The Libyan-Soviet relationship during the 
1970s did not act as a major source of dispute between the Libya and the UK.  
In short, with the passage of time, it became clear that the dispute between Britain and 
the Gaddafi regime had exceeded the issue of conflict of interests and differing 
ideologies to a real crisis of confidence, as the British government never trusted 
Gaddafi. In other words, the long history of disputes between the two countries (1969-
1975) over the outstanding issues (inflexibility of Libya over the negotiation of these 
issues, BP nationalisation and Libyan support for the IRA) created an atmosphere of 
distrust between the two sides. As one senior Foreign Office member state: ‘I have 
concluded after very careful consideration that, whether we reach a settlement or not, 
it is very doubtful that shall ever have good political relations with Gaddafi and the 
RCC'.826 
                                                 
824 Straw, S., Anglo Libyan relations and the British military facilities 1964-1970, p 200 
825 Ibid, p 200 
826 TNA, FCO 39/1111, Libya/BP: Anglo/Libyan relations, letter from Peter Tripp to A D Parsons GMH 
MVO MC, FCO, 16 February 1972 
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Therefore, there was a strong belief that as long as Gaddafi remained in power, there 
would be no future for good relations between the two countries. Differences in 
political ideologies were one of the main reasons for the widening gap between the two 
parties, particularly with regard to the Palestinian cause. Thus, whenever and almost 
wherever the British government pursued a policy contrary to Gaddafi's slogans, 
British interests were vulnerable to Libyan reprisals, Tripp said.827 Thus, it could not 
predict what Gaddafi might do. Tripp wrote that:  
Even if HMG were to pay £25 million or even £48 million, they would remain vulnerable to 
attacks their Middle East, Mediterranean, African (e.g. Rhodesian) policies[...]If he felt 
himself provoked by HMG’s policy concerning anything which he saw as his concern – and 
this, as we know, could be almost anything.828 
By the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980, it seemed that Gaddafi lost hope of 
settling his outstanding issues, and obtaining any normal relationship with Britain. A 
sign of a new crisis in British-Libyan relations began to show in relation to the amount 
of Libyan political refugees in Britain. In November 1979, Major Jalloud informed the 
British Ambassador in Tripoli, Mr Williams, that Libya was deeply concerned by the 
acts of some Libyans who were hostile to the regime in Tripoli. Jalloud referred 
particularly to twelve Libyans who were living in the UK, who he said were carrying 
out unfriendly activities against Gaddafi’s regime:829  
The Libyan leadership wanted these twelve[…]extradited to Libya, as a minimum, that they 
should be ejected from Britain: if not, would HMG like to see an IRA office opened in 
Tripoli?830 The IRA was only illustrative that, just as we [the British] four years ago had said 
that Libyan relations with the IRA were damaging to our relations, so now the Libyans wished 
                                                 
827 Ibid 
828 Ibid 
829 TNA, FCO 87/948, Anglo-Libyan relations, letter from Williams to FCO, 26 November 1979  
830 Ibid 
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to warn that harbouring the twelve and permitting them to carry out anti-Libyan government 
activities was also harmful to these relations.831  
In the early 1980s, Gaddafi gave orders to his intelligence services to assassinate 
dissidents abroad, particularly those who were in Britain.832 On April 1980, Gaddafi 
asked the Libyans who were living abroad to return home immediately. He said that: 
The Libyans abroad should go immediately to Libyan People's Bureaus (diplomatic missions) 
which would facilitate their return home as the final and only chance of saving 
themselves[…]either these people return to the Jamahiriya republic or they are doomed 
wherever they might be. Let all be warned. And those who do not take heed of this warning 
have only themselves to blame.833   
It did not take a long time until Gaddafi carried out his threat. On April 11th 1980, Mr 
Muhammad Ramadan, a Libyan journalist was shot in the Central Mosque in Regent's 
Park. On the 25th of the same month, Mr Mahmoud Abbu Nafa was shot dead at his 
office in Kensington.834 These two Libyans were killed by three Libyan intelligence 
agents, Ben Hasan Muhammad El-Masri, Magib Musta Gasmi and Muhammad Al-
Giddal.835 In June, Musa Kusa, Secretary of the Libyan People's Bureau in London told 
The Times that a decision was taken to murder two more opponents of the Gaddafi 
regime. The decision had been taken by revolutionary committees meeting in 
Britain.836  Kusa went on to say that: 'Libyan revolutionaries may start to cooperate 
                                                 
831 Ibid 
832 Andrew, C., British official perceptions of Muammar Gaddafi, 1969-2011 in: Freedman, L., and 
Michaels J H., Scripting Middle East Leaders: The Impact of Leadership Perceptions on U.S and UK 
foreign policy, Bloomsbury Academic, (London, 2012); Pal, G., Gaddafi Up-Close, Booktango, The 
(United States, 2012), p. 15; Burleigh, M., Up to his eyeballs in murder Gaddafi's fingernail-puller-in-
chief, The Daily Mail, 4 April (2011), at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1372166/Libyas-
Musa-Kusa-Gaddafis-fingernail-puller-chief-eyeballs-murder.html  
833 Knipe, M., Col Gaddafi tells exiles to return or be killed, The Times, Apr 28, 1980 
834 Ibid 
835 Tendler, S., Libyan killer squad waited two months, The Times, Sep 17, 1980 
836 Tendler, S., Ford, R., Horsnell M., and Gibb, F., Head of Libyan mission is expelled after death 
threats, The Times, Jun 14, 1980 
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with the IRA if the British government continues to support Libyans now in hiding in 
Britain'.837  
On June 13, the British government expelled Libya's chief representative in Britain, 
Musa Kusa, as a result of him telling The Times that two more Libyan exiles were to 
be killed in Britain.838 Three other members of the Libyan diplomatic mission were 
ordered to leave the United Kingdom. The British government said they were involved 
in activities which were incompatible with their functions. 839  In response to the 
expulsion of four Libyan diplomats, Libya expelled three British diplomats and 17 
other British subjects. 840  On 16th September 1980, the three Libyan agents were 
sentenced to life for murdering the two Libyan dissidents in London.841 These events 
clearly led to further deterioration in British-Libyan relations in the early 1980s, 
showing how fragile the relationship between the two countries had been throughout 
the 1970s. 
In conclusion, it may be helpful at this point to remind the reader of the overall story 
of the preceding analysis and explanation. 
The thesis explores the details in the documentation before drawing the main threads 
together in the concluding chapter. But although the following chapters are dominated 
by detail, it may also be useful for the reader to have a sense of the overarching 
                                                 
837 Horsnell, M., Gaddafi men sentence to death two Libyan exiles in London, The Times, Jun 13, 1980 
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narrative before it is spelled out, to see the wood for the trees. Therefore, looking ahead 
to the conclusions once the research has been completed, and to signal the main core 
narrative which emerges from it, the main themes of the thesis which unify it beyond 
the detail, can be summarised in the following argument. First of all, differences of 
both interests and perceptions emerge in every chapter. Secondly, the differences 
within the UK government, and differences at different levels within it, (such as the 
FCO, Department of Trade and Industry, junior ministers, various foreign secretaries, 
and full cabinet) reflect bureaucratic politics, variations in experience, and varied 
overall perspectives on Libya, as well as divisions aver the best definition of interests 
and the best means to achieve them. Thirdly, there were long running disputes between 
Tripoli and London over both arms sales and arms supplies to Ireland which, although 
they were not only about misperceptions and mismanagement, clearly did on the 
evidence result in part from those factors as well as from hard interests. Furthermore, 
if there were differences and divisions on the British side, perhaps less surprisingly 
given the large and complex machinery of foreign policy making there, it is also evident 
that there were disagreements and changes of mind within the Libyan policy making 
machinery, notwithstanding the dominant role that President Gaddafi occupied. 
Gaddafi was not consistent in his own views, and did not communicate (or did not 
allow his subordinates to communicate) clearly to the other side what he considered 
core interests and negotiable issues. Thus both sides contributed by their words and 
actions to the misperceptions and misreadings of the other. More succinctly, Anglo-
Libyan relations reflect long term conflicts of real interest including those derived from 
historical experience and perceptions, but all the same the dynamics of their 
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relationship cannot be explained solely in terms of that legacy or those interests. The 
role of individuals and bureaucratic structures and bureaucratic disagreements on both 
sides was a significant factor. Both sides misunderstood and misread the other quite 
often, and both side over-estimated their ability to shape the situation or change the 
thinking of the other. 
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